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Chapter 1
Introduction

Introduction
What induces people to devote their active working life to the care of patients 
who are seriously ill with a life-threatening condition which is usually go-
ing to kill them? Why do professional carers want a career in palliative care? 
What motivates them and what sort of qualities do they need to be good at 
providing such care? How should they relate to their patients? In this thesis 
it is taken as given that health care professionals who are involved in pallia-
tive care on a daily basis act – implicitly or explicitly – from a specific moral 
attitude. This moral attitude – which is defined in general terms as ‘the mo-
tivation and commitment to act in the interest of other people’1 – of profes-
sional palliative caregivers is the subject of this thesis. The moral attitude 
will be explored from various ethical angles, on the basis of empirical data 
that have been collected in several palliative care settings. The thesis includes 
discussion of how this specific moral attitude can be maintained and further 
developed while working in palliative care. In order to be more specific about 
the objectives of the study, we now describe the environment in which these 
questions arise. We define palliative care, the patients that receive such care, 
and the carers that provide it.
Palliative care
The emergence of modern palliative care as a specific field of care can best 
be understood as part of the general history of care, which cannot be de-
tached from its societal context.2 Four aspects of medicine and society have 
contributed to the growth of palliative care in Western countries.3 First, medi-
cal technology has increasingly blurred the line between life and death, which 
evoked a search for more comfortable alternatives to an increasingly tech-
nological and invasive medical environment. Second, a lack of attention to 
symptom control in medical education and practice has produced a narrow 
focus on the pathophysiology and cure of disease rather than on the experi-
ences of the patient. Unfortunately, suffering is not merely physical, but can 
3
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also be social, psychological and existential. Third, the loss of community ties 
and the reduction of the extended family to a more isolated nuclear family 
leads people to turn to professionals for support in the emotionally loaded 
task of caring for a seriously ill family member. Fourth, strained and evasive 
relationships, caused by the stresses involved in dying and bereavement, fre-
quently increase loneliness and suffering at the end of life. These all make a 
philosophy of care that emphasises human contact more attractive. 
‘Palliative’ is derived from the Latin word ‘pallium’, which means cloak. 
In the past four decades, ‘pallium’ has become a symbol for the warm and 
compassionate care patients receive at their last stages of life. However, it 
would be a mistake to reduce palliative care to ‘tender loving care’ – or TLC as 
medical specialists used to abbreviate it – entailing a high level of sympathy, 
and time and inclination to sit by the bedside holding the patient’s hand.4,5 
Palliative care is much more than that as can be seen in the words of Robert 
Twycross, one of the pioneers in the field, in which the influential definition of 
the World Health Organisation (see box) can easily be recognised:
“Palliative care is patient-centered, rather than disease-focused; accepts the inevita-
bility of death while simultaneously is life-affirming; addresses psychological, social, 
and spiritual concerns as well as physical ones; and is best delivered by a multipro-
fessional team working in partnership with patients and their families. Palliative care 
stresses the importance of ‘appropriate treatment’ and the need for doctors not to 
prescribe a lingering death. Even though there is no chance of cure, there is much 
scope for psychosocial and spiritual healing, and often some scope for physical 
rehabilitation. Palliative care is emotionally demanding for professional carers, and 
strategies for personal support are necessary.”6 
Interestingly, the emergence of palliative care in the 1960s coincided with a new 
medical ethic.8 The increasing technical possibilities in medicine, their conse-
quences for the care for the dying and accompanying demographic and societal 
developments not only stimulated the growth of palliative care but were also 
crucial to the birth of modern medical ethics.8,9 The focus shifted from the pres-
ervation of life wherever technically possible to the preservation of life when 
meaningful. The ‘patient as a person’ became a central issue. As Twycross says, 
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palliative care is centred on the patient, rather than on the disease. The editors 
of the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine point out that palliative care is 
concerned with three things (p.4): the quality of life as experienced by the pa-
tient, the value that is attached to life irrespective of its (economic) contribution 
to society, and the meaning of life, where existential questions prevail.5 This 
view on the care for those who cannot be cured seems to be acknowledged by 
the results of a survey among palliative caregivers from 32 European coun-
tries.10 The survey determined that the moral notions that are deemed most im-
portant by palliative caregivers are quality of life, human dignity, acceptation 
of mortality, and total care (physical, psychosocial, and spiritual).
WHO definition of palliative care7
Palliative care is an approach which improves the quality of life of patients and 
families facing life-threatening illness, by providing pain and symptom relief, spiri-
tual and psychosocial support from diagnosis to the end of life and bereavement. 
Palliative care:
- Provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms;
- Affirms life and regards dying as a normal process;
- Intends neither to hasten nor postpone death;
- Integrates the psychosocial and spiritual aspects of patient care;
- Offers a support system to help patients live as actively as possible until death;
- Offers a support system to help the family cope during the patient’s illness and 
in their own bereavement;
- Uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their families, includ-
ing bereavement counselling, if indicated;
- Will enhance quality of life, and may also positively influence the course of illness;
- Is applicable early in the course of illness, in conjunction with other therapies 
that are intended to prolong life, such as chemotherapy or radiation therapy, and 
includes those investigations needed to better understand and manage distress-
ing clinical complications.
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Demarcation confusion
Despite the clear contrasts set out in Twycross’ description of palliative care, 
the scope of palliative care remains controversial. A first aspect of contro-
versy is the demarcation within palliative care. Is palliative care in fact ter-
minal care or does it merely involve all care for incurably ill patients? There 
are several notions in circulation that feed the confusion concerning the scope 
of palliative care: supportive care (which is a part of palliative care aiming 
at the support of patients undergoing chemotherapy), palliative medicine 
(which has a medical specialist status in the UK and “is the study and manage-
ment of patients with active, progressive, far-advanced disease, for whom the 
prognosis is limited and the focus of care is the quality of life”5), hospice care 
(which refers to a specific setting, the hospice) or terminal care (which con-
cerns care in the last part of the palliative phase when dying is inevitable).11 
Research suggests that the majority of the palliative care professionals holds 
that palliative care starts from the time of diagnosis of an incurable illness.12 
The WHO-definition supports this by emphasising that palliative care is “ap-
plicable early in the course of illness”.7 The provision of palliative care is not 
limited to the last weeks of a patient’s life. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that the ‘illness’ is not specified, which makes it wrong to consider pal-
liative care as restricted to the care of cancer patients. 
This brings us to a second aspect of the scope of palliative care, involv-
ing the demarcation between palliative care and other medical practices. Be-
sides the narrower notions of palliative care mentioned above, there exists 
the notion palliative approach.11 This term is much broader and refers to the 
philosophy of care that underlies palliative care practices. Central to this ap-
proach is dealing with (experiencing) loss and providing care for the whole 
person. Some confusion does arise because this approach is not restricted to 
the practice of palliative care; several features of the palliative approach can 
be recovered in other fields of care, i.e. paediatrics, geriatrics, nursing home 
care, home care or general practice.11 From this broad perspective the demar-
cation of palliative care is problematic; how can it be considered as separate 
from other medical practices if it is an integral part of those practices? It is 
argued that what demarcates palliative care from other medical practices is 
a specific moral dimension that is expressed in the way care is given.12,13  Pal-
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liative care requires virtuous practitioners who are able to provide emotion-
ally involved care. This moral specificity relates to the fact that at the heart 
of palliative care is the care for the quality of life of patients and their rela-
tives from a physical, psychosocial, and spiritual point of view.12 The assumed 
virtuousness and the personal involvement of health care professionals with 
palliative care are the subject of the current study, but both aspects need to 
be set in context. 
The professionals interviewed for our study work in various caring en-
vironments: a hospice, a palliative unit in a nursing home, a palliative de-
partment in a hospital, and in patients’ homes. The focus of this study is 
on the broad notion of the palliative approach as expressed in the moral at-
titude of palliative care professionals. Why do professionals find their niche 
in palliative care? Why do they chose to adopt the palliative approach? How 
should palliative care be provided? The discussion in the current study cen-
tres around these questions. It is, however, not the intention of this thesis 
to consider the palliative approach as restricted to professionals working in 
palliative care settings. The intention is rather to obtain insight in the moral 
attitude that underlies that approach. These insights can be beneficial in both 
palliative care settings and in other branches of health care where the pallia-
tive approach is practiced. The question whether or not palliative carers are 
‘morally superior’ – as sometimes is suggested – when compared with carers 
working in other medical practices is unjust, since it would imply that non-
palliative carers act from a less valued moral attitude. Care actions always 
acquire their moral significance from the moral attitude expressed by these 
care activities.14 This implies that it is undesirable to consider one health care 
worker, e.g. a hospice nurse, as morally better than another, e.g. a paediatric 
nurse. 
The starting-point of this thesis is to explore the moral attitude from 
which palliative care professionals care for their patients. As mentioned 
above, a better understanding of this moral attitude can be beneficial to other 
medical practices as well, because practicing care from a ‘whole person’ pal-
liative approach is not limited to practicing care in a palliative setting.
WHO CARES?
8
Patients in palliative care
It is argued that a limited life prospect, an expectation of continuous decline 
and a future that is characterised by the certainty of death, distinguishes pa-
tients in the palliative phase from other sick persons.11,15  The process cancer 
patients go through, for example, is marked by a series of critical events.16 
The disclosure of the original diagnosis can be taken as a first critical event. 
The knowledge of living with a life-threatening illness raises questions about 
one’s death, about suffering, et cetera. Ideally, the provision of palliative care 
should start from this moment. After treatment is started, most patients ex-
perience a curative period where they are able to resume activities from the 
time before they fell ill. The recurrence of cancer defines the beginning of a 
new palliative period. In the early stages of this period, the central issue is 
‘living with an incurable disease’. ‘Death’ is still regarded as something in the 
future. This changes in the late palliative care period of terminal care. Most 
patients experience a point at which they understand that death is imminent. 
This awareness encourages most of them to work at bringing closure to their 
lives. Fear (of death, of losing control, of social exclusion, for example) and 
hope (of a good last period, of a good death, of life after death) often go hand 
in hand during this process. 
The elements of care that may contribute to a quality end-of-life can be 
sketched roughly on the basis of a recent German study of personal values and 
patients’ individual quality of life in palliative care.17 Benevolence, self-direc-
tion, and universalism are identified as the most important personal values 
(“emotionally and cognitively relevant principles guiding people’s lives”) re-
garding the quality of life of 75 patients who suffered from advanced cancer 
or ALS. While self-direction (“independent thought and action-choosing, cre-
ating, exploring”) refers to the patients’ own life, universalism (“understand-
ing, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people”) and 
benevolence (“preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact”) express their concern with oth-
ers.17 The researchers suggest that the importance of self-direction may in-
dicate “a more active coping style” (p.158), and that palliative care patients 
“appear to seek preservation and enhancement of the welfare of friends, rela-
tives, and all people” (p.158) as well.17
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Notably self-direction and benevolence can be retrieved in four of the 
five domains that characterise quality end-of-life care from the perspective 
of patients as identified by Singer et al.18 A first, more general, domain com-
prehends ‘an adequate pain and symptom management’, without which an 
adequate quality of care in the palliative phase would be impossible. The per-
sonal value of self-direction is advanced in two domains: the patients’ de-
sire to ‘avoid inappropriate prolongation of dying’ and to ‘achieve a sense of 
control’. Patients made it clear that they preferred to die naturally and that 
they did not want to be kept alive if they could not enjoy the life they could 
live. They were afraid of a lingering death. Furthermore, patients deemed it 
important to retain control when possible and have a proxy of their choice to 
take over if they became incapable. Benevolence – the value patients attach 
to the welfare of people close to them – is expressed in two other domains: 
‘relieving the burden which their dying process imposes on loved ones’ and 
‘the strengthening of relationships with loved ones’. On the one hand, patients 
were worried about the difficulties their friends and family might experience 
with their physical care, while witnessing their death, and when involved in 
substitute decision-making. On the other hand, patients felt that the involve-
ment of loved ones in their dying process was very important. When a certain 
intimacy was achieved, patients found their relationships strengthened. Qual-
ity end-of-life care is therefore considered as a dynamic process that takes 
place among patients, families, and health care professionals, and which is 
moderated by individual values, knowledge, and preferences for care.19
While palliative care is defined by the quality of life of patients, the cur-
rent study concentrates on professional palliative caregivers. In the following 
section the environment in which these professionals provide care will be 
further specified. 
Carers in palliative care
Informal carers – like a patient’s relatives or volunteers – perhaps play a more 
emphatic role in palliative care than in other fields of care.11 Because the cur-
rent study focuses on professional carers, the role these informal carers play 
in the practice of palliative care is ignored. It is, however, important to note 
that it is not always simple to bring formal and informal carers into line. 
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Relatives, who often act as co-carers and sometimes as decision-makers, may 
also need the support of professional carers. Actually, family support is an 
explicit aim of palliative care (see WHO-definition). This can raise dilemmas 
in daily care because paying a proper attention to relatives may distract the 
carer from the patient, who should be the primary focus of palliative care.20 
Therefore professionals are required to divide their attention in a balanced 
manner. Volunteers on the other hand, should be considered as an integral 
part of palliative care giving. In daily practice however, the cooperation be-
tween voluntary and professional carers is not always trouble-free. Connect-
ing both is regarded a responsibility of the institution they are affiliated with. 
Furthermore, integration and appropriate cooperation does not only depend 
on the benevolent dedication of volunteers; it demands adjustments from pro-
fessionals as well.21
The value of teamwork is one of the strengths of palliative care.4,5,20 As is 
pointed out in Twycross’ description quoted above, palliative care is best pro-
vided by a multiprofessional team. From the patient’s perspective, the team 
comprises all those involved in their care.20 Apart from physicians, nurses and 
certified nursing assistants (cna’s), this means that informal carers and para-
medics like social workers, psychologists, physiotherapists, dieticians, and 
clergy all have to work together to provide good care. Perhaps the teamwork 
in palliative care can best be described as a dynamic ‘professional partnership’ 
since the composition of the team will vary depending on the needs of the 
patient. Team members are responsible for their own input and formal lead-
ership is not really necessary. It must be noted however, that characterising 
teamwork as ‘professional partnership’ involves a (theoretical) model reflect-
ing an ideal. In practice, cooperation and decision-making can be difficult. It 
is argued, for example, that palliative care teams’ handling of moral problems 
in practice can be much improved.22 Be that as it may, palliative care profes-
sionals do not act alone and are dependent on each other. The team bears a 
collective, multiprofessional responsibility, which is in fact the responsibility 
for the patient’s total good or overall well-being. Palliative carers attempt to 
achieve the total good of a patient by providing whole person care. 
F. Randall and R.S. Downie offer an interesting framework in which the 
commitment of palliative care professionals to provide ‘whole person care’ 
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can be examined.20 This framework provides a good starting-point for a first 
exploration of the moral attitude of palliative care professionals because it 
offers a comprehensive ethical outlook on whole person care and the role of 
caregivers who intend to provide such care. Using Randall and Downie’s out-
look as a point of departure for this thesis is the more interesting since – as 
their work is considered as an ethical companion to the Oxford textbook5 – it 
sets a standard for palliative care ethics. In the paragraphs that follow, their 
point of view will be briefly presented. This subsection will be closed with 
the orientation of the moral attitude of caregivers within the framework of 
whole person care. However, the framework will not be adopted without any 
question. In the final chapter of the thesis, Randall and Downie’s claims will 
be reviewed on the basis of the findings of the current study.
Providing whole person care
Randall and Downie argue that palliative care is an integral part of effective 
health care. They distinguish a threefold aim of health care. First, health care 
workers – including those in palliative care – will have personal aims that 
are not necessarily connected to their field of work, e.g. earning a living, job 
security or expressing idealism. These aims could easily be satisfied by other 
occupations. Second, anyone practicing health care must endorse its intrinsic 
aim, i.e. to bring about the ‘medical good’. This aim is intrinsic to palliative 
care as well. It is concerned with medical treatments as the use of drugs or 
technical procedures, which can lead for example to amelioration, relief of 
suffering or prolongation of life. A prerequisite for the success of such treat-
ments – whether they concern patients in general or palliative patients – is 
dedicated nursing care. The patient’s good is more than the patient’s medical 
good. In the third place, dealing with emotional problems or spiritual anxiet-
ies involves more than bringing about the medical good and belongs to the 
extrinsic aim of health care. “To ask about the extrinsic aim of palliative care 
is to ask about what doctors and nurses may be able to do as a result of their 
standing in the special relationships with their patients which is the condition 
of fulfilling the intrinsic aim” (p.18).20
The promotion of a patient’s emotional, relational and spiritual goods are 
extrinsic to palliative care’s primary aim to bring about the medical good. The 
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connection of these goods to this primary aim is what makes them a second 
target of health care. Randall and Downie argue that two reasons underpin 
this distinction. First, psychological, social or spiritual problems constitute 
the background or consequences of the patient’s primary problems, which are 
of a medical nature. Second, “there are no skills which professionally qualify 
a carer for dealing with […] the range and complexity of people’s emotional, 
relational, or social problems” (p.18).20 It is claimed that it is an illusion to 
consider a total professional approach consisting of medical, nursing, and 
counselling skills sufficient to deal with the broad range of human problems 
that can arise in the last stages of life-threatening illness. In other words, the 
expertise and skills required to provide the whole person care that palliative 
care aims at, cannot all be acquired by merely going on a course.
According to Randall and Downie palliative care, like other forms of 
health care, has two different components.20 Its intrinsic aim demands profes-
sional skills, which are derived from the knowledge bases of medicine, nurs-
ing, social work, psychology and allied health care professions. Dealing with 
broader human issues – the extrinsic aim of palliative care – requires practi-
cal wisdom, or phronesis as Aristotle described it. Although every person has 
this ability to some extent, it is cultivated and moulded through experience 
through the course of life. Palliative caregivers, some more than others, de-
velop this practical wisdom as a consequence of their professional experience, 
of life in general, and under the influence of their own personalities. This 
practical wisdom can assist in dealing with the relationship troubles, the re-
grets, or the anxieties that can occur in a patient’s life. Being able to deal with 
these issues is not a result of some kind of training, but has to do with the 
manner in which a treatment is given and the manner in which a professional 
approaches a patient. 
Personal involvement
Although palliative care professionals are likely to be motivated to act for the 
patient’s good, Randall and Downie argue that one should be modest about the 
range of ‘whole person care’ that can be provided.20 The professional exper-
tise in dealing with psychological, social and spiritual distress is limited; the 
practical wisdom with which the professional approaches the patient prevails 
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here. Furthermore, a palliative care team cannot bear the sole responsibil-
ity for a patient’s overall well-being, because professionals can influence the 
state of a patient only in partnership with that patient. Both carer and patient 
are actively involved. “Whole person care implies responsibility for influenc-
ing physical and mental illness states and minimizing distress from them, in 
partnership with the patient. It also implies a willingness to assist the patient 
to overcome psychological, social, and spiritual barriers to well-being, by us-
ing our relationship with them as fellow members of community” (p.24).20 
The ‘willingness to assist the patient to overcome psychological, social, and 
spiritual barriers to well-being’ means that palliative care requires a personal 
involvement of the professional. 
The relationship between patient and professional forms the basis of 
whole person care. Of course there are many factors that contribute to the 
success of that relationship, i.e. professional competence, a patient’s honesty, 
et cetera. The unequal nature of the relationship, however, makes two moral 
conditions a necessity for this relationship to meet its aim: the carer’s com-
mitment to the patient’s good and the patient’s trust in that commitment.20 
Since a patient is dependent on the carer’s knowledge, skills and resources, 
patients have little choice but to trust his carer. But, as Randall and Downie 
argue, “if patients are to be able to place this trust in their carers, then they 
must have some grounds for doing so. The best grounds for doing so are that 
the commitment to act for the patient’s total good must be part of what it 
means to be a carer” (p.39).20 This ‘ideal of beneficence’ must be more than a 
practical guiding principle for professionals; it must be intrinsic and therefore 
essential to being a carer. 
It is this ‘ideal of beneficence’, which is expressed in the moral attitude 
that is central to the current study. In the following chapters palliative carers’ 
moral attitude, defined as ‘motivation and commitment to act in the interest 
of other people’, will be explored from several ethical points of view. Profes-
sionals from four palliative care settings were interviewed in order to provide 
practical component in these ethical explorations. The concluding chapter 
will discuss the most important findings. Here, Randall and Downie’s distinc-
tion between the intrinsic and extrinsic aim of health – and palliative – care 
will be discussed as well. Although this distinction is very clear, we doubt 
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whether making such a sharp distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic 
aim and the related ‘professional skills’ and ‘phronesis’ is tenable in the light 
of the findings of the present study. 
Objectives & Outline of the thesis
The objectives of the current study can now be formulated. The first objective 
is to further explore and analyse normative views with regard to the moral 
attitude of professional caregivers in palliative care. Chapters 2-5 of this the-
sis examine the moral attitude of palliative care professionals from various 
ethical angles. The notions of professional competence, phronesis, well-be-
ing, the caring relationship, self-esteem, personal identity and professional 
identity play a central role in these chapters. Semi-structured interviews that 
were conducted with professionals from a variety of palliative care settings 
provide the link to practice.23 After this broad empirical-ethical exploration of 
the normative views of the moral attitude of palliative caregivers, the focus of 
the study is shifted. The second objective of this thesis is to explore how the 
moral attitude of care professionals can be stimulated, preserved and main-
tained. This objective will be dealt with in the chapters 6 and 7. Finally, the 
thesis concludes with a chapter that discusses the most important findings of 
the study. 
Chapter 2 examines the moral basis of professional competence in pallia-
tive care. On the basis of clinical vignettes, four dimensions (cognitive, techni-
cal, relational, affective/moral) of professional competence are discussed. It is 
argued that another dimension – ‘habits of mind’ – cannot be detached from 
these aspects of professional competence. This observation is discussed from 
the perspective of the ethics of care and virtue ethics. The notion of phronesis 
is an important element in this discussion. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on quality of life, which is one of the central val-
ues of palliative care practice. Currently, well-being is considered the main in-
dicator of quality of life. The aim of this chapter is to compare insights about 
well-being from contemporary philosophy with the practice-related opinions 
of palliative care professionals. These opinions are derived from 19 interviews 
with palliative care professionals from various settings. Two questions are 
central to the empirical part of this chapter: 1) Which aspects of well-being 
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emerge from the views the interviewed professionals have on (their contribu-
tion to) the well-being of their patients?, and 2) What does providing palliative 
care mean for the well-being of the professionals themselves? Subsequently, 
the empirical results are discussed in the light of two philosophical theories 
on well-being and the attention is shifted to a more normative question: what 
should professionals do to help these patients? It will be argued that good 
palliative care concerns not only the fulfilment of a patient’s preferences, but 
that good care also implies a professional approach that can be characterised 
as covenantal.
In chapter 4 the caring relationship between palliative care patients and 
the nurses who care for them will be further explored. A ‘sustained partner-
ship based on mutual participation’ is supposed to be the most appropriate 
characterisation of this relationship. This assumption is analysed from a spe-
cific ethical point of view using ‘the ethics of the caring conversation’, which 
is based on the ethics of Paul Ricoeur. The discussion then concentrates on 
the perspective of the palliative care professional and will explore the way 
person, role and the caring relationship are interwoven in hospice care. Two 
questions are answered: 1) What kind of person should the hospice nurse be?, 
and 2) How should the hospice nurse engage in caring conversations? A profile 
of an exemplary hospice nurse will provide the empirical input. This profile is 
based on statements derived from the analysis of interviews with five hospice 
nurses and forms the theme of the chapter. 
Chapter 5 elaborates on the preceding one and further examines the no-
tion of self-esteem in the personal and professional identity of the hospice 
nurse. The story of the exemplary hospice nurse once again serves as the 
empirical theme of the chapter. This chapter also focuses on two questions: 
1) What is self-esteem and how is it related to personal identity and its moral 
dimension?, and 2) How do self-esteem and personal identity relate to the pro-
fessional identity of the nurse? The discussion demonstrates the importance 
of the coinciding of moral and personal goals in the life of the palliative care 
nurse. 
A recent report of the European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) 
recommends the promotion of reflective practice in palliative nurse educa-
tion. Chapter 6 explores the moral attitude that professionals bring to such 
WHO CARES?
16
reflective practice from a virtue-ethical perspective. Quotations from in-
terviews with palliative care professionals provide the practical substance 
of this exploration. The chapter also explores the way this attitude can be 
maintained and further developed. The argument concentrates on the ques-
tion ‘what kind of palliative caregiver should I be?’ and the role this question 
should play in reflective practice. It will be argued that portfolio learning 
offers opportunities to make reflection on that question an integral part of 
palliative care practice. 
Chapter 7 covers the development of the moral attitude of medical stu-
dents and the role palliative care can play in developing such an attitude. It 
makes a case that incorparating palliative care into basic medical education 
will improve the balance between knowledge, skills and attitude in medical 
training. Structural integration of palliative care into medical eduction will 
transform the so called ‘hidden curriculum’ into a more governed and ex-
plicit enculturation of doctors-to-be into the medical community. Two practi-
cal means of using palliative care practice to refine medical students’ moral 
attitude are proposed. 
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis. This chapter provides a resumé of the 
thesis’ most important findings concerning the moral attitude of palliative 
care professionals on the basis of three notions: phronesis, the caring con-
versation, and the covenant of care. Then Randall and Downie’s framework 
of ‘whole person care’ is briefly evaluated in the context of this study. This 
chapter closes by advancing some suggestions for future research on moral 
attitude and professional development in palliative care. 
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Chapter 2 
Professional competence and palliative care 
An ethical perspective
Gert Olthuis 
Wim Dekkers
Abstract
The aim of this article is to explore an ethical view of professional competence 
by examining the professional competence of physicians in the context of pal-
liative care. A discussion of the four dimensions of professional competence 
– knowledge, technical skills, relationships, and affective and moral attitude 
– leads us to the conclusion that ‘habits of mind’ are important in every as-
pect of professional competence. This observation is then considered in the 
context of virtue ethics and ethics of care. Virtue ethics focuses on personal 
qualities and moral attitudes, while the ethics of care concentrates on the 
way these qualities are lived out in specific care relationships. Our conclusion 
points up the importance of education in ethics in the development of profes-
sional competence, and argues that because palliative care involves intense 
human interactions, integrating palliative care into the medical curriculum 
may improve the ethical culture of health care as a whole. 
Journal of Palliative Care 2003; 19: 192-197,
with permission of the Centre for Bioethics, Clinical Research Institute of 
Montreal, Canada

Professional competence and palliative care
An ethical perspective
Introduction
Medical professionalism and the competence of professionals is the central 
concern in recent discussions about the future of health care.1-5 These discus-
sions include very little systematic reflection on the moral aspects of profes-
sionalism from a broader ethical perspective, even though these moral aspects 
are crucial. In this paper we will use palliative care as a specific example to 
illustrate the importance of such a broader view of professional competence 
in the education of physicians. The extensive curriculum for the Education 
of Physicians in End-of-life Care (EPEC),6,7 for example, intends to equip phy-
sicians with “a core base of knowledge which, in its application, will help 
physicians to improve their competence and confidence, strengthen physi-
cian-patient relationship, and enhance personal satisfaction with end-of-life 
care”. According to the EPEC handbook, applying this knowledge in day-to-
day practice should  “push physicians to rediscover some of the core values of 
our profession”. This asserts that being a competent professional is more than 
applying the right knowledge and skills; it also means a commitment to a set 
of ‘core values’. Despite this the EPEC-curriculum does not systematically 
look at these values in a wider ethical context. Several authors do go fur-
ther and suggest that many elements of palliative care can be directly linked 
to philosophical insights.8,9 Schotsmans for instance argues: “Greater aware-
ness of these philosophical foundations therefore has considerable potential 
to enhance the ethical culture of palliative care” (p.126).8 He claims that al-
though specific expertise is a prerequisite for palliative care, “fundamentally 
one is dealing with an inter-human event, involving both the attendant and 
the dying person” (p.134).8 Schotsmans’ remarks emphasise the significance 
of a broader moral view in the education of professionals in palliative care, a 
view that goes beyond ‘a core base of knowledge’ which the EPEC handbook 
is intended to provide. 
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This article advances such a broader view of professional competence. 
Before we can examine the professional competence of physicians in the con-
text of palliative care or reflect on its moral basis, we have to go more deeply 
into ethics and professional competence and discuss palliative care’s ‘ethical 
culture’. What does it mean to say that palliative care has an ethical culture? 
Does palliative care’s ethical culture differ from the culture in other health 
care disciplines? The goals of medicine can be a useful guide. A recent re-
search project specified four goals of medicine: 1) the prevention of disease 
and injury and the promotion and maintenance of health, 2) the relief of pain 
and suffering caused by maladies, 3) the care and cure of those with a malady, 
and the care of those who cannot be cured, and 4) the avoidance of premature 
death and the pursuit of a peaceful death.10 This makes palliative care an inte-
gral part of medicine. Three of the four goals refer to palliative care: relief of 
pain and suffering, care for incurable patients, and the pursuit of a peaceful 
death. However, modern medical ideology puts an emphasis on the cure as-
pect of “care and cure”, and while there is no inherent contradiction between 
care and cure in medicine, the emphasis on cure is evident even in day-to-day 
practice and sometimes distracts from the need for care.10 Medicine conceived 
in terms of fighting illness and developing campaigns of treatment to cure 
disease devalues the caring elements of medicine, such as compassion and 
attention. 
Balancing technical intervention with a humanistic, caring approach to 
patients lies at the heart of palliative care, as it does elsewhere in medicine. 
Because palliative care deals with patients who cannot be cured, it necessar-
ily places more emphasis on care than other branches of medicine. This leads 
to a specific ethical culture that is displayed more clearly in a discipline like 
palliative care than in other parts of medicine. The increasingly technical ap-
proach to care does influence the care of dying patients and several authors 
have commented on medicalising tendencies in palliative care.11-13 A compara-
tive survey across 768 palliative care professionals in 32 European countries 
revealed out that 92% of the respondents held that medical, psychological, so-
cial and spiritual care were of equal importance within this field.14 More than 
90% of the respondents considered the following moral notions as central in 
palliative care: quality of life, human dignity, acceptance of human mortality, 
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and total care. Obviously, the ethical culture of palliative care is a subset of 
the ethical culture of medicine as a whole, and these moral notions are also 
specific ethical elements of medicine in general, but their relevance is more 
frequently and more dramatically obvious in palliative care. Practicing pallia-
tive care can enhance the quality of physicians in general because it exposes 
the physician to unusually frequent and intense human interactions illustrat-
ing these moral notions.
As in medicine in general, the goal of palliative care is the good of the 
patient.9 Palliative care aims “to enable the dying person to live until he dies, 
at his own maximum potential, performing to the limit of his physical activ-
ity and mental capacity with control and independence wherever possible” 
(p.viii).15 This aim imposes specific requirements on palliative care profession-
als. In the next section we will outline these requirements in terms of a recent 
definition of professional competence. We will illustrate some basic tenets 
of this definition with some clinical vignettes derived from interviews with 
palliative care professionals (these interviews form part of a larger research 
project, titled Moral attitude in palliative care). Subsequently, we will turn 
to ethics and consider professional competence in palliative care from the 
perspective of virtue ethics and care ethics. Virtue ethics focuses on personal 
qualities and moral attitudes, care ethics on the way these qualities are lived 
out in specific care relationships.16
Professional competence in the context of palliative care 
The professional competence of physicians has recently been described by 
Epstein and Hundert as “the habitual and judicious use of communication, 
knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning, emotions, values, and reflec-
tion in daily practice for the benefit of the individual and the community 
being served” (p.226).5 This definition, which is based on several prior defini-
tions, consists of seven dimensions: cognition, technical expertise, integra-
tion, context, relationship, affective/moral attitude, and habits of mind.5 We 
will examine the cognitive, technical, relational and affective/moral dimen-
sions in the context of palliative care. The dimension ‘habits of mind’ will 
be discussed in the next section because it is exactly in this dimension that 
virtue ethics and care ethics converge.
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The cognitive dimension
Box 1
‘What we learn at medical school, what is in our heads, that is no practice. You have 
to learn to apply knowledge in practice. What gives a positive effect in one patient, 
and a negative effect in another is a difference that you have to learn through ex-
perience.’ 
‘As a health care professional you want to do something for patients. You tend to 
go to people with a lot of baggage. You have to learn to carry the baggage on your 
back, not in front of you. You have to examine the possibilities for this individual 
patiënt and learn what you have to offer. What are the limitations? Where is some 
space? That is the baggage with which you go to a patient. You need colleagues for 
that. You have to know the team very well, you have to know what skills you can 
deploy, what tricks you can use, and what kind of personality you have.’
Core medical knowledge learned at medical school lays the foundation of the 
cognitive dimension of professional competence. Nevertheless, the quotation 
from a palliative care physician in box 1 is an example that indicates the im-
portance of another kind of knowledge: tacit knowledge. “Tacit knowledge 
is that which we know but cannot normally easily explain, including the in-
formed use of heuristics (rules of thumb), intuition, and pattern recognition” 
(p.227).5 Practicing palliative care is not just applying knowledge and skills. 
It requires experience to get a feel for contributing to the quality of life of a 
seriously ill patient, to get to understand the different possibilities for differ-
ent patients, to get to recognise gaps in knowledge, and to get to know when 
to ask for assistance of other team members. 
The technical dimension
Box 2
I asked my colleagues about pain treatment: ‘Someone has pain and you give them 
something for it. How long do you wait before there is any result?’
‘Well,’ they say, ‘it depends on what kind of pain.’
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‘Okay,’ I say, ’apart from that, how long do you think somebody may have pain 
before there is any result?’
‘Three quarters of an hour, two hours.’
‘And if it happens to you. You’re suffering a terrible pain and the doctor prescribes 
something. What do you think now?’
‘Well, preferably five minutes.’
‘Why do you apply double standards? Have you ever checked if the drugs you 
prescribed did work?’
‘No, that’s a nurse’s job.’
‘And? Did they ever call you to say whether or not the drugs worked?’
‘Never.’
‘Do you know whether or not you gave your patient adequate medication?’ 
‘No.’
‘And you think we are doing effective pain relief?’
‘If you say it like this…’
Without relief from pain and from other distressing symptoms like nausea, 
vomiting and dyspnoea, it is hard ‘to enable dying persons to live until they 
die,’ as Cicely Saunders expressed the aim of palliative care.15 The techni-
cal demands on palliative care practitioners should not be underestimated. 
A brief discussion between a palliative care physician and his non-palliative 
colleagues (box 2) shows that technical intervention in palliative care is more 
than just applying learned skills. Relief of pain for instance, should take place 
in close deliberation with the patient to find out whether or not the interven-
tion is adequate. Because palliative care’s aim is to improve the quality of life 
for patients who have a limited amount of time left, the urgency of adequate 
pain relief and the relief of other symptoms often seems to be higher than in 
other disciplines of medicine. Moreover, the discussion in box 2 also suggests 
that because of their broad experience in pain relief, palliative care physicians 
may have an unusually good understanding of the complexities of effective 
pain relief. 
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The relational dimension
Box 3
‘A palliative care professional has to be good in communication. Not only in com-
munication with patients, but also with the multidisciplinary team. You have to un-
derstand patients as well as colleagues. At the moment we don’t have a team like 
we used to have. We’re in a weaker position right now, I should say.’
‘Our original team had members who complemented each other very well. We had 
creative people who could not organize accurately, but we also had organizers who 
picked up things others overlooked. And the rest of the team, the doctor, the social 
worker, the pastor… if you don’t get on well together, it works against the team. And you 
need each other very much in palliative care. You cannot avoid each other, and if you 
don’t complement, or at least understand one another, you have got a big problem.’
The remarks of the head of a palliative care unit in box 3 indicate that the 
relational dimension of professional competence applies to communication 
both with patients and with colleagues. Patients at the close of life expect 
their caregivers to be there for them, to show personal commitment and to 
listen attentively to their stories.17 Communication in palliative care often 
deals with difficult questions about life and death that evoke emotional reac-
tions in both patient and caregiver.18 Furthermore, palliative care requires 
teamwork. A palliative care team may not only involve professionals, but can 
also include the family, friends, and neighbours of the patient, as well as other 
volunteers who may contribute to the provision of care.19,20 The quotation in 
box 3 refers to a team of professionals. This emphasises the importance of a 
balanced team that includes at least nurses, attendants, a physician, a social 
worker, and a pastor. Such a team can only function well if the professionals 
involved respect one another, are open-minded, listen well, and find ways 
to deal with divisions of leadership and responsibility.9 Research shows that 
while working with dying patients and their families can be stressful, close 
co-operation with others, conflicts with colleagues, difficulties with one’s oc-
cupational role, and other work-environment related matters are also a major 
source of stress for those working in palliative care.21-23 
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The affective and moral dimension
Box 4
Up until the last moments I had to convince her that without morphine I could not 
do anything. She had no tablets, we injected her.
‘O no, there we go again,’ she used to say.
‘No,’ I said, ‘did you trust me so far?’
‘Yes,’ she said.
‘You can trust that I give you a small amount of 5 mg, it has effect in about 15 
minutes, it works for three hours. After two hours I ‘ll ask you how you feel.
And so I did: ‘How do you feel?’
‘Fine,’ she said.
‘What were you afraid of?,’ I asked.
‘That I would go insane, and nauseous.’
‘And?’
‘Nothing.’
‘Can we continue?’
‘Yes.’
The affective and moral attitude makes up an important dimension of profes-
sional competence in palliative care. Caring requires motivated people who 
are committed to act for the benefit of other people. The tacit, but essential 
obligation of caring is to be there when another person needs it, in the way 
he or she needs it. Caring is helping in such a way that one gives personal 
attention to the cared-for. As the conversation in box 4 shows, trust, respect 
and receptivity to the concern of the patient are essential in this dimension. 
Professionals in palliative care have to be able to tolerate a certain degree 
of ambiguity and anxiety on the part of the patient when it comes to, for in-
stance, the use of morphine. Some emotional intelligence can be required to 
get a patient’s consent to the administration of a particular drug. Emotional 
intelligence is also necessary to manage one’s own emotions when working 
with dying patients. Even for professionals, unexamined emotions like feel-
ings of powerlessness, fear of death, grief, cynicism or frustration, can have 
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unintended consequences that detract from good patient care.24,25 Developing 
self-knowledge and the ability to face up to personal emotions is an impor-
tant part of the education of physicians. “Excess attachment and avoidance or 
disengagement are forms of abandonment of the physician’s primary mission, 
caring for the patient” (p.3008).25 
From the discussion of these four dimensions of professional competence 
in the context of palliative care, it appears that scientific knowledge, clini-
cal skills and moral attitude cannot be considered as separate entities in the 
practice of care. The common thread running through these dimensions is 
‘the habitual and judicious use’ mentioned in the definition of professional 
competence given above. Our discussion of the cognitive and technical di-
mension demonstrates that there is no direct relationship between knowledge 
and skills on the one hand and their application on the other. Experience is 
necessary to assess the individual patient’s needs and to deal with them ju-
diciously. Experience is also required to develop the tacit knowledge that is 
the basis of the habitual use of the physician’s armoury. The discussion of the 
relational and affective/moral dimensions of professional competence dem-
onstrates the importance of a habitual and judicious use of communication, 
values and emotions in the day-to-day practice of palliative care. Obviously, 
the seventh dimension of professional competence mentioned by Epstein and 
Hundert, ‘habits of mind’, cannot be detached from the other dimensions.5 It 
plays a part in all the four dimensions that we have discussed. “Competence 
depends on habits of mind that allow the practitioner to be attentive, curious, 
self-aware, and willing to recognise and correct errors” (p.228).5 In the next 
section, we consider professional competence from a specific ethical perspec-
tive, that of ethics of care and virtue ethics.
The moral basis of professional competence 
The ethics of care presumes that caring adequately “is a quality of the mor-
ally good person or society” (p.126).26 This does not mean that providing care 
automatically makes someone morally good. It rather emphasises the central 
role of caring in human life. The ethics of care considers care as a practice 
that involves both particular acts of caring, and a general ‘habit of mind’, 
involving care, that should inform all aspects of a practitioners life. There 
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is no intention to overthrow moral rules or ethical principles, but a desire 
to give a broader account of morality. Tronto identifies four elements of care 
that form a good starting-point to describe the moral basis of professional 
competence.26
The first moral aspect of caring is the recognition of a need for care (‘car-
ing about’). This requires an attention to needs at various levels. In pallia-
tive care, caregivers should first of all recognise the need for care of the dy-
ing patient. As discussed above, caregivers also have to be attentive to their 
colleagues and to their own emotions if they are to provide good palliative 
care. The second moral aspect of care is ‘taking care of’, which presupposes 
a responsibility for care. This means the responsibility of society in general, 
and health care in particular, to organize palliative care. It also refers to the 
responsibility of individual caregivers working in palliative care to put pallia-
tive care into practice as best they can. The third moral aspect of care is the 
need for competent care (‘care-giving’) because the responsibility to provide 
care can only be met when the caring work is competently performed. The 
competence of care-giving, Tronto notes, “should centrally inform profession-
al ethics” (p.134), because “intending to provide care, even accepting respon-
sibility for it, but then failing to provide good care, means that in the end the 
need for care is not met” (p.133).26 The fourth moral aspect of care – ‘care-re-
ceiving’ – involves the response of the care receiver to the care being offered. 
The vulnerable position of patients in palliative care compromises their status 
as independent and autonomous individuals. Assessing responsiveness to care 
“requires that we remain alert to the possibilities for abuse that arise with 
vulnerability” (p.135).26 
Tronto’s point of view underscores the importance of a broader ethical 
view of professional competence. It shows that the various ethical elements 
of care are inextricably intertwined. Attentiveness for instance, is a central 
moral element in caring about patients, but the competent performance of 
caregivers and the responsiveness of care receivers also involve attention. 
Care ethics also shows that merely professionally competent care, whether it 
is palliative or not, time and again departs from the needs of the patient.
In fact, the ethics of care has deep historical roots. It dates back to Aris-
totle’s virtue ethics in which phronesis, or practical wisdom is the key virtue. 
WHO CARES?
30
Virtue ethics focuses on someone’s inner qualities or character.16,27 Aristotle 
describes the practical wisdom that is required to make the best decision in 
particular circumstances as “a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with 
regard to things that are good or bad for man”.28 Phronesis should be consid-
ered as a capacity that motivates appropriate action in particular situations. 
It is a quality that enables someone to deliberate about what is good or bad 
for a human being in a particular situation and as a consequence enables the 
deliberator to act appropriately.29 The emphasis on phronesis in virtue ethics 
is connected with the moral aspect of responsibility in care ethics: we are 
responsible for our intentions as well as for the consequences of our actions, 
in as far as we can predict them. When we intend to care for the dying, we ac-
cept a responsibility to provide professionally competent palliative care. This 
requires more than just applying knowledge and skills. Whether it concerns 
knowledge, technical skills, relationships or emotions, practical wisdom is 
required to judiciously choose appropriate actions. Phronesis is not a feeling 
about what is good, nor just a capacity to make a good choice, it is rather a ha-
bitual disposition to act well.30 As our discussion of professional competence 
points out, taking good care of the patient starts with the ‘habitual and judi-
cious use’ of the abilities that a physician has at his or her disposal. Deploying 
these abilities requires a physician to be able to predict the consequences of 
his or her actions. After all, palliative intervention aims at the relief of pain 
and suffering and at improving the quality of life of seriously ill patients. 
Conclusion
On the basis of a dialogue between virtue ethics and care ethics, Benner argues 
that health care can be understood as “a caring practice carried out by practi-
tioners of trustworthy character” (p.50).16 Looking at professional competence 
in the context of palliative care from the perspective of the ethics of care 
and virtue ethics emphasises the importance of the practitioners’ trustworthy 
character or ‘practical wisdom’ in clinical practice. A review of four of the di-
mensions of professional competence (the cognitive, technical, relational and 
affective/moral dimensions) indicates that this wisdom should not be seen as 
a separate entity supporting a professional’s competence, it rather plays a role 
throughout the provision of care. Ethics cannot be considered as a separate 
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part of medicine. “Medicine is, at its center, a moral enterprise grounded in 
a covenant of trust. This covenant obliges physicians to be competent and to 
use their competence in the patient’s best interests” (p.1042).31 Since medi-
cal education lays the foundation of a physician’s professional competence, it 
should explicitly pay attention to its moral origin. Although practical wisdom, 
in large part, depends on experience in practice, an education in ethics that 
sets professional competence in a wider context seems to be a prerequisite 
for the development of some initial awareness of medicine’s moral basis.32-34 
As pointed out in Schotsmans’s remarks, quoted in the introduction, a greater 
awareness of the philosophical and moral basis of palliative care makes it pos-
sible to improve its ethical culture. Moreover, our discussion of professional 
competence shows that the qualities that make a good physician also make a 
good palliative care physician. Because palliative care involves intense human 
interactions, the basic ethical culture of medicine seems to be more evident in 
palliative care practice. That is why we argue that integrating palliative care 
into the medical curriculum may well improve the ethical culture of medicine 
as a whole. 
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Chapter 3
Quality of life considered as well-being
Views from philosophy and palliative care practice 
Gert Olthuis 
Wim Dekkers
Abstract
The main measure of quality of life is well-being. The aim of this article is to 
compare insights about well-being from contemporary philosophy with the 
practice-related opinions of palliative care professionals. In the first part of 
the paper two philosophical theories on well-being are introduced: Sumner’s 
theory of authentic happiness and Griffin’s theory of prudential perfection-
ism. The second part presents opinions derived from interviews with nine-
teen professional palliative caregivers. Both the well-being of patients and the 
well-being of the carers themselves are considered in this empirical explora-
tion. In the third part the attention shifts from the description of “well-be-
ing” to prescriptions for the promotion of well-being. Our interview data are 
analysed in light of the theories of Sumner and Griffin for clues to the pro-
motion of “well-being”. The analysis (1) underscores the subject-relativity of 
well-being, (2) points out that values that are considered important in every 
life still seem to be relevant (at least in palliative care practice), and (3) shows 
the importance of living a certain sort of life when aiming to enhance dying 
patients’ well-being.
Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 2005; 26: 307-337,
with permission of Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands

Quality of life considered as well-being
Views from philosophy and palliative care practice
Introduction
Although the concept of quality of life is well established within contempo-
rary health care, there is little consensus about the nature of this concept.1 
“Quality of life” was introduced into medicine as an additional measure of the 
effect of an intervention, over and above the basic biomedical information 
that had been used to judge people’s health, to serve as a supplement to these 
‘objective’ medical measures. The underlying idea was that medicine should 
care about a person as an integrated, feeling and active being and not just 
focus on the person as a biological organism.2 A person’s own assessment of 
their life was added to the objective measures of health. Nowadays, a person’s 
well-being is considered the main indication of quality of life. The first part of 
the current paper is an outline of how the nature of well-being is interpreted 
in contemporary philosophy. Two recent views on well-being will be intro-
duced in this section: Griffin’s prudential perfectionism and Sumner’s theory 
of authentic happiness.3 
The second part of this paper presents the results of empirical research 
into the way palliative care professionals perceive well-being. Palliative care 
aims explicitly at achieving the best possible quality of life for patients who 
cannot be cured and for their families.4 There is a recent trend to pay attention 
to the well-being of the professionals and informal care-givers of patients with 
a life-threatening illness as well.5 We asked nineteen palliative care workers 
about their views on (their contribution to) patient well-being and about the 
impact that providing end-of-life care had on their own well-being. 
In the third part of the paper the practice-related views of palliative care 
professionals on well-being are compared with the insights offered by con-
temporary philosophy. How do the different aspects of well-being discussed 
in philosophy relate to professional caregivers’ opinions and their experiences 
concerning well-being? What does this comparison tell us about how well-be-
ing should be promoted?
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Contemporary philosophy on well-being
Reflections on quality of life have a long tradition in philosophy. In the clas-
sic Greco-Roman period, philosophers reflected on the notion of ‘a good life’.6 
Contemporary philosophy sees a good life or a good quality of life largely in 
terms of subject-related personal well-being. Well-being here refers to the 
prudential value of a life. Instead of a general question (‘What makes a per-
son’s life go well?’), the question is rephrased as asking about the good life of a 
particular person, with their own biography and characteristics (‘What makes 
life go well for the individual whose life it is?’). The focal point is not what 
makes a life good compared to other lives, but how outer and inner events 
in the life of a specific person affect the well-being of that person. One of 
the main issues in contemporary philosophical discussion about well-being is 
whether or not prudential values exist independent of a person’s desires and 
experiences of being well. Griffin’s prudential perfectionism acknowledges 
the independent existence of prudential values and argues that there are some 
things that are valuable in every life. Sumner’s theory of authentic happiness 
denies the independent existence of prudential values and argues that they 
are valued only in terms of the subject’s attitude towards the world. 
Sumner: authentic happiness
According to Sumner, well-being involves the experience of “authentic happi-
ness” by which he means that well-being is the happiness as it is experienced 
by an informed and autonomous person.7 In fact his account of well-being is 
something in between hedonism and desire theory. Classical hedonism, which 
perceives well-being as a mental state, provides Sumner’s theory with the 
experience requirement: “a necessary condition of a state of affairs making 
me better off (directly or intrinsically) is that it enter into my experience” 
(p.175).7 Desire theory, as a state-of-the-world theory, adds an information 
requirement. A person’s authentic happiness, which Sumner considers to be a 
personal satisfaction of desires, is interpreted as an endorsement of the condi-
tions of his or her life. People have to assess their well-being, the fact that life 
is going well for them, on the basis of a clear and correct perception of their 
life conditions. 
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This subjective account of well-being is grounded in an individual’s view 
of the world which “is made up of the values or standards which a subject 
uses in determining whether their life is satisfying or fulfilling” (p.175).7 Their 
life conditions have to satisfy their own basic values to contribute to their 
well-being. The affirmation of their life circumstances (‘I prefer this state-
of-the-world’) should be truly theirs (autonomous: ‘It is my preference and 
I determined it independent of others’) and should do justice to their lived 
experience of being well (‘I feel well’). For Sumner, well-being is a purely 
subjective matter that is dependent on personal attitudes of favour and dis-
favour. Well-being is ‘subject-relative’: assessments of a person’s well-being 
involve the state-of-affairs of that particular person. The question, however, 
is whether Sumner has confused subject-relativity and subjectivism about 
prudential values.8 Does the fact that someone’s well-being is being assessed 
from the perspective of their particular life mean that well-being is subjec-
tive and that objective features of well-being are ruled out? As Varelius con-
cludes there is no reason to exclude objective theories of well-being on the 
basis of the subject-relativity of prudential value.8 A theory that considers the 
prudential value of well-being from such an objective perspective is Griffin’s 
prudential perfectionism.9
Griffin: prudential perfectionism
Griffin’s theory should be seen as ‘something in between’ desire theory and 
objective theory. Like Sumner’s theory, the basis of Griffin’s account is made 
up of ‘informed desires’. Desires can be faulty because of a lack of informa-
tion, mistaken facts, or because of logical or conceptual errors. In other words, 
people have to be fully informed about their inner and outer circumstances 
before they can assess their lives as going well. Griffin’s account of informed 
desires implies that these desires are structured in such a way that their final 
aim is the good life. Informed desires value the content of the good life. “Ac-
cording to Griffin, things or states of affairs are valuable because we have in-
formed desires for them, but at the same time we have those informed desires 
because there is something in their nature that we can recognise and appreci-
ate as valuable” (p.120).10 Desirability is based on more than just being ratio-
nally informed. Rational understanding of what is perceived as favourable 
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is interconnected with a desire that somehow pulls someone towards that 
favourable object. The appeal that is inherent in the nature of an object that is 
required for well-being, makes a person knowledgeable about its desirability. 
Griffin argues that without such an appeal and a subsequent movement to 
acquire the desirable features of that object, there is no adequate explanation 
for the fact that features are desirable. It is emphasised that informed desires 
are considered a response to the features sought because these features are 
generally intelligible as desirable; one should be able to explain the desirabil-
ity and others must be able to understand the value of the object. 
Griffin moves from informed desires to a perfectionist account of well-
being, from the focus on individuals to an objective account which focuses on 
an index of values that are good for everyone. To put content into his theory, 
he lists five prudential values that could be endorsed by every well informed 
person: (1) accomplishment11, (2) the components of human existence (here 
Griffin explicitly mentions three components of human agency: choosing one’s 
own course through life/autonomy, having the basic capabilities that enable 
one to act, and liberty), (3) understanding (knowing about oneself and one’s 
world, or being in touch with reality), (4) enjoyment, and (5) deep personal 
relationships. This list “provides us with an important standard for judging 
most (ordinary) human lives” (p.70).9
In sum, according to both Sumner and Griffin the nature of well-being 
has to do with the fulfilment of informed desires about personal life circum-
stances. Sumner emphasises that people’s well-being is based on their subjec-
tive view on the world and that endorsement of the conditions of their life 
(‘my life goes well’) is a reflection of their basic values. Griffin on the contrary, 
takes informed desires to be both personal and impersonal. The latter appear 
as prudential values that should be considered necessary conditions for the 
well-being of every well-informed person. “Well-being is achieved by the re-
alization of the values on the list, but in different ways, in different combina-
tions and to different degrees for each individual” (p.123).10
Palliative care professionals on well-being
This section empirically examines well-being in the practice of palliative care 
as it was presented in interviews with professional palliative caregivers. The 
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aim was to formulate answers to two questions. The first question asks how 
palliative care professionals see the well-being of dying patients: Which as-
pects of well-being emerge from the views professional palliative caregivers 
have on (their contribution to) the well-being of their patients? The second 
question focuses on the well-being of the caregivers themselves: What does 
providing palliative care mean for the well-being of these professionals? After 
a description of the methods used to collect and analyse the data, an overview 
of our findings will be presented. 
Methods
Respondents and data collection 
Nineteen palliative care professionals from three different settings partici-
pated in a larger study of which this paper is a part (see table 1).12 A semi-
structured list of topics was used to guide the interviews with the partici-
pants. This list included a basic set of questions that had to be covered in 
the course of the interview. The advantage of the semi-structured interview 
guide was that it ensured that the same general topics were covered in all the 
interviews, while leaving room for the interviewer to ask follow-up questions 
based on specific answers of interviewees.13
The opening questions were aimed at mapping the respondents’ history 
in (palliative) care: why did they work in health care in general and palliative 
care in particular, and what motivated or inspired them? Then the interview 
moved on to focus on the respondents’ views on the ideals of palliative care: 
what is it and what enables palliative caregivers to provide such care in prac-
tice? In this section of the interview, we also asked them for their opinion 
concerning education: can one learn palliative care in training, and – more 
specifically – is every health care professional suited to provide palliative 
care? The third part of the interview focused on well-being. The respondents 
were invited to give their view on the well-being of patients, and we asked 
them what their contribution to patient well-being would be. We also brought 
up the concepts of a good life and a good death. The final question concerned 
the well-being of the interviewees themselves: in what respect did providing 
palliative care contribute to their own quality of life?
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Table 1 - Respondents
Palliative care unit in a nursing home (founded in 1997; 4 beds):
Position Age category Sex Experience
CNA* 30-39 F 5 years
Dept. head 30-39 F 6 years
Pastor 50-59 M 6 years
CNA* 20-29 F 3 years
Physician 50-59 M 6 years
Social worker 40-49 F 6 years
Activity-facilitator 40-49 F 6 years
Palliative care department located in a hospital (founded in 1997; 6 beds):
Physiotherapist 40-49 F 6 years
Physician 40-49 M 6 years
Physician 40-49 M 4 years
Nurse 50-59 F 2 years
Nurse 30-39 M 6 years
CNA* 20-29 F 3 years
Home care (the nurses are part of a palliative care expertise project that  
started in 2002):
Nurse 20-29 F 2 years
Nurse 50-59 F 2 years
Nurse 30-39 F 2 years
Nurse 30-39 M 1 year
CNA* 40-49 F 24 years
Consultancy team:
Physician 30-39 F 3 years
* Certified Nursing Assistant
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Data analysis
In most qualitative analyses three basic steps are followed: immersion, data 
reduction, and synthesis.13,14 Unlike quantitative research, qualitative re-
search requires the researcher to become immersed in the data during the 
analysis. By frequently reviewing the data during the collection phase, the re-
searcher decides whether or not additional data are needed. As the collection 
process proceeds the researcher eventually observes that no new information 
is emerging from the data (theoretical saturation). In this study saturation 
occurred during the third series of interviews (home care nurses). After com-
pleting the home care interviews, only the interview with the consultant was 
added to the data to increase the variety of the group of respondents. The 
next step involved data reduction. This process divides the data into more 
manageable units. To carry out the reduction of the data we used Kwalitan, 
which is a computer programme for arranging qualitative data.15 Before en-
tering the data into the programme, the interviews were divided in a total of 
178 segments. A segment is a part of an interview that is marked with one 
or more codes. After importing the data into Kwalitan, a first round of coding 
took place (by GO). Codes are defined as “tags or labels for assigning units of 
meaning to the descriptive […] information compiled during a study” (p.56).14 
Some of the codes were generated from the questions included in the inter-
view while others emerged from the data itself. The analysis produced a list 
of 29 different codes. Further interpretation and clustering of inter-related 
codes revealed six categories that synthesised the data into a more coherent 
whole. We will describe the process of data analysis in more detail elsewhere; 
four categories are to be discussed in a report on the moral attitude of pallia-
tive care professionals. The last two categories – concerning well-being – are 
discussed below (see box 1). 
Limitations of the study
The larger project of which the current study is a part focuses on (the views 
of) professionals in palliative care. Experiences, opinions and beliefs of vol-
unteers, patients, family and friends are not included in the analysis. System-
atic fieldwork observations were not made, nor did we carry out a survey to 
address a larger group of respondents. Our findings are based upon nineteen 
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interviews with nineteen professionals from various professional roles and 
from three palliative care settings located in a specific region of one country. 
Therefore, a certain modesty concerning the empirical findings is called for; 
one should comply with caution generalizing the results to a larger popula-
tion. The value of the study mainly consists of the insights it provides con-
cerning both the meaning of well-being for palliative care professionals and 
the relationship between well-being as it is discussed in philosophy and well-
being as it is experienced by palliative carers. 
Results 1: The well-being of patients
This category contains six codes. The following six subheadings concern a 
presentation of the results belonging to these codes (see box 1). The first code 
reflects what respondents considered to be the nature of well-being. The other 
five codes deal with what they consider to be valuable aspects of the well-
being of palliative care patients. These are the matters that the respondents 
concentrated on when they explained the opportunities to be well at the end-
of-life and their attempts to provide these opportunities. It is important to 
note here that we do not intend to give a complete overview of what palliative 
care professionals consider valuable for the well-being of their patients. Our 
results should be understood as a qualitative exploration of what our respon-
dents thought mattered most for well-being at the end of life. 
Box 1
1. The well-being of patients
(1) The nature of well-being
(2) Emphasising life
(3) Trying to meet patient preferences
(4) Treating the patient as a person
(5) Completing life
(6) Dying well
2. The well-being of professionals
(7) Satisfaction & enrichment
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(1) The nature of well-being
Most participants remarked that they intended to contribute to their patients’ 
well-being. The majority of the respondents answered the question on what 
they mean by the “well-being” of a palliative patient, by saying that it con-
cerns a judgement of the patient about his or her current situation. “Well-be-
ing is when someone tells: ‘I feel well considering the situation I’m in.’” [home 
care nurse] or “I think the well-being of patients is what they experience as 
well-being. When they enjoy themselves as they want it, then it’s okay” [CNA]. 
Another respondent explained:
“In the terminal phase, the patient’s convenience or well-being is most important. 
It is not about whether a small wound will heal or not. The wound will not heal. It 
is rather: that this patient accepts the wound and it does not bother her, she’s satis-
fied, considering her condition.” [home care CNA]
Apparently, in addition to a patient’s individual preferences, well-being 
is bound to a specific condition. An important aspect of patient well-being 
seems to be a certain acceptance of the changing living conditions. As the 
interviewed consultant pointed out: “You strive for a situation as optimal as 
possible, doing justice to that particular person and to what quality of life is 
for him”, but “you can never expect a terminal patient to feel entirely well.” 
It seems necessary that patients somehow come to terms with being ill and 
should allow for their illness in their judgements of the quality of their lives. 
(2) Emphasising life
A number of participants emphasised the fact that palliative care is concerned 
with life rather than death. “As long as they are here, they belong to life” [ac-
tivity-facilitator]. End-of-life care tries to enable patients to live their lives as 
well as possible. 
“Palliative care aims at life. It tries to contribute to the last part of life, to the inescap-
able progress to the end, in such a way that a patient has some energy left to say: 
‘I live until the end.’ That is the best thing there is, that you can recognise that for a 
number of patients.” [nursing home physician]
In daily practice, the focus on life often consists of enabling patients to enjoy 
small events like listening to music, a nice conversation or attending a birth-
day or a wedding: “You try to involve people in daily life as much as possible” 
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[physiotherapist]. The imminence of death often complicates this focus on life 
events. One of the respondents used a metaphor when a patient concentrates 
too much on the actual end of life. 
“I compare it to a play in the theatre. You know that in the end the curtain is going 
to fall. As a spectator, you can stare at that curtain, but then you miss what happens 
on stage. I try to make clear that instead of staring at the curtain, one can try to con-
centrate on the scenes. People often experience this as an eye-opener.” [pastor]
Two participants – both physicians – critically examined palliative care’s 
contributions to patients’ quality of life: “Good palliative care often prolongs 
people’s lives. But do they live better?” And: “Good life in this respect is ro-
manticising dying. You cannot always remove all suffering or the fact that one 
has to say goodbye.” 
(3) Trying to meet patient preferences
Most respondents maintained that it is not procedures or protocols, but what 
the patient himself wants that is central to daily palliative care. 
“We try to determine if someone aims at something. We concentrate on a per-
son’s own preferences, not on what the hospital or health care in general aims at.” 
[nurse]
“There is a lot of room for people to lead their own lives. Patients can withdraw to 
their room, but also have the opportunity to make use of what nursing home life 
offers.” [pastor]
“The ideal of palliative care is that people can spend the last stage of their lives as 
they want it themselves, in their own way, together with their families that prefer 
that way as well.” [home care nurse]
There are limitations regarding attempts to meet patient preferences. An ex-
ample from a home care nurse: “It is very difficult when clients prefer one 
nurse over another. Of course, a patient’s authority increases when he is at 
home and he can refuse our help when he considers it a violation of his pri-
vacy. But we’re not in the position to honour his request for a specific nurse; 
we are all professionals. If our work schedule assigns a less preferred nurse 
to that client, we call to announce this. And if that client does not agree then 
there’s no nurse that day.” Furthermore, for the professionals, patient prefer-
ences can sometimes be rather unclear: 
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“What I experience as very difficult is a first encounter. How far has someone gone 
in the process? I realized that people deal with it [the approaching death] very dif-
ferently. Some prefer to talk about it very openly, others say that they will talk about 
it, but when you want to talk to them concerning the content it does not work out. 
Sometimes you get into a kind of quarrel because they blame you for raising prob-
lems that were never discussed.” [home care nurse]
“I think it is embarrassing to help a patient with the bedpan when the family is still 
in the room. But if the patient does not mind them being around, I do not make 
difficulties about it. I had to learn that.” [CNA]
On the other hand, several respondents spoke about their efforts in palliative 
care to try to fulfil specific wishes of patients. “Somebody can ask: I would 
like to go outside once more. Well, let’s go outside in that bed!” [CNA]. Another 
respondent noticed: “I once cared for a man who very much wanted to see his 
horse. I am afraid of horses, but we went” [CNA]. 
(4) Treating the patient as a person
According to the respondents, considering the patient as a person with a life 
of their own, with a past, with relatives, emotions, doubts, and with interests 
and concerns of their own is very important. It is not only a condition for 
contributing to patient well-being. According to some of them, interest in the 
patient as a person is also considered a motivation to provide palliative care. 
“I am interested in more than a backbone that does not rotate well. I believe it is 
very interesting to see how people feel and how they think, and why they behave in 
a particular way and why they have those complaints. You listen to people’s stories 
and think: ‘What can I mean for that person?’” [physiotherapist]
“When I teach I notice: these are the good ones. They are open to the effect the situ-
ation has on somebody’s life and well-being and on how someone looks at the end 
of life. They want to talk to the patient.” [nursing home physician]
What this means in day-to-day practice is evident in the following quota-
tion:
“You have to react to a patient in an appropriate and individualized way. If some-
body always had difficulties with talking about emotions, then you know you should 
not force him. Someone’s expression gives you clues. Is he almost in tears or not? 
Does someone tremble? How does the patient touch you or look at you? These are 
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the things that tell you how a patient feels. You have to connect to these signals and 
to the experiences of the family.” [social worker]
Several participants pointed out that previous life events determine a pa-
tient’s capacity to deal with illness and suffering at the end of life: “When 
patients and lay carers talk very openly to each other about what they are 
going through or about the funeral or about one another’s grief, then that in-
volves the joint history of these people. The character of the patient also plays 
a part” [home care nurse]. The consultant interviewed added that although 
contact with patients can be very intense, the variety of personal experiences 
concerning (the end of) life means that palliative care professionals cannot 
always know what specific patients actually want. 
“People carry with them a whole life and I cannot have the illusion that I know 
them. Sometimes a person can get terrified unexpectedly and you don’t know what 
you’ve stirred up. You will always have to be sensitive to the fact that situations of 
loss and interactions about that are not logical.” [consultant]
(5) Completing life
Three quarters of the respondents mentioned that completion of life plays a 
part in the quality of the last stages of life. 
“The last stage ideally should have room for completion, for people to calm down, 
to trust that it is going to be all right, that life will end decently.” [nurse]
“I think it is ideal when people experience some growth in that last stage. Perhaps 
they can have a family reunion or look forward to something, and come to a good 
closing of their life together with their family.” [social worker]
Nevertheless, dying patients are often quite desperate about what lies ahead, 
which deprives them of the opportunity to close their lives in a calm and de-
cent way. Anxiety and feelings of hopelessness sometimes lead to a euthanasia 
request. The nursing home physician explained how he attempts to deal with 
such a patient’s fear:
“I do not leave people in panic and I do try to help them to collect their thoughts. 
I try not to lose touch with reality, but I do try to decrease the tension that seems 
to overwhelm them. I try to put my trust in that particular patient and talk about it. 
This can open up other possibilities and it can turn out that you are able to make 
a difference.” 
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The growth that is possible when patients can overcome their agitation most-
ly manifests itself in relationships. From the perspective of the respondents, 
this “growth” generally involves an acceptance of the situation and a deepen-
ing of relationships: “Illness can be very meaningful in the palliative phase. 
You can perceive lovely things happening between people” [home care nurse]. 
However, a closer relationship does not always make a patient feel better.
“Such a process can be both wonderful and painful because it can become obvi-
ous that someone had always felt rejected or that a father had a past that he had 
previously been unwilling to discuss. I often see an intensification of contacts.” [con-
sultant]
Yet if patients are able to live through the last stage of life properly that is 
of importance for themselves as well as their loved one’s: “People who con-
sciously deal with their suffering can be a support for their environment” 
[home care nurse]. Many patients (re) turn to their religion to seek comfort at 
the close of life. “I notice that there are quite a few people who seek contact 
with the convictions about life they grew up with. Of course there is a big 
difference between the one’s who are churchgoers and those who are not” 
[pastor]. 
(6) Dying well
The last code concentrates on dying well. This code closely corresponds with 
– and partly overlaps – the previous code ‘completing life’. “We aim at both 
life and death. Most of the time, the lead up to the moment of death deter-
mines whether it will be a ‘good’ death or a ‘bad’ death” [department head]. 
However, central to ‘dying well’ is not the (more active) individual comple-
tion of life but the actual process of dying a patient undergoes quite passively. 
Besides pain and symptom management, people’s image of the end of life, the 
context of dying and its consequences for others play a part here as well. Sev-
eral respondents had noticed that death and dying might be taboo for patients 
and their families. 
“Often you know that people know they are dying, but they do not want or cannot 
talk about it. Or they do not want to burden others.” [social worker]
“Dying is banished from many people’s existence. They do not know what it is and 
do not realize that it is not something that takes half an hour.” [home care nurse]
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Many respondents characterised a good death as something that happens 
when someone is ready for it and “when a patient has come to terms with the 
end of life” [home care CNA], preferably unburdened by pain, nausea, agita-
tion, shortness of breath, or fear. Several respondents admitted that this was 
an ideal rather than a regularly achievable target. The presence of family and 
friends is mentioned as a part of a good death. Several respondents felt that 
patients should not die alone, while other participants emphasised that dying 
is a personal and individual event: “Everybody dies his own death. As a care-
giver you have to figure out what is a good death for that person, what he fears 
and definitely does not want. Then you can anticipate that” [consultant].
In spite of this, a good death does not just involve the death of the person 
in question. Several respondents point out its value for those who witnessed 
the dying process.
“[It is good] when someone finally accepts it and has the strength to complete his 
life together with others, and consequently has the strength to let others accept it. 
When someone leaves behind a healthy basis for grief.” [physician]
Others point out the distress that can be caused by witnessing a painful 
death:
“I was very happy that there was no family present this time. If they had seen this, 
they probably would not have understood it. They were very vulnerable.” [nurse]
Finally, we note that the quality of a patient’s dying process affects the way 
loved ones perceive their own death. The next section concentrates on the 
relationship between providing palliative care and the well-being of the pro-
fessionals who provide such care.
Results 2: The well-being of professionals
(7) Satisfaction and enrichment 
As in other occupations, in palliative care being appreciated is a source of job-
satisfaction: “It is nice when people indicate that they appreciate what you 
did” [nurse]. Nonetheless, one respondent explicitly mentioned that she found 
it difficult when a patient’s family effusively thanked her for her contribution 
to care: “When people thank you once, I reply: ‘You’re welcome. I enjoyed it 
and I am glad it ended well.’ But sometimes they thank you six times. Then I 
feel awkward” [CNA]. 
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However, the answers of the participants indicate that being appreci-
ated is not the most important source of well-being. One physician considered 
working in palliative care no more satisfying than working in other branches 
of health care – “When it comes to job-satisfaction, for me doing something 
good for a patient does not depend on working in palliative care or in a hospi-
tal” – but most respondents identified a number of other sources of satisfac-
tion involved in caring for the dying. The feeling that they had the ability to 
contribute positively to the situation of patients and their families seems to be 
an important source of satisfaction for most participants. 
“Providing palliative care is trying to offer just a little bit more. That gives me a good 
feeling when I am at home. It brought me to a level where I would not have been 
otherwise.” [CNA] 
“Sometimes you find such a warm atmosphere in families. That is what you would 
want to have at home. You can get a very good feeling when you are finished there 
and everything went well for everybody. I get a kick out of it.” [home care nurse]
“I am not an angel, but often caring for these patients is doing me good.” [CNA]
“If you have the feeling that you have done your part and it went well, than that is 
satisfying.” [pastor]
“It is very nice to see that it helps people. That gives me a lot of satisfaction.” [home 
care nurse] 
It is not surprising that almost all participants considered that providing pal-
liative care was an enrichment of their lives: it gives a feeling of doing some-
thing good, it gives the opportunity to develop personally, and it impels a 
broader view of life and humanity in general.
“What palliative care does for me when I am at home is that I manage my own time 
more consciously. We should be happy with what we have got. Tomorrow can be 
very different from today.” [nursing home physician]
“I learned to put things into perspective. Being amazed at what is important for oth-
ers and what you think of it yourself.” [activity-facilitator]
“I think I became more mild as a person. I learned about the value of life. Some-
times it seems as if in a short period of time you observe a lot of problems very 
intensively. I believe you are always confronted with your own life and you learn 
from that.” [physiotherapist]
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“It enriches me. Especially because I have the feeling that palliative care gives me 
the opportunity to actualise myself.” [consultant]
“You show a lot of yourself, but that is in no proportion to what patients show you. 
In fact, in two or three weeks every aspect of a whole life passes by; sadness, misery, 
fights, misunderstanding, love. You take part in that. That is the added value of pal-
liative care: what you give is in no proportion to what you receive.” [nurse] 
In the next section we will return to the theories of well-being and discuss 
them in the light of the picture of well-being in palliative care practice pre-
sented above. The aim of this section is to investigate the relationship be-
tween philosophical theories about well-being and the views of palliative care 
professionals on this subject. Furthermore, we will shift our attention from a 
description and analysis to a consideration of how we ought to act to promote 
well-being.
Discussion
There are several ways in which empirical studies can be important in medi-
cal ethics.16 One is that they provide descriptions of what is considered moral 
in a particular context. The importance of a study that describes what pal-
liative care professionals believe about a moral question – like contributing 
to a dying patient’s well-being – is that these descriptions illuminate human 
responses to a normative question: what should I do to help these patients? 
The basis of empirical ethics is that the relationship between normative and 
descriptive research in ethics is interactive: normative theories raise ques-
tions that can be studied in practice and empirical data can bring up issues 
that impel fine-tuning of ethical theories.16,17  In this third part we interpret 
our empirical results in the light of the theories of Sumner and Griffin, in or-
der to search for clues concerning the promotion of well-being.
Well-being as a value without content
According to Sumner, an adequate description of well-being has to be decou-
pled from its potential role in a normative framework.7 Although he admits 
that his description will inevitably be guided by some normative destination 
that he has in mind, he is convinced that (descriptive) questions about the 
nature of well-being should precede (normative) questions about its value.7 
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Subsequently, he argues, descriptive adequacy requires four boundary condi-
tions: fidelity, generality, formality and neutrality.18 Working from Sumner’s 
starting-point produces a description of the nature of well-being without 
content: the theory of authentic happiness. This description fits with com-
mon sense experiences of well-being, is generally acceptable, formally tells us 
what it is for a life to go well, and is neutral concerning the enormous variety 
of human attitudes towards life. When it concerns the role of well-being in 
ethics, Sumner argues for what he calls ‘welfarism’, which implies that “eth-
ics ultimately has to do with making lives go well, or at least making sure that 
they do not go badly” (p.191).7
According to Sumner, welfarism means that nothing but well-being mat-
ters for ethics. Well-being becomes the only foundational value for ethics, 
which qualifies welfarism as a monistic theory of the good. Furthermore, as 
explained in the first section, Sumner regards well-being as entirely dependent 
upon a person’s attitudes of favour or disfavour. What is prudentially valuable 
(what contributes to a person’s well-being) is whatever ways of life are found 
to be fulfilling by an informed and autonomous subject. Sumner’s view on 
the nature of well-being can be recognised in what our respondents consider 
the nature of well-being. Most of them emphasised that well-being should 
be considered a judgement by the patient about his or her current situation. 
This judgement should be informed and autonomous. The patients themselves 
determine whether or not they are doing well. A consequence of Sumner’s mo-
nistic and subjective account of well-being is that what promotes someone’s 
well-being cannot be separated from that particular person: “however valu-
able something may be in itself, it can promote my well-being only if it is also 
good or beneficial for me” (p.37).19 But what then should palliative care profes-
sionals do to promote the well-being of dying patients? Should their actions be 
fully and only dependent upon the opinions of the patients in question? 
The content of well-being and its promotion in palliative care
Whereas Sumner argues that the ideal life (of being well) is – without re-
ferring to any content – whatever a person considers an ideal life in given 
circumstances, Griffin abandons the criterion of neutrality and suggests that 
when we are seeking the ideal life, we are looking at its content (p.58).9 Be-
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cause there are irreducibly many ideal forms of life, Griffin accepts a plurality 
of values rather than reducing to Sumner’s single ultimate value. Promoting 
these values would lead human beings, today or in the future, to live better 
lives (p.71).9 While the respondents’ views on the nature of well-being can be 
seen as conforming to Sumner’s account, a closer look at the other five codes 
concerning the well-being of palliative care patients reveals the important 
role of Griffin’s prudential values in the palliative actions of professionals di-
rected at the enhancement of well-being. A reflection on our results regarding 
patient well-being on the basis of Griffin’s list of prudential values and other 
studies will demonstrate this (see table 2). 
Emphasising life
According to Griffin, ‘agency’ is at the heart of what it is to lead a human ex-
istence (p.67).9 He indicates three components that make up the complexity of 
agency: 1) autonomy, or deciding for oneself, 2) having the basic capabilities 
that enable one to act (a body that works, freedom from pain and anxiety), 
and 3) liberty. The data that have been labelled as emphasising life show that 
the efforts of palliative carers intend to acknowledge human agency as much 
as possible. Although a patient’s mobility often is seriously diminished at the 
end-of-life, professionals try to focus on what life has to offer to a patient tak-
ing a patient’s decreased capabilities into account. As the nursing home physi-
cian emphasised: the best thing is a patient saying: ‘I live until the end’. Other 
respondents, however, wondered if palliative care indeed is able to cherish a 
patient’s agency while retaining and restoring his quality of life. Research ac-
knowledges these respondents’ doubts. Lawton, for instance, critically com-
ments on palliative care’s starting-point to enable patients to live until they 
die and states that contemporary palliative care seems to ignore the tremen-
dous impact bodily deterioration and decline can have on the patient’s self.20 
She claims that to realise and maintain selfhood, at least two bodily capacities 
must be possessed: a “bounded, physically sealed, enclosed body”, and “the 
bodily ability to act as the agent of one’s embodied actions and intentions” 
(p.7).20 Lawton concludes that dying patients often fall out of the category of 
personhood in both their own and other people’s evaluations; they experience 
a diminishment of self. Yet, the statements of the nursing home physician and 
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Table 2 – Prudential values in codes concerning patient well-being
Respondents on patient well-being Prudential values (cf. Griffin)
Emphasising life Components of human existence: human  
 agency (having the basic capabilities that  
 enable one to act)
 Enjoyment
Trying to meet patient preferences Enjoyment
 Components of human existence: human  
 agency (having the basic capabilities that  
 enable one to act; choosing one’s own  
 course through life)
Treating the patient as a person Deep personal relations
Completing life Accomplishment
 Understanding: knowing about oneself 
 and the world, being in touch with reality
 Deep personal relations
Dying well Components of human existence: human  
 agency (choosing one’s own course  
 through life)
 Deep personal relations
the pastor indicate that Lawton’s assertions do not always follow: a number 
of patients actually seems to be able to experience the last stages of life as a 
period where ‘human existence’ prevails, despite their bodily deterioration. 
We will get back to this below. Lastly, we point out that the prudential value 
of enjoyment also plays a part when emphasising life, since professionals at-
tempt to promote well-being through focussing on the joy of the “day-to-day 
textures of life” (p.67).9 
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Trying to meet patient preferences
Two types of therapeutic (nursing) interaction that possibly improve feelings 
of well-being of palliative patients can be identified: professional interaction 
addressing the disease and physical problems, and humanistic and egalitarian 
personal interaction focussing on psychological well-being.21 The data coded 
as trying to meet patient preferences show the importance of the latter type, 
acknowledging for instance the prudential value of enjoyment. Although the 
independent mobility of patients may be minimized (as Lawton pointed out), 
our respondents still consider them persons who value pleasure or appre-
ciate nature. This is expressed in their occasional attempts to fulfil specific 
wishes of patients. Furthermore, several studies show that patient and family 
preferences concerning end-of-life care initially focus on pain and symptom 
management.22 The prudential value that plays a part here is one of the com-
ponents of human agency: having the basic capabilities that enable one to 
act, which means freedom of great pain as well (p.67).9 Our study makes clear 
that palliative carers believe that one should not limit oneself to physical care 
when it concerns dying patients’ well-being. Research identified five domains 
of quality end-of-life care from patients’ perspective: (1) receiving adequate 
pain and symptom management, (2) avoiding inappropriate prolongation of 
dying, (3) achieving a sense of control, (4) relieving the burden imposed on 
loved ones, and (5) strengthening relationships with loved ones.23 An adequate 
treatment of pain and symptoms does not seem to be sufficient to attain a 
sense of well-being at the close of life. This code explicitly advances anoth-
er component of human agency as well: autonomy in the sense of choosing 
one’s own course through life. As mentioned by one home care nurse: people 
should spend the last stage of their lives as much as possible in the way they 
themselves want to. This implies approaching them from a professional per-
spective in an egalitarian, non-paternalistic way. Nevertheless, the results 
belonging to this code also make clear (as Sumner would argue) that patients 
must take their life conditions into account when it concerns the evaluation 
of their well-being. Their precarious situation for instance makes them both 
dependent upon others for daily care, and upon organizations for the provi-
sion of that care. Not accepting this can have negative consequences for their 
experienced quality of life. 
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Treating the patient as a person
Emotional support and personalized care from professionals belong to the most 
important needs of patients at the end of life.24 Emotional support is primarily 
expressed through compassion, responsiveness to emotional needs, hope and 
a positive attitude, and comforting touch.24 In the data that are identified as 
treating the patient as a person these aspects of care are advanced in the fact 
that the respondents consider their interest in the patient as a person a mo-
tivation to provide palliative care. Due to a growing atmosphere of openness 
and honesty when patients are dying25, contact with them can be very intense 
as the interviewed consultant affirms. The respondents consider the oppor-
tunity to get closely involved in the dying person’s (family) life an attractive 
element of end-of-life care (see also: Results 2: The well-being of profession-
als, p.50). Furthermore, personalized care is expressed through treating the 
whole person, not just the disease, making the patient feel unique and special, 
and considering the patient’s social situation.24 It is suggested that getting to 
know the (uniqueness of the) patient is central to providing quality palliative 
care.25,26 Our respondents indicate that treating the patient as a person also 
means taking the joint history of the patient and his family into account. 
From the perspective of palliative care professionals, the prudential val-
ue ‘deep personal relations’ is of importance in two ways here. On the one 
hand, this value plays a part in the significance of the professional-patient re-
lationship, i.e. in the professionals’ authentic concern for patient and family. 
On the other hand, professionals have to deal with relations between patients 
and their families and loved ones. As several respondents indicate, a patient’s 
relational history partly determines the extent to which he is able to deal with 
his present situation. 
Completing life
Research into patients’ perspectives on dying has established the importance 
of having the opportunity to gain a sense of completion.27,28 “Life review, say-
ing good-bye, and resolving unfinished business provide both patients and 
their families with an opportunity for human development at the end of life” 
(p.2481).28 Patients often admit to having particular tasks to achieve in bring-
ing closure to life as death draws near.27 Several aspects of life completion are 
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advanced in our respondents’ answers. An open communication with friends 
and especially family is one of them. As the respondents indicate, this open-
ness can be both supportive (relationships can be deepened) and painful (deal-
ing with unfinished business might raise unexpected matters) for those sur-
rounding the patient. Furthermore, completing life might imply (emotional) 
deliberations: Should I continue palliative chemo treatment or not?, or What 
about euthanasia when suffering increases? 
First of all, the prudential value of accomplishment plays a role here. Ac-
complishment can be described as “the act of accomplishing or finishing work 
completely and successfully”.29 Accordingly – since our concern is the end of 
life – it refers to finishing life completely and successfully. Griffin emphasises 
that accomplishment differs from achieving pre-set goals: accomplishment as 
a value is valuable independently of its consequences. This is exemplified both 
in the strengthening of family ties, as the interviewed social worker remarks, 
and in making painful confessions before death arrives, as the consultant in-
dicates. Those actions are not meant to reach a particular goal, but seem to 
be worthwhile in the sense that they give life point or substance serving the 
well-being of patients who finish their life.11 Furthermore, the data catego-
rized as completing life again show the significance of the prudential value 
of deep personal relations. According to the respondents for instance, growth 
at the end of life generally involves a valuable deepening of relationships for 
patients and their family and friends. Simultaneously, matters that disrupt 
personal (family) relations can seriously degrade well-being in the last stage 
of life. Finally, the prudential value of understanding can be recognised in 
the data gathered as completing life. Understanding is explained as: “Simply 
knowing about oneself and one’s world is part of a good life. We value, not as 
an instrument but for itself, being in touch with reality, being free from mud-
dle, ignorance, and mistake” (p.67).9 According to the respondents, acknowl-
edging that life is ending (‘being in touch with reality’) contributes to a certain 
well-being while death is imminent. Professionals stress the importance of 
consciously dealing with suffering when facing death (‘knowing about oneself 
and one’s world’). This can be beneficial for the well-being of both patients 
and their loved ones. 
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Dying well
As explained in the results-section, dying well differs from completing life in 
the sense that the former concentrates on death and the actual dying process a 
patient undergoes relatively passively. Patients first of all preferred adequate 
pain and symptom management. Without it, dying well seems to be hard, as 
the respondents’ answers suggest. Simultaneously, several respondents postu-
lated that being open about death and dying is still very much a taboo among 
patients and their families. Interestingly, some studies recently pointed out 
the emergence of openness about one’s own death in contemporary societies 
due to a prolonged dying process and medical developments to bring pain and 
symptoms under control.30,31 “The rhetoric of palliative care sets great store 
by the autonomy of the individual patient and the fulfilling of the latter’s 
wishes about how and where (if not when!) she chooses to die” (p.406).30 And 
it is claimed that the manner in which ‘denial’ is defined and used in pallia-
tive care literature is not so much as an individual defence mechanism, but 
as an instrument in a larger discourse on dying, which both invites patients 
to participate in the planning of their death and labels those who do not com-
ply.31 This observation can also be recovered in the interviewed consultant’s 
remark on the fact that everybody dies his own death and caregivers have to 
figure out a patient’s preferences, thus supposing a patient has a specific view 
on his or her end of life. We suggest that in this shift to consider (the good) 
death more individualized, the prudential value of choosing one’s own course 
through life can be recognised. 
Several studies refer to worries patients have about burdening their own 
family.32,33 In our study these worries were not mentioned. This can prob-
ably be explained by the fact that respondents focused on patients who al-
ready received professional care. However, the respondents mentioned both 
the value and dangers of witnessing another person’s death. Research among 
seniors who had provided informal end-of-life care for others, who had ex-
perienced their deaths, and who had considered their own death and dying, 
shows that family members are considered a key element of care.33 While 
participants of that study did not think of their previous care giving for others 
as a burden, there was common concern about burdening their own families 
regarding their own dying process. Nevertheless, they had learned that dy-
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ing people typically depend on others and participants therefore preferred 
informal caregivers to care for them at home. This suggests that experiences 
with death and dying of others stimulate reflection upon one’s own mortal-
ity, which will contribute to the content of the (preferred) image of one’s own 
death. This corresponds with our observations concerning the value and dan-
gers of witnessing the death of loved ones. Apparently, close involvement in a 
loved one’s dying process can have both positive (consolation, acceptance) and 
negative (worries about burden, fear) consequences for the well-being of both 
patients and family members and friends at the end of life. It seems however, 
that the prudential value of deep personal relations inevitably plays a part 
when it concerns the quality of the dying process. 
Thus, our data show that Griffin’s prudential values conform relative-
ly well to palliative care professionals’ views on well-being. Is the fact that 
these values can be recognised in palliative care practice sufficient to conclude 
that they should be promoted generally? From the respondents’ perspective, 
Griffin’s list of prudential values appears to be relevant if one intends to posi-
tively affect the well-being of palliative care patients. But do these prudential 
values improve life, independent of the situation of one particular person? 
Perhaps not, because, as the respondents’ answers suggest, a significant part 
of an individual’s well-being depends on the fulfilment of that individual’s 
desires. But the data about the well-being of the professionals themselves 
suggest the importance of a more objective aspect of well-being, one that goes 
beyond the subjectively oriented preferential interpretation: the significance 
of living a certain sort of life. 
A covenantal approach to end-of-life care
Beyond the appeal (‘ethical pull’) that according to Griffin is inherent in the 
five prudential values, he draws on virtue ethics to explain that well-being de-
pends on the additional ‘ethical push’ of having lived a good life. The external 
pull that prudential values have (‘these values make an individual life good’) 
cannot be detached from an internal motivation that persuades individuals 
to interact in a specific way (p.63).9 This motivation is embedded in living 
a certain sort of life.34 For example, an ethical analysis of the relationship 
between personal and professional identity of hospice nurses in the context 
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of caring conversations with patients demonstrated that their professional 
efforts should not be seen separate from the way they experience and evalu-
ate their activities in the light of what they consider worth living for.35 This 
observation indicates close ties between being a person and being a (palliative 
care) professional.
To attain well-being it is not sufficient for a person to get what he wants: 
it also depends on the way the preferences are satisfied. In other words, “my 
happiness must involve my living a good life rather than just having desires 
filled” (p.19).36 This ‘living a good life’ does not only relate to someone’s per-
sonal life, but is also expressed in professional life. As is evident from the 
respondents’ answers, they experience providing palliative care as very re-
warding. But as the data show, the well-being provided by end-of-life care 
is not the mere satisfaction of subjective desires. It is also a function of close 
involvement in other people’s lives – as was put forward in the code ‘treating 
the patient as a person’ – and the opportunity to contribute positively to the 
quality of their last stage of life. The basis of the sort of life that seems sig-
nificant here can be seen in the comments of a nurse (last quote in the second 
part) about giving and receiving in palliative care: “You show a lot of yourself, 
but that is in no proportion to what patients show you. […] What you give is in 
no proportion to what you receive”. The sort of life revealed by the answers of 
the professionals corresponds closely to what Byock refers to as ‘a covenant-
al approach’.37 Byock argues that interaction in palliative care is covenantal 
rather than contractual. Unlike a contract – which is temporary and founded 
on distrust – a covenant is durable because it is based on trust. “Within a cov-
enantal approach to illness, care-giving, dying, and grief, people respond to 
others out of a lived sense of mutuality and because they are motivated by a 
desire to care. In acting covenantally, I make decisions affecting the well-be-
ing of another, conscious that their well-being affects my own” (p.S40).37
Conclusion
Drawing a comparison between two philosophical perspectives on well-being 
and the practice-related views of palliative care professionals on that subject 
shows both a bridge and a gap between the subjective account of well-being as 
advanced by Sumner and the opinions of our respondents. While the majority 
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of the respondents consider a patient’s well-being a (subjective) judgement of 
that patient about his or her current situation – which is in line with Sumner’s 
assertions – a closer examination of the respondents’ answers suggests that 
the content of that judgement corresponds with features that are considered 
valuable in every life. The prudential values as listed by Griffin play a promi-
nent part in the respondents’ accounts on how to promote the well-being 
of patients at the end of their lives. Although respondents acknowledge the 
subjectivity of patient well-being, they do not seem to be neutral as to how to 
enhance it in everyday working life. Whereas quality of life – and well-being 
as its main indicator – is introduced into medicine as a subjective measure of 
the effect of an intervention, our analysis suggests that objective features of 
what it is to be well (still) play a part in the actions of palliative carers. 
The actions of our respondents which are aimed at enhancing their pa-
tients’ well-being both seem to be determined by the ‘ethical pull’ of the pru-
dential values and by a particular motivation (‘ethical push’) that can be char-
acterised as covenantal. The accounts of our respondents concerning their 
own well-being clarified that their actions are also motivated by their com-
mitment to suffering others. Simultaneously, their efforts should not be inter-
preted as altruistic: ‘What you give is in no proportion to what you receive,’ 
one of the interviewees emphasised. According to Byock, both a lived sense 
of mutuality and a desire to care are central to the covenantal approach to 
important life events like illness, death and grief. 
In sum, our analysis leads to three significant observations. First, it un-
derscores the subject-relativity of well-being. Second, it points out that values 
that are considered important in every life still seem to be relevant (at least 
in palliative care practice). Third, it shows the importance of living a certain 
sort of life when aiming at enhancing dying patients’ well-being. The latter 
observation implies that the attitudes that should be taken to the desires of 
palliative patients should ideally be rooted in a moral attitude, which reflects 
a personal motivation and commitment to act in the interest of others.38 The 
extent to which a professional’s own well-being depends on the provision of 
palliative care, justifies careful attention to the (future) professional’s motives 
and personal characteristics in training and education. Eventually, palliative 
care patients will benefit from this. 
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Abstract 
Good nursing is more than exercising a specific set of skills. It involves the per-
sonal identity of the nurse. The aim of this article is to answer two questions: 
(1) What kind of person should the hospice nurse be? and (2) How should the 
hospice nurse engage in caring conversations? To answer these questions we 
analyse a nurse’s story that is intended to be a profile of an exemplary hospice 
nurse. This story was constructed from an analysis of five semistructured in-
terviews with hospice nurses, based on the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’, 
which is inspired by the ethical perspective of Paul Ricoeur. The research 
questions concentrate on the norms of respect, responsibility, and reciprocity, 
which are integral parts of the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’. 
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The caring relationship in hospice care
An analysis based on the ethics of the caring conversation
Introduction
It is well known that the quality of communication can make the difference 
between the success and failure of health care.1 Research has established that 
the dying patient’s perception of ‘feeling better’ largely depends on a humanis-
tic and egalitarian relationship with the nurse.2-5 Despite this, several authors 
have assessed communication in the palliative phase as inadequate.6-11 In pal-
liative nursing practice in hospitals, for example, a biomedical and task-ori-
ented approach9,10 aimed at dealing with the patient’s physical needs6,11 seems 
to be dominant. It has been suggested that – for the patient – the quality of 
care improves considerably when the care provided is patient-centred.12-14 
Thus the relationship between the health care professional and the patient 
is increasingly regarded as the key to improving communication at the end-
of-life. The patient-centred approach can best be described as establishing a 
relationship between caregiver and patient that works as a sustained partner-
ship based on mutual participation.13 This article presents a discussion of the 
ethics of this sort of partnership in palliative care, as seen from the perspec-
tive of the health care professional, i.e. the hospice nurse.
The aim of this article is to answer two questions: (1) What kind of per-
son should the hospice nurse be?, and (2) How should (s)he engage in caring 
conversations? To answer these questions, we make use of ‘the ethics of the 
caring conversation’ as proposed by Fredriksson and Eriksson.15 This frame-
work is based on the ethics of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Whereas 
Ricoeur’s ethics concentrates on the relationship between the construction 
of personal identity and ethics in general, ‘the ethics of the caring conversa-
tion’ elaborates on the identity of nurses and the way they (should) relate to 
patients. Both approaches are philosophical rather than practical. This paper 
takes the normative frameworks based on these ethical perspectives, and uses 
them to analyse statements made by hospice nurses when they were inter-
viewed about their involvement in palliative care. Our goal here is not use 
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empirical research to verify or correct Ricoeur’s ethics, nor is it to question 
the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’ as proposed by Fredriksson et al. We 
merely apply their normative framework to the practice of palliative care and 
use it as a tool to analyse the way person, role and the caring relationship may 
said to be interwoven in hospice care. 
This paper is part of a more comprehensive study. It focuses on the ap-
plication of the normative framework to empirical findings that are summa-
rised in the story of Susan (box 1). This story gives a profile of a hospice nurse, 
structured on the basis of Ricoeur’s normative framework. The story is based 
on five interviews (see appendix 1 for methods and analysis). The second part 
of the study will be published in a later issue and will relate the analysis be-
low to a more extensive examination of recent literature on the personal and 
professional identity of nurses (see chapter 5).
Box 1 - Susan’s story
After having worked in several hospital departments for more than 20 years, Susan 
(45) decided to apply for a job as a nurse in a hospice. At the time of the interview, 
she had worked there for 5 years. What induced her to switch to professional pal-
liative care? “The hospital was not quite what I thought it would be. That became 
very obvious in the oncology ward. All those chemotherapies. I don’t have anything 
against them, but they just don’t suit me. Especially because of what happens to 
the human body. Doctors inform patients rather well, but I wonder if patients real-
ize what they are to undergo. I see how sick they get and how poor the results are. 
That bothers me. Quality of life decreases so rapidly. What do you gain? Sometimes 
nothing. I noticed that the patients were disappointed. My persisting question was: 
Who am I to think that these people should perhaps have died sooner, but with a 
better quality of life?” “Furthermore,” she continues, “you know what upset me in 
the hospital? It was all curative: physicians are educated to cure people and con-
sider it a failure when a patient dies. I noticed that doctors would wait a long time 
before telling a patient that nothing could be done, because there was always some 
new therapy or experimental treatment, especially in an oncology ward with phase 
II studies. Patients got very sick and I thought: ‘Is this really necessary? Three months 
left and one of those months very sick…’” 
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Susan’s interest in end-of-life care did not appear out of the blue. “The mystery of 
having to say goodbye. The fact that death is forever and the considerations of the 
hereafter have always fascinated me. I think it’s very personal. It is tied up with who 
I am. What decided me to take that final step to quit the job at the hospital, was 
when I wondered: What tires me at work? What gives me energy? When do I come 
home feeling well? When I can have conversations with patients about the way they 
perceive their illness and how they deal with it, or when I can comfort the family, 
explain things to them, give them information.”  
After five years of hospice experience, Susan knows pretty well why palliative 
care suits her. “I am easily accessible. People trust me very quickly. I may and I can 
get very close. I am not scared of intimacy. I dare to ask, I dare to say something, and 
I dare to name what I see. I noticed that it opens doors. Why I am not afraid? I think 
I am not afraid of emotions, I am not afraid of tears. And I think I’ve experienced 
enough myself. I had a lot of trouble with relationships. I thought a lot about myself.” 
She goes further into her own history and tells: “Palliative care concerns values that I 
consider important in life. I struggled with them myself. Being allowed to be as you 
are. I have noticed that the more I do this, the more I invite others to do this as well. 
I try to pay attention to who somebody is. Respecting a person without judgements. 
My point of view is: we’re here to take good care of each other.” 
“Palliative care practice,” Susan explains, “is very broad and concerns both the 
somatic, and the psychosocial and the spiritual. This means you have to be atten-
tive. You should concentrate on what a patient wants, and not on what you have to 
offer a patient. What is important for me is that I, as a nurse, will have the time to 
provide care. That I will have the time to start a conversation, and that I will have the 
opportunity to react to a remark by a patient and not have to go to another patient 
right away. A patient should have the opportunity to bring something up, whatever 
it is. Time is then condition number one. For instance, sometimes a patient is terri-
fied. Then I ask: ‘What are you afraid of?’ 
‘I actually don’t know.’
Then I say: ‘Look at it.’ 
‘I do not dare.’ 
‘Why not,’ I ask.
‘Then I get more terrified.’ 
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I try to reassure someone that nothing can happen if they analyse their anxiety. 
Often the process of dying or fear of pain or suffocation come up. Then you can 
discuss that together with the patient. Explain what you do when pain increases.” 
During the interview Susan recalls an event that indirectly contributed to her mo-
tivation to reorient professionally: the death of a friend, several years ago. He died 
two weeks after admission to a palliative care unit in a nursing home. Frequently 
visiting him made her realize what aspect of care was lacking at that unit. “There I 
met a couple of nurses who could do the care well, but who in my view missed an 
essential part of that care. They were interested, but still missed some kind of guts. 
They didn’t dare to present themselves communicating ‘I am in charge here and I 
am here for you’. I am not saying you should not show your vulnerability, but despite 
that vulnerability I believe you should stand firm.”  
When asked what is special about palliative care, she answers: “Something is ini-
tiated in care at the end-of-life, and that is the real, deeper contact between people. 
It goes deep very quickly. The art is to find out what it is like for this person. Does 
he want conversation, or does he want to be left in peace, or to watch television, 
or whatever… That continues to be fascinating; nobody is the same. For example, 
I once cared for a woman and the night she died I provided the final care together 
with her three daughters. I came home at six in the morning and was very happy. 
I thought: ‘wow, this went so well.’ That’s exactly the difference with other kinds of 
care; you only lose your mother once. At that moment I realise that I am a witness 
of such a profound and intimate moment. It is very special to me, having the op-
portunity to be part of that.” 
Another attractive aspect of hospice care came up: “Here in the hospice, I have a 
different feeling that I had in those 20 years in the hospital. My colleagues here all 
have a particular perspective, they reflect, and deal with things more consciously. 
Of course there are differences of opinion and conflicts once in while. Still, I have 
the idea that we can get on with each other in a mature way here. I expect to grow 
and to get feedback. If it concerns well-being, I think that the team as we have it 
is extremely important for my own well-being. They are all people I can call on for 
questions, to tell them something, or to have a cry… I am a person who needs to be 
able to say: ‘that patient said this, isn’t it nice? What could she mean?’ Getting some 
feedback. We’re with a team and I really like working in a team.”
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The caring conversation
At the end of life, health care interventions and the quality of life of the pa-
tients and their families are largely determined by conversations the patients 
(and members of their families) have with nurses, physicians and other pro-
fessionals.2,3 Because each patient’s illness is incurable, many patients strug-
gle with questions of meaning and need a partner who is willing to listen and 
engage in that struggle. Within the nursing sciences, Fredriksson – elaborating 
on studies by Eriksson – developed the term ‘caring conversation’ as a means 
to explore the meaning of suffering for the patient.15,18 This approach takes the 
caring relationship to be the central issue in caring. Fredriksson distinguishes 
between two primary modes of relating to a patient in a caring conversation: 
one aiming at connection, the other aiming at contact.18 These modes form 
a continuum where ‘connection’ is used to signify a caring relationship, and 
‘contact’ is to be understood as a relationship with limited intensity and inter-
subjectivity. Three elements are found to be essential for a caring conversa-
tion: presence, touch and listening. The modes of connection and contact each 
imply a specific interpretation of these elements. 
In the relational mode connection, the nurse is listening, using connec-
tive and caring touch, and is present as ‘being with’ a patient who wants a 
connection with the nurse. The characterisation that can be applied here is 
that of invitation and gift. The patients invite the nurse to enter into their 
world and to share their narratives. The nurse gives the caring or connective 
touch, silence and attention. In the contact mode the nurse is ‘listening’, using 
task-oriented touch, and is present as ‘being there’ for a patient who wants 
contact. An adequate characterisation here is that of question and answer. 
The contact begins with a question from a patient, which is answered by the 
nurse. As noted in the introduction, a task-oriented approach in palliative 
care, focussed on the patient’s physical problems, is less likely to lead to an 
improvement of well-being in the sense of ‘feeling better’. Since the achieve-
ment of the best possible quality of life for the patient is the main goal of 
palliative care, and the emphasis of this paper is on the caring relationship 
between hospice nurse and patient, we concentrate on caring conversation in 
the sense of connection. 
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The caring conversation in palliative care: ethics and morality 
Ricoeur frames the goal of ethics as the ethical intention: “to aim at the ‘good 
life’ with and for others, in just institutions”.15,19,20 This ‘formula’ combines 
both the Aristotelian heritage of ethics as the aim of an accomplished life 
(what is considered to be good) and the Kantian heritage of morality as the 
articulation of that aim in norms (that which imposes itself as an obligation).19 
Two significant features of this point of view are that ethics should be distin-
guished from morality, and that the first (the good) has primacy over the latter 
(the obligatory). The ethical intention has three dimensions: the personal, the 
interpersonal, and the institutional (see appendix 1). Before going on to an-
swer the two questions that are the focus of this paper, we will clarify these 
dimensions in the story of Susan (box 1). 
Personal dimension: self-esteem
Since the goal of palliative care is to alleviate suffering and to improve the 
quality of life of patients (and their families) who are facing a life-threatening 
illness,21 the professional perspective of the hospice nurse should be directed 
to that goal. What motivates this nurse to commit herself to this goal? Susan 
remarks that the attractiveness of end-of-life care is very personal to her and 
that it is tied up with who she is – someone who is fascinated by the finiteness 
of life. Furthermore, she indicates that her interest and willingness to care 
for the dying comes from the value she attaches to ‘taking good care of each 
other’. Ricoeur (p.176) uses the notion standards of excellence – which he bor-
rows from MacIntyre’s After virtue – to indicate the good that is immanent in 
a practice.19 This ‘good’ is inherently present in the goal of palliative care (to 
alleviate suffering, to enhance well-being), but is also expressed in the words 
of Susan referring to the emphasis on the socially and historically constructed 
notion of ‘total care’ (somatic, psychosocial, and spiritual) in palliative care 
practice. 
As Susan indicates, she values the opportunity to act out these standards 
of excellence. By valuing this, she also values herself as the author of those 
palliating actions: in the interpretation of her acting as a hospice nurse, Su-
san interprets herself. On an ethical plane self-interpretation leads to self-es-
teem.15 Susan’s story contains two passages that show her self-interpretation 
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and its relation to self-esteem. The first paragraph gives her interpretation of 
her work in the oncology ward. Although she does not reject chemotherapy as 
such, her observations of patients and procedures at the ward bothered her 
and her view of herself as an oncology nurse damaged her self-esteem. She 
did not interpret herself as a good nurse. Susan’s interpretation of herself as 
a hospice nurse, however, shows a more positive picture. She explains why 
palliative care suits her and why she is good at it. In the second half of this 
paragraph Susan further interprets her own history and indicates precisely 
how her self-esteem was improved by her work in palliative care. This illus-
trates the second dimension of Ricoeur’s ethical aim.
Interpersonal dimension: solicitude
The ethical intention is not only to live a life with esteem for oneself, but to 
live a life that is lived with and for others. Susan’s interpretation of her own 
background shows the importance of solicitude: concern for the other.20 A 
good life also implies a good life for the other and this is clearly expressed in 
Susan’s words about the value she attaches to allowing others to be as they 
are. She emphasises: ‘we’re here to take good care of each other’. Interest-
ingly, Susan’s closing remarks show another side of solicitude and point to the 
importance of providing palliative care in a team together with other profes-
sionals. Apparently, teamwork is not only important for patients, but also for 
carers. As can be concluded from Susan’s words, she has the need to consult 
with colleagues on a regular basis – in the sense of connection, not contact 
– and she expresses a certain (no less important) need to be appealed to as 
“other” in the form of getting feedback. As Ricoeur emphasises, self-esteem 
and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon without the other.20
Solicitude actualises the dialectic of giving and receiving as a fundamental 
aspect of the ethical relationship between the self and the other.15 Ricoeur ar-
gues that (the problem of) acknowledging freedom in second person is the cen-
tral phenomenon of ethics (aiming at the good life): if I don’t understand what 
it is for me to be free, I can’t want this for the other.22 He introduces an ethical 
relationship that combines both asymmetry (Levinas) and mutuality (Aristo-
tle).15 However, contrary to the Levinasian perspective, it is not the moral in-
junction coming from the other, but the reduced capacity of being-able-to-act 
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(suffering) of the other that evokes sympathy from the individual. Because of 
this passive suffering – which Ricoeur conceives as the reverse of the moral 
injunction coming from the other19 – the initiative has to come from the com-
passionate other (com passio: the one suffering with). This readiness to act, 
emerging from the wish to restore freedom (being-able-to-act) for the other, ap-
pears in Susan’s story when she talks about the nurses she encountered when 
her friend died. She believes these nurses somehow lacked such initiative and 
lacked an attitude that communicated the availability: ‘I am here for you’. 
Ricoeur explains mutuality in the ethical relationship on the basis of Ar-
istotle’s notion of virtuous friendship (the common wish to live together). For 
this he introduces three closely related principles. First, reversibility means 
that in a relationship, roles are reversible: when a person says ‘you’, the other 
understands ‘I’, and vice versa. Susan’s prototype conversation with a terri-
fied patient exemplifies this feature of mutuality. Second, non-substitutability 
indicates that persons apart from their roles are irreplaceable. In the story, 
this is illustrated by Susan’s answer to the question about what is special 
in palliative care: the fact that end-of-life care is very personal and offers 
the opportunity for deeper human contact in which everybody is a distinct 
individual. Finally, these two notions lead to similitude, which stems from 
the exchange between self-esteem and solicitude. This means that the other 
is not solely receiving and the compassionate person is not merely giving.15 
An example of similitude is advanced twice in Susan’s story. First when she 
explains what gave her energy when she was still working in the hospital: 
conversations with patients and family, and later in Susan’s positive experi-
ence in providing final care for one of her patients, in cooperation with the 
three daughters of the patient. Here, she clearly says what it means for her 
self-esteem when she is caring (acting) out of concern for others. 
Institutional dimension: equality
In the third dimension the analysis moves from the interpersonal to the institu-
tional and extends solicitude to justice by adding equality to the interpersonal 
dimension: equality is to life in institutions what solicitude is to interpersonal 
relations.15,20 Institutions refer to structures of living together that extend be-
yond the interpersonal relationship and thus expand the range of the ethical 
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intention to all humanity. An institution involves a system of distribution of 
goods and burdens and exists only to the extent that individuals take part in 
it.20 Susan’s story involves two health care institutions: hospital (oncology) 
care and hospice care. It can be seen from her story that Susan did not find 
her niche in the hospital. The tension between Susan’s own perspective (the 
personal and interpersonal dimension) and her experiences in the hospital 
(the institutional dimension) can be explained within Ricoeur’s framework. In 
the first paragraph, she gives her opinion that hospital patients often don’t die 
well, because chemotherapy impairs the quality of end-of-life. Oncology care 
did not match her idea of taking good care of patients at the ends of their lives, 
while she finds that palliative care does offer a better end-of-life. 
Susan’s changeover to hospice care may be explained by her personal com-
mitment to palliative care – as we have suggested above – but it may also be 
that she was persuaded to switch by the nature and language of hospice care 
with its caring approach. Language can be considered the most important in-
stitution of the caring conversation.15 First of all, language, either verbal or 
non-verbal, marks the beginning of a conversational intervention: it enables a 
patient to invite a caregiver to interact and gives the latter the opportunity to 
react. However, a conversation involves much more than face-to-face contact 
between individuals. What is said by individual speakers is inevitably coloured 
by ‘social languages’: discourses peculiar to a specific stratum of society (e.g. a 
professional group) within a given social system at a given time.23 The social lan-
guage of palliative care (patient-centred, holistic, see: standards of excellence 
in ‘personal dimension’) shapes what individual carers say. When Susan has a 
conversation with a patient who is afraid of pain or suffocation, she is doing so 
not only as an individual but also as a professional making use of the socially 
and historically constructed notion of ‘total care’. In this way, through social 
language, anonymous others participate in communication at the micro-level. 
Apparently, the role of acting out the institutionally structured and prescribed 
professional-patient relationship in hospice care suits Susan much better than 
the role of an oncology nurse taking care of patients undergoing chemotherapy. 
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Discussion 
Practical wisdom
According to Fredriksson and Eriksson, the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’ 
can be summarised as a “melting pot where the triadic ethos of self-esteem, 
autonomy and caritas, reconsidered as the norms of respect, responsibility 
and reciprocity, can be spelled out in the conviction of practical wisdom” 
(p.145).15 This summary advances the three central ethical notions of the per-
sonal and interpersonal dimension – self-esteem, autonomy (ability-to-act), 
and caritas (referred to as a historical standard of excellence for caring and 
nursing15, p.140) – translated into corresponding norms. This ‘triadic ethos’ and 
the norms emanating from it will function as a guide to answer the questions 
that are the starting point of this article, though we first have to expand on 
the concept of practical wisdom.  
As Ricoeur argues, the good (ethics) has primacy over the obligatory (mo-
rality). The transformation of the ethical intention into norms consequently 
requires practical wisdom (phronesis) that allows the application of these 
norms to particular cases. The Aristotelian term phronesis is often considered 
to be the central concern of professional competence and can be described as 
a habitual disposition that enables someone to both deliberate about what is 
good or bad for a human being in a particular situation and to act appropriate-
ly.24 This means that in caring conversations in palliative care, the willingness 
to do good and the demands of moral rules in practice require the practical 
wisdom that enables the nurse to make the good and the obligatory tangible 
to dying patients, who often find themselves in complex and disorderly situa-
tions. Thus, conversation can be considered as an aspect of practical wisdom 
in which a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between the two poles of the dialectic rela-
tionship – the conviction of the good and that which imposes itself as obliga-
tory – is to be achieved.20 But what kind of person should the hospice nurse 
be? And how should (s)he engage in caring conversations? 
What kind of person?
The good life of the hospice nurse, as sketched in Susan’s story, makes it clear 
that self-interpretation on an ethical level is self-esteem. At the time Susan 
worked at the oncology ward, her self-evaluation as a practitioner seemed to 
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generate less self-esteem than her current evaluation of her role as a hospice 
nurse. As a norm, self-esteem is interpreted as self-respect and consequently 
esteem for others becomes respect.15 Respecting others comes up on several 
occasions in the story: both in Susan’s remarks on the importance of allow-
ing others to be as they are, and in her need to receive feedback from others. 
Moreover, evaluating one’s actions presupposes autonomy: the capacity to 
judge is based on the ability to act.20 The norm which corresponds to auton-
omy is responsibility. In Susan’s story this comes out as initiative, the readi-
ness to act, which she finds very important in the care of dying patients. In 
other words, knowledgeable and skilled palliative care nurses should respect 
both themselves and others and should take the responsibility to be active in 
their own performance and in acting for dying patients, who lack the ability 
to act for themselves. 
This advances the distinction between, and the close relation between, 
the person of the nurse and the role of the nurse in palliative care. This can be 
seen in Susan’s story. On the one hand, Susan’s self-esteem as a person arises 
from her valuing herself as a nurse, which is in fact a role, while Susan’s use 
of the ‘social language’ of palliative care in her approach to dying patients 
makes it difficult to distinguish the nurse as a person from someone playing 
the societal role of a hospice nurse. On the other hand, playing the role of the 
competent hospice nurse seems to demand a specific personal motivation and 
a specific capacity to bring palliative ‘standards of excellence’ into practice. 
As Susan points out: an active attitude to one’s own performance and to dying 
patients is not granted to everybody. 
How to engage in conversations? 
So far, the kind of person of the hospice nurse is central to the ethical relation-
ship emphasising respect and responsibility. To correct this asymmetry and to 
eliminate the risk of a relationship where the nurse acts as a dominant figure, 
the ethos of caritas, reconsidered as the norm of reciprocity, is indispensable. 
This third aspect of the ‘triadic ethos’ also determines how hospice nurses 
should alleviate suffering through caring conversations: accepting the suffer-
ing patient as the person he or she is on the basis of mutuality.15 Reciprocity 
is expressed through the principles of reversibility, non-substitutability, and 
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similitude, which ought to safeguard the caring relationship between hos-
pice nurses and dying patients from the danger of abuse of power. From the 
ethics of the caring conversation, it is argued that the personal and interper-
sonal dimension are inextricably tied together by Ricoeur’s reformulation of 
Kant’s Golden Rule: ‘in order to hold others in esteem, I must hold myself in 
esteem’.15 In sum, hospice nurses not only give when they provide care. They 
also receive. Patients not only receive but they also give. Hospice nurses – as 
is exemplified in the story of Susan – aim to contribute to the quality of life 
of dying patients. The patients contribute to the quality of life of their nurses 
through the positive effect of palliative care on the nurses’ self-esteem. Our 
analysis suggests that such an interaction is essential when a good (ethical) 
relationship – centred on caring conversations in the sense of connection – is 
considered the corner stone of palliative care. 
A closer examination of this analysis of hospice nurses and the way they 
should engage in caring conversations will be presented in a following paper. 
In that paper, our results will be set in context with the recent literature on 
self-esteem, and on personal and professional identity in nursing. 
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Appendix
Appendix 1 - Respondents, methods and analysis
Respondents
The story of Susan (box 1) is a fictitious story which is composed of exemplary state-
ments (those between quotation marks) made by five hospice nurses who were 
interviewed within the framework of a larger project: Moral attitude in palliative 
care. This project explores the personal motivation and commitment of palliative 
professionals to act in the interest of others. One of the settings where data for this 
research project were collected was a hospice that had just been founded. Two 
of the respondents (one male, one female) had prior experience in palliative care 
practice before getting involved in their current position in the hospice. Two (both 
female) had worked for many years in an oncology wards in an academic hospital, 
while one of them worked as a palliative care consultant as well. One respondent 
(male) had had little experienced concerning end-of-life care before he started to 
work in the hospice. In sum, Susan’s story is to be seen as a portrait of an exemplary 
nurse that is based on the statements derived from the analysis of the five inter-
views on the basis of ‘the ethics of the caring conversation’. 
Methods
The semi-structured interview with hospice professionals initially focussed on the 
respondents’ history in palliative care. Why palliative care, and what motivates them? 
Next, the theme of palliative care itself was raised. What is it, and what is the ideal? 
Furthermore, is everybody suited to providing such care? Another theme that was 
brought up was well-being: What is their view on the well-being of patients? In what 
respect does providing palliative care contribute to their own well-being? 
Analysis
The five interviews were imported into Kwalitan, a software package that is designed 
to be used to analyse and interpret qualitative data.16 Before entering the data into 
the program, the five interviews were divided in segments. A segment is a part of 
an interview that is marked with one or more codes. The actual analysis took place 
on the basis of ‘the ethics of the caring conversation’ that incorporates the ethics 
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of P. Ricoeur.15 For this analysis, each of the three components that are the funda-
ment of Ricoeur’s ethics and of the ethics of the caring conversation – the personal, 
the interpersonal and the institutional – were translated into several codes (see 
list below). Codes are labels for assigning units of meaning to (parts of) interview 
segments as imported into Kwalitan. For example: all text fragments that referred 
to a respondent’s motivation (first code in the list below) were assigned that code. 
After coding five interviews, a list of statements concerning the respondents’ moti-
vation could be compiled (reduction of data). Subsequently, the most characteristic 
remarks concerning motivation were used to construct the story of Susan (synthe-
sis).17 Susan’s story should be understood as the profile of an exemplary hospice 
nurse that is structured on the basis of the normative framework of Ricoeur and 
built out of selected quotations from the five interviews. 
Limitations
This is an exploratory study that aims to provide a concrete picture of the ethics of 
the caring conversation in palliative care practice. Since its empirical part is based on 
five interviews in which hospice nurses give their view on (the ideals of) palliative 
care and their role in practice, we have to be modest about the generality of the 
results. The strength of the study is that it provides – through the normative frame-
work of Ricoeur – an interpretation of the qualities, processes and considerations 
that enable hospice nurses to relate to dying persons in the sense of connection. 
Furthermore, it draws a picture of the close relationship between the person and 
the role he/she plays as a hospice nurse.
What follows are the three components of Ricoeur’s ethical aim, the accompany-
ing codes and the descriptions with which the five interviews were interpreted. 
The personal – ‘Aiming at the good life...’
Motivation: What motivates the nurse to alleviate the suffering of the dying?
Standards of excellence: What are the standards of excellence immanent in pallia-
tive care practice?
Self-interpretation: Concerns the interaction between the respondent’s idea of the 
good life and choices in connection to respondent’s practice (‘What seems to us to 
be best with regard to our life as a whole’).
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The interpersonal – ‘…with and for others…’
Solicitude: Concerns the connection of the interpersonal with the individual and 
actualises the dialectic of giving and receiving as a fundamental aspect of the ethi-
cal relationship (‘A good life cannot be a good life only for oneself but it must also 
be good for the other’)
Compassionate other: Reflects that an ethical relationship is asymmetrical: the ini-
tiative comes from the compassionate other, the one suffering-with. 
The following three codes are inseparably connected and explain the mutuality of 
the ethical relationship:
Reversibility: Refers to roles: when I say you, you understand I. 
Nonsubstitutability: Refers to personhood: people are irreplaceable apart from their 
roles.
Similitude: The one suffering is not solely receiving and the compassionate one is 
not only giving: there is mutuality.
The institutional – ‘…in just institutions’
Equality: When moving from the interpersonal to the institutional, equality replaces 
solicitude.
Language: Concerns language as an important institution of the caring conversa-
tion.

Chapter 5
Why hospice nurses need high self-esteem 
Gert Olthuis 
Carlo Leget
Wim Dekkers
Abstract
This article discusses the relationship between personal and professional 
qualities in hospice nurses. We examine the notion of self-esteem in personal 
and professional identity. The focus is on two questions: (1) What is self-es-
teem, and how is it related to personal identity and its moral dimension?, 
and (2) How do self-esteem and personal identity relate to the professional 
identity of the nurse? We demonstrate that it is important that the moral and 
personal goals in a nurse’s life coincide. If the nurse’s personal view of the 
good life is compatible with their experiences and feelings as professionals, 
this improves their performance as nurses. We also discuss how good nursing 
depends on the responses that the nurse gets from others (patients, colleagues, 
family); they make the nurse feel valued as a person and enable them to see 
the value of the work they do.  
Nursing Ethics 2007; 14: 62-71,
with permission of SAGE Publications Ltd, London, UK

Why hospice nurses need high self-esteem 
Introduction
Can every nurse be a good palliative care nurse? Can palliative care nurses 
persevere in the continuous care for dying people without the support of sig-
nificant others? Professional caregivers who are involved in practicing pallia-
tive care on a daily basis will probably answer “no” to both questions. Why 
shouldn’t every nurse be able to provide good palliative care? Why should 
palliative professionals need the support of other people? This article explores 
these observations and attempts to offer an explanation from an ethical per-
spective in which the concepts of self-esteem, personal identity and profes-
sional identity play a central role. 
Background
This article elaborates on the results of a previous analysis of a depiction of 
an exemplary hospice nurse.1 This depiction – the story of Susan – is based on 
statements derived from the analysis of five interviews with hospice nurses 
(box 1). Table 1 displays the ethical notions and their corresponding norms 
that were central to our analysis. These notions were taken from the norma-
tive framework that we used to analyse Susan’s story: ‘the ethics of the caring 
conversation’, which is based on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.2  
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Table 1 – Central ethical notions and corresponding norms
Ethical notion Corresponding norm
Self-esteem Self-respect 
Autonomy Responsibility 
Caritas Reciprocity
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Box 1: Susan’s story – A synopsis*
Susan (45) has worked in a hospice for 5 years now, after having worked in several dif-
ferent hospital departments for more than 20 years. What induced her to switch from 
oncology to professional hospice care was the impact of chemotherapies on patients. 
She doesn’t have anything against those therapies, but felt that they just didn’t suit her: 
“Quality of life decreases so rapidly. What do you gain? Patients get very sick and I think: 
‘Is this really necessary? Three months left and one of those months very sick…’” Further-
more, she realised that she came home feeling good when she had had conversations 
with patients about the way they perceived their illness and how they dealt with it, or 
when she could comfort the family, explain things to them, and give them information.
Susan already had an interest in end-of-life care: “The mystery of having to say good-
bye. The fact that death is forever and the considerations of the hereafter have always 
fascinated me. I think it’s very personal. It is tied up with who I am.” She describes herself 
as easily accessible and as a person who thought a lot about herself. People are quick 
to trust her: “I may and I can get very close. I am not scared of intimacy. I dare to ask, I 
dare to say something, and I dare to name what I see. I noticed that it opens up doors. I 
think I am not afraid of emotions, I am not afraid of tears.” Palliative care concerns values 
that she considers important in life: being allowed to be as you are, respecting a person 
without judgements. “My point of view is: we’re here to take good care of each other.”
Susan emphasises that in hospice practice professionals should concentrate on what 
a patient wants, and not on what you have to offer a patient as a professional. A patient 
should have the opportunity to bring something up, whatever it is. “The art is to find out 
what it is like for this person.” Time is then the most important constraint. She believes 
that hospice professionals should be able to show their vulnerability, but despite that 
should be able to stand firm, to communicate that: ‘I am in charge here and I am here for 
you’. For Susan, two factors indicate what is special about hospice care. First, that end-of-
life care can initiate real, deeper contact between humans. It goes in-depth very quickly. 
Second, she mentions that in the hospice the atmosphere is not the same as it was in 
the 20 hospital years: “My colleagues here all have a particular perspective, they reflect, 
and deal with things more consciously. I expect to grow and to get feedback. I think that 
the team as we have it is extremely important for my own well-being.”
*For methodological details on the way this story was assembled see chapter 4 of this thesis.
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The first question in our analysis was: What kind of person should the hospice 
nurse be? We identified two important characteristics. First, the interpreta-
tion of one’s performance as a professional closely corresponds to the esteem 
one has for oneself as a person. As her story shows, Susan felt much better 
about herself in the role of a hospice nurse than she did in the role of an on-
cology nurse. In normative terms, self-esteem is interpreted as self-respect: 
Susan seemed to respect herself much more as a hospice nurse. In addition 
the ability to evaluate one’s professional performance depends on one’s abil-
ity to act, which presupposes autonomy. Susan could evaluate her actions as 
a nurse because she is able to act as an autonomous person who is responsible 
for her own actions. In a caring relationship in the hospice, this responsibil-
ity – which is a normative interpretation of autonomy – is expressed by the 
initiatives of the hospice nurses to actively involve themselves in the care of 
dying persons. Susan’s willingness to engage in hospice care stems from her 
‘concern for the other’ as is brought forward by her assertion that “we’re here 
to take good care of each other”. This seems to suit her much better than the 
responsibilities that she had to accept as an oncology nurse.
The second question we attempted to answer in our analysis was: How 
should hospice nurses engage in caring conversations? Caring conversations 
are an avenue for exploring the meaning of suffering for patients. Although 
hospice nurses ideally perform their job with a pro-active attitude, patients 
in the palliative phase often find themselves in a dependent position. The 
ethical notion of caritas and the corresponding norm of reciprocity play a key 
role in compensating for this asymmetry in the caring relationship. Caritas 
should be conceived of as a historical standard of excellence for caring and 
nursing, while reciprocity expresses the dialectic of giving and receiving in 
the caring relationship between the hospice nurse and the dying person. As 
can be seen in Susan’s words about respecting a person without judgements, 
hospice nurses engaged in a caring conversation should accept the suffering 
patient as the person they are, on the basis of mutuality. Susan’s concern for 
the other becomes respect for others, in the same way that Susan’s esteem 
for herself becomes self-respect. Although hospice nurses aim to improve the 
quality of life of dying patients, the patients contribute to the quality of life of 
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the nurses because the nurses’ self-esteem is improved by the palliative care 
they provide for patients.
This article
Our previous analysis explored the professional role hospice nurses are ex-
pected to play and the way this is interwoven with the person they are. Self-
esteem clearly plays a crucial role. This article elaborates on the earlier analy-
sis and takes further the theoretical clarification of the links between personal 
and professional identity. The story of Susan will serve as a background for 
this discussion. We offer a more detailed examination of self-esteem in re-
lation to the notions of personal identity (person) and professional identity 
(role). We focus on two questions: 1) What is self-esteem and how is it related 
to personal identity and its moral dimension? and 2) How do self-esteem and 
personal identity relate to the professional identity of the nurse? In the con-
cluding paragraph we will return to the questions that were posed at the 
beginning of the article.  
What is self-esteem and how is it related to personal identity and its moral 
dimension? 
Self-esteem
Self-esteem can briefly be described as  “one’s good opinion of one’s own 
worth”3 or “worthiness to be loved”.4 According to Ricoeur, a person’s self-es-
teem results from self-interpretation.5 Self-esteem evolves from a hermeneu-
tical circle where people, in interpreting their actions, are interpreting them-
selves as a specific person. Ricoeur characterises this hermeneutical circle as 
a “back-and-forth motion” (p.179) between a person’s idea of ‘the good life’ 
and the most important decisions of that person’s existence (i.e. career, love).5 
In social psychology, in which the concept of self-esteem is widely discussed, 
a closer examination of the concept appears to display two characteristics 
that play a crucial role: it is mastery-oriented and self-esteem monitors one’s 
value as a relational partner. Susan’s story offers several examples that illus-
trate these two characteristics.
First, self-esteem is mastery-oriented rather than achievement-oriented. 
This means that the central issue is mastering abilities rather than pursuing 
CHAPTER 5 Why hospice nurses need high self-esteem
5
certain goals as effortlessly as possible. According to Dweck, self-esteem is not 
something that people can acquire via positive reinforcement directing them 
to achieve particular goals.6 It is rather “a way of experiencing yourself when 
you are using your resources well – to master challenges, to learn, to help oth-
ers” (p.128).6 Self-esteem is developed in interaction with, and is facilitated 
by, other people such as parents, peers, and teachers. Self-esteem is something 
that people feel when they are striving wholeheartedly for worthwhile things. 
As an oncology nurse, Susan returned home feeling fulfilled when she had had 
the opportunity to talk to patients about what their illness meant to them. 
Later on, she described the resources that let her exercise her values as a hos-
pice nurse. This illustrates how Susan’s self-esteem was based on her experi-
ences of using her abilities fully in a service that she found important.
Second, self-esteem monitors a person’s suitability for membership of de-
sired groups and relationships.7 It motivates behaviour that promotes accept-
ance by other people, even when relational devaluation is not an immediate 
problem for that person. Leary and Baumeister suggest that people appear 
to be particularly predisposed to seek and maintain interpersonal relation-
ships that are characterised by stability, affective concern, frequent contact, 
and the prospect of continuing contact.7 This ‘need to belong’ plays a central 
role in self-esteem. Self-esteem should therefore be seen as a ‘sociometer’: an 
internal monitor of the degree to which one is valued as a relational partner. 
Self-esteem is not a simple reflection of other people’s evaluations, but must 
be viewed as a more dynamic psychological system. It enables individuals 
to monitor and maintain the quality of their interpersonal relationships by 
reacting to others’ responses. At its core, self-esteem refers to how one feels 
about oneself. It is one’s subjective appraisal of how one stands as a valuable, 
viable, sought-after member of the groups and relationships to which one 
belongs by choice (p.2).7 Susan’s story illustrates this ‘sociometer’ perspec-
tive on self-esteem when she talked about what she considered to be special 
about hospice care. She emphasised the opportunity hospice care offers to 
both maintain in-depth relationships with patients and their families, and to 
establish more reflective relationships with colleagues. 
Did Susan experience self-esteem as an oncology nurse? Did she use her 
resources well in that period? Did she receive positive feedback from others? 
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Although she did do her best, and others – oncology patients, their families, 
her colleagues – must have valued her as a relational partner, oncology nurs-
ing did not offer enough for her to consider it worth while. The oncology ward 
apparently did not offer her sufficient opportunity to make use of her resourc-
es. In her opinion ‘quality of life’ rather than ‘life extension’ should determine 
health care interventions at the end of life. In Susan’s view of the good life, 
participating in caring conversations and hospice nursing do more good than 
delivering chemotherapy and nursing hospital patients. Hospice care gave her 
the opportunity to bring her resources into action in a way that she valued, 
that is, by taking good care of others and allowing them to be as they are. It 
also gave her the opportunity to be a sought-after member of groups to which 
she aspired to belong: in meaningful relationships with persons facing death 
and with colleagues who were prepared to reflect on the way they provide 
end-of-life care. 
Self-esteem and personal identity
We presume that people’s appraisal of the way they use their abilities, and of 
their performance as a relational partners is central to self-esteem. Yet, how 
is self-esteem related to personal identity? Etymology offers a first indication. 
The term ‘identity’ is derived from the Latin word for ‘same’, while in contrast 
‘person’ is derived from the Latin word for ‘theatrical mask’, which is some-
thing that is changeable.8 A mask is an impermanent thing that exists only in its 
role of representing something other than itself. The point of wearing a mask is 
to communicate. Masks are used to perform in social situations, which implies 
that the various meanings of that mask are all fundamentally relational. 
Ricoeur offered a further conceptual clarification of personal identity.5 
He distinguished between identity as sameness (idem) and identity as self-
hood (ipse). Idem points to identity as a unity that has certain permanence in 
time. Susan as a hospice nurse is the same Susan who was an oncology nurse. 
Identity meaning ipse, however, involves a dialectic of self and other than 
self: “the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree 
that one cannot be thought of without the other” (p.3).5 Susan the hospice 
nurse may still be the same (idem) Susan as Susan the oncology nurse, but 
Susan’s view of herself (ipse) changed through her interaction with others. Su-
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san’s personal, reflective concern with her own experience was progressively 
transformed by her interactions with others and gradually altered her from 
an oncology nurse into a hospice nurse. 
Although self-esteem enables individuals to monitor and to respond to 
other people’s responses, other people also play a crucial part in personal 
identity. Since, on the one hand, identity as selfhood (ipse) involves the dialec-
tical relationship between self and other, and self-esteem is concerned with 
maintaining the quality of one’s interpersonal relationships, it seems reason-
able to assume, as Ricoeur did, that they are interwoven and affect each other. 
On the other hand, identity as sameness (idem) is also related to self-esteem. 
Korsgaard, for instance, gives an account of personal identity, which empha-
sises agency or authorship.9 She argues that the sort of continuity needed by 
persons to maintain their own personal identity (‘same’) essentially involves 
their agency. According to Korsgaard: “We think of living our lives, and even 
of having our experiences, as something that we do” (p.121).9 Given the as-
sumption that self-esteem depends on people’s competence to maintain rela-
tionships and the extent to which  they see themselves as socially valuable, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that it is tied to the sense of authorship that 
Korsgaard has in mind. Although we see ourselves as authors of our own ac-
tions, the response of others to our actions seems to determine, through self-
esteem, how we appreciate ourselves as such agents. In Susan’s story, she 
learned to value herself more highly as a hospice nurse than she did as an 
oncology nurse. 
The moral dimension
Self-esteem and personal identity have a shared social nature. The perceived 
response of others seems to connect self-esteem with personal identity. From 
Ricoeur’s analysis it can be concluded that the social nature of personal iden-
tity is the basis for morality. From this discussion of self-esteem and per-
sonal identity it appears that ‘agency’, or ‘authorship’, plays a prominent part 
in their mutual connection. Experiencing self-esteem is psychologically rel-
evant: “it appears to influence our sense of agency in addition to our sense of 
well-being” (p.60).10 However, what does the moral dimension of the relation-
ship between self-esteem and personal identity imply?
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Self-esteem is related to morality because it may be understood to arise 
from a perception of oneself as morally competent.10 This accords with our 
view that self-esteem is one’s experience of oneself when one uses one’s abili-
ties for the benefit of what one considers important in life. The moral dimen-
sion of the relationship between self-esteem and personal identity explains 
why people wish to act morally. The key to answering this question is located 
in the integration of morality and personality.11 Moral sensibility shapes per-
sonal identity, and identification with morality shapes one’s sense of personal 
responsibility and motivates one to act consistently with what one knows 
and believes. Moral behaviour is closely associated with the kind of person 
people consider themselves to be and “depends on how the “I” understands 
itself and its responsibilities” (p.37).11 Morally good behaviour not only de-
pends on moral beliefs, but also on the manner and extent to which individu-
als’ moral concerns are involved in their sense of themselves as persons (i.e. 
their personal identity). Two observations from a study on ‘moral exemplars’ 
can further clarify this relationship.12 Both observations can be recognised in 
Susan’s story.
First, morally admirable persons who are regarded as ‘moral exemplars’ 
define themselves in terms of moral goals; are more likely to interpret events 
as morally relevant and will be more likely to see themselves implicated in 
the solution of these problems.12 This coincidence of moral and personal goals 
means that there is little divergence between judgement and conduct and that 
choices for action are made with some confidence. These people feel morally 
involved in what happens in their environment and do not hesitate to convert 
this engagement into action. The coincidence of moral and personal goals in 
Susan’s situation can be seen in the way that her providing palliative care 
involved values that she considered important. Susan also emphasises the 
importance of a kind of engagement and readiness to act by communicating ‘I 
am in charge here and I am here for you’.
Second, people’s moral goals and choices are actively construed in the 
context of actual interpersonal relationships.12 In explaining their life deci-
sions, ‘moral exemplars’ tend to offer justifications based on actions, events 
or circumstances rather than on abstractions like values or principles. The 
active construction and transformation of moral goals and choices is exem-
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plified in Susan’s story by her switch from oncology to hospice care. It was 
more her dissatisfaction with the specific experiences of patients undergoing 
chemotherapy that made her decide to switch to hospice care, than any ethi-
cal principle. 
The experience of self-esteem is therefore related to people’s perceptions 
of themselves as the authors of their own actions, and is also affected by the 
dialectical relationship between the individual and others. Self-esteem not only 
involves concern for oneself, but also concern for others. Meeting demanding 
challenges, using one’s resources well and receiving positive responses from 
other people feed self-esteem in making for a productive and constructive life.6 
In the course of the development of ‘moral exemplars’ as people, personal goals 
are transformed into moral goals, which become more and more central to 
their sense of self.12 Some people “care so deeply about morality and about the 
quality of their relations with other people – or most simply and fundamental-
ly about other people – that it shapes who they are at a fundamental level and 
thereby consistently motivates them in the right direction, constrains them 
from exempting themselves from the claims morality makes on all of us, and 
compels them to ongoing moral self-reflection” (p.41, emphasis added).12 We 
believe that the italicized words indicate the inevitable connection between 
self-esteem and personal identity and its moral dimension. 
How do self-esteem and personal identity relate to the professional iden-
tity of nurses? 
Personal and professional identity
Öhlén and Segesten have conceptually analysed the professional identity of 
nurses and discern a personal and an interpersonal dimension.13 Their study 
is helpful in clarifying the nature of the links between personal and profes-
sional identity.
The personal dimension of professional identity implies that personal 
identity should be considered a prerequisite for the development of profes-
sional identity. The relationship between personal and professional identity 
is specifically expressed in the fact that the latter concerns the individual 
nurses’ perceptions of themselves in the context of nursing, involving the ex-
perience and feeling of being a nurse. Professional identity can be described 
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as “having the feeling of being a person who can practise nursing with skill 
and responsibility” and “implies awareness of personal resources and limita-
tions” (p.721).13 Being a nurse not only requires a personal effort to be open 
to patients, but also means interpreting professional activities in the light of 
being a person, which makes professional development a key contributor to 
increased self-esteem. This observation demonstrates the crucial role self-es-
teem plays in nursing care, and makes clear its close relationship to personal 
and professional identity. 
The interpersonal dimension of professional identity clarifies the part 
that others play in the relationship between personal and professional iden-
tity. Professional identity is developed by interaction with other nurses and 
through internalization of the relevant knowledge, skills, norms, values and 
the professional nursing culture. This happens by socialization, which is a 
continuing interactive lifelong process that characterises both general human 
development and specific professional growth. The subjective part of profes-
sional identity (i.e. nurses’ experience and feeling of themselves as nurses) is 
considered to be the basis for the objective part (i.e. other people’s images of 
persons as nurses). This general image of  the person of the nurse emphasises 
presence, readiness to act and congruence between feelings and behaviour 
towards others.13 This image seems to resemble the observations in the eth-
ics of the caring conversation, that initiative has to come from nurses who 
are actively involved in caring for suffering others. A prerequisite for the de-
velopment of a professional identity as a nurse is a focus on what is best 
for patients, which characterises the influence of the patient on professional 
development. Even though patients are dependent and often in distress, they 
should still be approached as persons. The importance of perceiving patients 
as persons can again be recognised. Another central element of the interper-
sonal dimension of the ethics of the caring conversation can therefore be rec-
ognised as solicitude, or concern for the other. 
Moral agency in a professional context
All the mutually connected threads concerning self-esteem, personal identity, 
and the professional identity of nurses seem to converge in ‘agency’, or what 
elsewhere is referred to as ‘moral agency in nursing’.14 Nurses’ view of them-
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selves and of their professional identity is intrinsically linked to their capac-
ity to see good in the work they do. In this respect, two kinds of value can be 
recognised:14 the value that is intrinsic to the moment (i.e. the significance to 
nurses of being present in a particular situation, at a particular time, having 
the unexpected opportunity to experience a reciprocal relationship that is val-
ued by both themselves and the patients) and the value of personally achieving 
that which one believes a professional nurse ought to achieve. There is more 
to this than just excellent job performance; “It requires that the goals of nurs-
ing are embraced by nurses as a part of their ongoing chosen direction within 
their life plan” (p.170).14 This was emphasised by the exemplary hospice nurse 
who was the subject of our previous analysis: ‘My point of view is: we’re here 
to take good care of each other’. We outlined above that self-esteem and (the 
moral dimension of) personal identity are closely interwoven when it concerns 
someone’s motivation to act for the benefit of other people. Taking good care of 
other people can be considered an important condition for a nurses’ develop-
ment as a persons,15 but this does seem to happen more naturally when nurses’ 
moral goals coincide with the goals of those nurses’ personal ambitions.
Concluding remarks
We began by wondering whether every nurse could be a good palliative care 
nurse and if palliative care nurses could do without the support of significant 
others. We suggested that the majority of the palliative care community would 
disagree with these propositions. Our article is aimed at clarifying these ‘pal-
liative commonplaces’ from an ethical perspective on the basis of the relation 
between self-esteem, personal identity and professional identity. 
It seems obvious that palliative care nurses cannot do without the sup-
port of others, and this can be explained in terms of self-esteem. As self-esteem 
largely depends on the perceived quality of interpersonal relationships, the 
appreciation of others seems to be an indispensable support for a practicing 
nurse. The often intensely experienced reciprocal relationship with patients 
and with their families let Susan see her value as a relational partner. Having 
reflective colleagues in the hospice was also very important. They made her 
feel that she was a member of their group, in which she wanted to remain, 
and they saw the value of the work she did; indeed, the work they all did. 
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The network of interpersonal relationships that impacts on hospice 
nurses’ experience of making a difference and may influence their self-esteem 
can easily be expanded (e.g.: home front, hospice management, nursing pro-
fession as a whole, society). The quality of hospice care is not only determined 
by the quality of the professionals and of the personal relationships involved, 
it is also determined by the appreciation these professionals receive from the 
wider world. The embedding of (hospice) nursing in such a wide relational 
web also implies a risk: it inevitably contributes to a nurses’ self-esteem and 
to their capacity to see value in the work they do, but it also makes them 
vulnerable and can just as easily make them feel undervalued. A lack of ap-
preciation has not only negative consequences for the well-being of the nurse. 
It may also discourage them from making caregiving central to their personal 
values and may consequently degrade the quality of the care they give. 
The fact that not every nurse can become a good palliative care nurse, 
can be explained by what particular nurses consider valuable in their person-
al and professional lives. The discussion of self-esteem, the moral dimension 
of personal identity, and moral agency in nursing demonstrates the impor-
tance of the coincidence of moral and personal goals. If nurses’ personal view 
of the good life does not include what they experience and feel as professional 
nurses, it becomes more difficult for them to provide good nursing. For Su-
san, providing hospice care puts into everyday practice values that concerned 
her, that is, taking care of each other, quality of life, being allowed to be as 
one is. Palliative care values are an important part of Susan’s personal life: 
“It is tied up with who I am.” This not only made her suitable to work as a 
hospice nurse, but it also contributed to her quality of life in the sense that it 
increased her self-esteem. 
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Chapter 6
What kind of palliative caregiver should I be?
Moral attitude and reflection in palliative practice
Gert Olthuis 
Wim Dekkers 
Abstract
A recent EAPC-report recommends the promotion of reflective practice in pal-
liative care. The present article explores the moral attitude that professionals 
bring to such reflective practice. A clear articulation of this moral attitude is 
required to structure the recommended reflective practice. We examine this 
moral attitude in terms of four crucial aspects of virtue ethics; practice, mo-
tivation, emotion and practical wisdom. The examination is tailored to pal-
liative care with quotations from interviews with several professionals. It is 
argued that the reflective practice should be persistently focused on the ques-
tion: What kind of palliative caregiver should I be? While this question plays 
an important, but often implicit, role in staff support activities we argue that 
as an educational tool portfolio learning offers opportunities to improve the 
integration of reflection into the structure of palliative care practice. 
Submitted

What kind of palliative caregiver should I be? 
Moral attitude and reflection in palliative practice
Introduction
Because good education programmes are considered a necessary condition for 
the further professionalisation of palliative care, the European Association for 
Palliative Care (EAPC) recently published A Guide for the Development of Palli-
ative Nurse Education in Europe.1 This report offers guidelines for the develop-
ment of education in palliative nursing and presents the basic competences that 
can reasonably be required of the nurse in practice. It proposes a model of the 
palliative care learning process that links the various aspects of palliative nurs-
ing practice. It places the patient at the centre of the interaction and recognises 
the various factors that affect the patient’s life, such as the family, the inter-
disciplinary team, the health care system and society.2 The report emphasises 
the direct benefit of education to practice and patient, but it also advocates the 
– less easily quantified – need for palliative nurses to reflect about their own 
lives. Self-awareness and the capacity for ethical deliberation are considered to 
be an integral part of the professional equipment of the practicing nurse. 
The EAPC-report is relevant and comprehensive, and its recommenda-
tions reflect current practice. It represents an essential step in the further 
development of palliative care. This article focuses on an aspect of palliative 
care that is underemphasised in the document: the moral attitude of profes-
sionals that forms the basis of the reflective aspect of palliative care practice. 
A clearer understanding of this moral attitude could make for more specific 
recommendations about reflective practice. We intend to illustrate the moral 
attitude by quotations from interviews with palliative care professionals.* We 
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* These interviews were conducted within the research project ‘Moral attitude in palliative 
care’, which is being carried out by the authors.  See references 4 and 5 for methodological de-
tails. Note that the quotations in the present article serve merely to illustrate the moral attitude 
of palliative care professionals.  The quotations come from a variety of palliative care profes-
sionals, although the EAPC-report focuses on palliative nurse education. We believe that the 
patient-centred moral attitude that is central to our discussion is required of all palliative care 
professionals. Methods that can improve reflective nursing practice are applicable in palliative 
care practice as a whole.  
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argue that the pivotal question in reflective palliative practice is: ‘What kind 
of palliative caregiver should I be?’ We will briefly suggest how reflective 
practice can be integrated in the educational approach as proposed in the 
EAPC-report by pointing out the value of portfolio learning. 
Moral attitude and virtue ethics in palliative care
As a starting point it is crucial to acknowledge – as the EAPC-report does 
– that the efforts of palliative care professionals cannot be seen as separate 
from their own personal view of life.3-6 One of the obligations of health care 
professionals “is commitment to an open, truthful, and fully cooperative rela-
tionship with patients” (p.23).7 We claim that this obligation should be rooted 
in a specific moral attitude. It is important to note that health (palliative) care 
workers always have a specific moral attitude, albeit not always developed 
to the same extent in every practitioner. The key issue is not how to develop 
such an attitude, but rather how to maintain it and how to develop it further. 
As the EAPC-guide suggests, personal self-awareness is an important compo-
nent of this attitude. 
Moral attitude
Elsewhere we have described moral attitude as the personal motivation and 
commitment to act in the interest of other people.8 A closer look at the impli-
cations of this moral attitude in palliative care demonstrates that providing 
care is more than just performing an expert activity in order to achieve cer-
tain objectives. Care actions acquire their moral significance from the moral 
attitude expressed by these care activities.9 Caring is centred on the response 
of the carer to the needs of the one being cared for. In palliative care, provid-
ing care is the sensitive and supportive response of the professional to the 
situation and circumstances of a vulnerable human being who is in need of 
help, who cannot be cured or whose death is imminent. The professional’s re-
sponse actualises a moral attitude that guides the caring activity. Nurses are 
driven by values, such as respect, responsibility, and courage, which are fun-
damental to their moral attitude.10 The moral goals of palliative care should 
ideally be moral goals that are part of the professional’s personal life.6 Moral 
attitude encompasses a personal motivation and commitment to help others. 
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This means that such an attitude cannot be acquired as some sort of expert 
skill, but “is brought to expression in typically personal characteristics such as 
lifestyle, character, social skills and relationships with other human beings” 
(p.220).9 
Virtue ethics
Since a moral attitude implies an active concern for other’s well-being, pa-
tient-centeredness can be considered a central element. Morally speaking, 
patient-centeredness can be framed from a consequentialist point of view (‘it 
is a good thing only if it has good consequences’), a deontological perspective 
(‘it is good in and of itself and therefore ought to be pursued as a matter of 
duty’) or from a virtue ethical perspective.11 We will consider the patient-cen-
tred moral attitude underlying palliative care practice from a virtue-ethical 
perspective because this perspective (1) relates good behaviour to the kind of 
person someone is, and (2) offers insight into the way in which the qualities 
that are a prerequisite for such behaviour can be (further) developed. 
A specific moral attitude seems to be indispensable for realizing the val-
ues that are inherent in caring practice. Virtues, for their part, can be con-
sidered as interiorized values.12 Virtues are dispositions that determine one’s 
attitude towards situations that arise in the practice of life. These situations 
require choices, where one should chose to act as well as possible.13 The mo-
rality of an act is determined by what a sensible person would do in a par-
ticular situation. Virtues reflect the way in which we are - and act as - hu-
mane people, and can be conceived as the extent to which we are able to act 
well.12 Virtues are the qualities people need to be able to realise themselves 
in the roles they perform, with the abilities they have at their disposal and in 
the situations they fall into.13 Moral perception plays a central part; one sees 
what has to be done in a situation, because one knows how to perform an 
activity skilfully.14 
In the following sections, the moral attitude required for palliative care 
will be discussed from a virtue-ethical perspective, assuming an inseparable 
connection between virtue on the one hand and practice, motivation, emotion 
and practical wisdom on the other. 
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Moral attitude and palliative care practice
Practice
Virtues are developed in practice. They are considered to be dispositions that 
arise from practice and education and make a person likely to perform par-
ticular actions as a matter of habit.13 Aristotle claimed that to become virtu-
ous, one should act as a virtuous person would do. Virtues like compassion or 
courage that can be considered to be prerequisites for good palliative care are 
characteristics of people that develop as they live their lives.
“When I was a student, I got acquainted with an elderly lady with breast cancer. I 
visited her once a week and I was impressed by the way she dealt with her life and 
illness. I remember asking her: ‘I know why I like to come here, but what do you get 
from talking to such an inexperienced person as me?’ She told me that I was one 
of two people with whom she could talk about her disease and the way she expe-
rienced it. I was surprised. She said that most people brought up commonplaces or 
started to talk about another topic. […] A certain thread became visible. My parents 
told me that as a child I could enter the room with a serious question and that I 
would not be satisfied until it had been answered seriously. I also remember the 
shock I felt when my biology teacher said: everybody knows that everybody will die, 
but no one believes that of himself’.” [psychologist, hospice]
The development of virtue is not restricted to the individual’s private life. The 
interest palliative care professionals have in caring for seriously ill patients 
inevitably affects the way they provide care at the end of life. Values like 
‘person-centeredness’, ‘openness’ or ‘availability’, which are advanced in the 
quotation above, are continuously actualised in daily practice. The motiva-
tion and commitment to act in the interest of others can be strengthened in 
practice, as the following remark from the same respondent indicates. 
“I’ve often wondered why I want to do this, to work in palliative care. What I like 
is that it is easy to have contact about matters that are essential. You come into 
contact with the essence of people. I realised that I was not growing in the nursing 
home where I worked, while in palliative care I do grow. Palliative care brings out 
the best in me. It addresses my own essence.” [psychologist, hospice] 
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Motivation
According to virtue ethics, it is not sufficient to apply general rules to particu-
lar situations: “The virtuous moral agent has a deep desire to behave well” 
(p.298).15 A good palliative caregiver is inclined to provide care in accordance 
with the values that are inherent to care at the end of life. The desire to care 
for the whole person – a crucial value in palliative care, as mentioned in the 
EAPC report – and not just manage symptoms is, for example, expressed in 
the next quotation:
“Treating people in this [palliative] department is not primarily aimed at just the 
complaint, but at the whole person. That attracted me very much.” [physiotherapist, 
palliative unit hospital]
“Palliative care is very broad. You have to be a specialist-generalist. That attracts me. 
Just like the fact that you can mean a lot for the patient, and for the family.” [hospice 
physician]
Caring for seriously ill patients as a team is another motivating value that is 
central to palliative care.
“In my previous job I was involved in care for a dying, handicapped person twice. I 
noticed the enormous mutuality within the team because we were occupied with 
something very essential; attempting to make the last stages of life as bearable as 
possible. I was highly moved by what you can mean for others as a human being. 
When I was invited to apply for a job here I thought: ‘I believe I have to do this’.” 
[coordinator volunteers, hospice]
The motivation to act in the interest of others is not only of relevance for pa-
tients. As can be understood from the quotation above, great significance is at-
tached to mutuality within the team. This implies that good palliative carers 
are inclined to look after each other. The habit of reflecting on how colleagues 
experience their work seems to be intrinsic to palliative care, as the following 
remark acknowledges.
“Sometimes a colleague will expose an issue that concerns them. Persistent ques-
tioning often reveals somebody’s experiences and suddenly you realise: ‘ah, that’s 
how it is and that’s why you reacted so-and-so.’ You get to learn more about each 
other’s values and norms and eventually understand why someone acts in the way 
they do.” [head/nurse, palliative unit nursing home] 
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But before one can be motivated to perform an action, one must perceive the 
need for that action. Both emotion and practical wisdom play a role in this 
perceptual process.
Emotion
Emotions contribute to a person’s appreciation of circumstances; they illumi-
nate perception.15 Emotions involve judgements about important things, in 
which we acknowledge our needs and inadequacies in areas we do not fully 
control.16 In palliative care, where the needs of the incurable patients and the 
uncertainty of both patients and professionals about the process of dying are 
central issues, emotions cannot be set aside. For many professionals, the emo-
tional and more existential focus of palliative care constitutes the particular 
attraction of the work. 
“As a lung specialist I missed something. I did some research, published, read pa-
pers at all kinds of congresses, but it was all too ‘pseudo’. It was not real. I always 
looked for…this is what it is all about.” [physician, palliative unit hospital]
“I have always been curious to know about deeper questions people are concerned 
with. Not for reasons of faith, but rather to find out what affects people in their lives, 
what made them move, how did they fit certain events into their lives. I always look 
for that.” [pastor, hospice]
Furthermore, the emotional intensity of (care at) the end of life and the inti-
mate relationships with patients and their families force palliative care pro-
fessionals to continuously observe and examine their own (emotional) well-
being. 
“A lot of people live very unconsciously, even in their professional lives. People are 
not aware of the fact that they do something in one situation that they don’t in an-
other, similar situation. Palliative care requires one to move into one’s own depths, 
to listen to other people and to get things across to oneself. That can be frightening 
sometimes, it is much easier to be a superficial doctor.” [physician, hospice]
Practical wisdom
Virtuous people see what needs to be done and are appropriately moved by 
what they see.14 Ethical perception is not merely emotional; reasoning en-
ables people to act and feel in ways appropriate to specific circumstances. 
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Good palliative care requires the capacity to know when and how to exhibit 
the virtues that actualise the values relevant in that situation. The funda-
mental virtue that functions as a link between the various relevant virtues 
is ‘phronesis’, or practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is considered to be the 
deliberative capacity to reason well; it enables a person to choose the right 
action at the right moment within the perspective of the whole situation.13,17  
The following remark illustrates the crucial role of this deliberative capacity 
in the interaction with patients:
“I try to encounter people and then find out what happens. Together we set out for 
the direction we want to go. […] If someone says that he doesn’t want morphine, 
I don’t start it for the time being: ‘I promise that if it is necessary I will explain it to 
you.’ It is like a permanent game. This means that you have to put time and energy 
in it, you have to be available at the moments when they need you.” [physician, pal-
liative unit nursing home]
The thoughtfulness – or practical wisdom – that is required to recognise the 
morally pertinent aspects in practice is also relevant for the carers them-
selves. The emphasis the EAPC-report puts on the self-awareness of profes-
sionals is reflected in the following remark: 
“When I started working here I believed that a patient, terminal or not, should be 
washed every day. But who am I to say that somebody should be washed daily? 
That is about self-reflection. Why do I want that?” [certified nursing assistant, pallia-
tive unit nursing home] 
Observation of one’s own moral attitude seems to be part and parcel of work-
ing in palliative care. The intense experiences in the practice both force pro-
fessionals to grow into their role as attentive caregiver in palliative situations 
and simultaneously force them to adjust their perception of themselves and 
of life in general. Virtue in living and caring seems to develop in practice and 
not in classrooms. This observation is relevant to the promotion of reflective 
practice in palliative care. 
Promoting reflective practice 
The above discussion of the moral attitude of palliative care professionals ar-
gues that it is rooted in practice and that it is related to motivation, emotion 
and practical wisdom. The discussion argues that moral attitude cannot be 
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achieved through theoretical education, but that it requires continuous at-
tention to, and reflection on, the practice of life and palliative care. From this 
perspective, the focus of reflective practice in palliative care should be the 
question ‘What kind of palliative caregiver should I be?’. The promotion of 
self-awareness and ethical deliberation in both palliative nursing and in other 
aspects of palliative care depends on the professionals’ readiness to repeat-
edly reflect on this question. 
How can this reflection be made part of daily practice? To some extent, 
the question ‘what kind of palliative caregiver should I be?’ already plays 
a more or less explicit role in the narrative activities like team intervision, 
clinical supervision and closure conferences that are progressively being in-
troduced into palliative care.18-20 There are, however, possibilities to integrate 
attention to self-awareness and ethical deliberation into practice in a more 
structured way. One of the educational tools that can help effectuate this in-
tegration is portfolio learning. 
From a professional development perspective, a portfolio is described as 
a collection of material, made by a professional, that records and reflects on 
key events and processes in that professional’s career.21 It is a narrative enter-
prise that can include a variety of material, from a reflective diary to a career 
plan, and from a critical article review to one’s experience of a critical inci-
dent. The portfolio reveals an evolution of thought and expression, as well as 
knowledge and skill, and can become a reference source of permanent value 
to the student.22 In fact, building a portfolio enables a professional to repeat-
edly (re)consider the question ‘what kind of palliative caregiver should I be?’.
Three arguments underpin the use of portfolios to stimulate and sup-
port reflective practice in palliative care. First of all, a portfolio is not just a 
record of facts, but also a tool that helps people make sense of the multitude 
of perceptions and experiences that constitute their (professional) lives; it 
stimulates moral development. A portfolio can be considered as a “narrative 
of practice” where the learning is in the telling.23 Reflective learning through 
story telling improves both a professional’s confidence and their ethical de-
cision-making.24,25 As such, portfolios function as a ‘meaning-making sys-
tem’ where the learning process is central, rather than the outcome. Second, 
portfolio learning fits comfortably into the adult education approach recom-
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mended by the EAPC-report. Self-directed and problem-based learning forms 
the basis of this approach. Portfolios can be very effective in continuing pro-
fessional development26,27 and function as an instrument of self-evaluation. 
Third, the usefulness of portfolios has been demonstrated in undergraduate 
medical education; they were shown to be a continuing source of stimulation 
for students’ professional development and self-knowledge.28-30 
Portfolio learning seems to fit into the current staff support activities 
aimed at self-care and self-awareness and would seem to offer the promo-
tion of the reflective practice recommended by the EAPC-report. Adequate use 
of portfolios enables professionals to become more self-aware, since it offers 
them ample opportunity to repeatedly deliberate on ethical issues that arise in 
palliative care practice and to reflect on their own motivation and emotions.
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Chapter 7
Medical education, palliative care and 
moral attitude
Some objectives and future perspectives
Gert Olthuis 
Wim Dekkers
Abstract
Context Adequate medical education has three interrelated aspects: theoreti-
cal knowledge, practical skills, and the personal attitude of the physician. The 
current emphasis on medical science distracts attention from the importance 
of the attitude aspect of medical education. We argue that the integration 
of palliative care into the medical curricula can correct this imbalance be-
tween knowledge, skills, and attitude. In our view, including palliative care 
into medical training not only improves the quality of palliative care, but also 
contributes to the moral quality of the doctors being trained. To support our 
argument we emphasise the moral aspects of attitude. Moral attitude focuses 
on the capacity to respond to others in a humane manner and can be com-
pared with the way a virtuous physician acts. We show the crucial role this 
moral attitude plays in palliative care and the surplus value palliative care 
education can have in general medical training. 
Perspectives We suggest that clinical experience in palliative care, supple-
mented by reflection on narratives about chronically ill or dying patients, and 
mourning or aging processes, offer prospects for developing palliative care ed-
ucation. These perspectives can contribute to the transformation of the pres-
ent ‘hidden curriculum’ of contemporary medical education which implicitly 
shapes the student’s moral attitude, into a future more explicit enculturation 
into the medical realm. Ultimately, this will improve health care as a whole.
Medical Education 2003; 37: 928-933,
with permission of Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK

Medical education, palliative care and moral attitude
Some objectives and future perspectives
Introduction
Recently, several authors have argued that current education in palliative care 
in the medical curricula is inadequate.1-4 An inventory of the state of affairs of 
palliative care in the Netherlands revealed that palliative care is hardly a spe-
cific part of medical training.3 In our own professional setting, the University 
Medical Centre in Nijmegen, there is discussion about whether an optional 4 
week-module on palliative care that is highly valued by the students should 
be integrated in the general medical curriculum. In this paper we will discuss 
the advantages that integrating palliative care into the core curriculum of 
medical training can offer in educating the attitudes of medical students.
The Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine specifies a series of learning 
objects in ‘Education and training in palliative care’ (see box 1).5 The authors 
rightly claim that there is wide agreement about what needs to be explored in 
palliative care medical education. Their list of objectives summarises - inter 
alia - the basic principles for enhancing palliative care education proposed 
by Billings and Block.6 Other studies discuss learning objectives that largely 
resemble those of the Oxford Textbook.7,8 
The purpose of this article is to argue that structural attention to pal-
liative care in the medical curriculum will enhance the personalities and the 
moral characters of the doctors being trained. Adequate medical education is 
generally considered to have three interrelated aspects: theoretical knowl-
edge, practical skills, and the personal attitude of the physician. Contempo-
rary medical education, however, emphasises knowledge and skills and pays 
little explicit attention to what kind of person the doctor should be.9 Although 
the personal attitude of the physician is of great concern in medicine as a 
whole, we argue that by putting more emphasis on palliative care in the medi-
cal curriculum, the balance between these three areas can be improved. Typi-
cally, palliative care is provided as an integral part of the care of all patients10 
and not by palliative care specialists. Although clinical areas like care of the 
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elderly or primary care might claim to have the potential to educate students’ 
attitudes, palliative care is also likely to enhance the attitude of the physician-
in-training. Physicians tend to see palliative care as epitomizing the ideals of 
patient care, as has been mentioned in several studies of the provision of end- 
of-life care in general practice.11,12 Although caring for dying patients does 
not obviously differ from patient care in general, Field observed that dying 
patients were treated differently from other patients in a number of ways.12 
At the end of their lives, patients receive more time and attention, and care 
seems to be more patient-centred than elsewhere in medical practice.
In the first section of this article, we elaborate on the process of form-
ing the physician’s attitude as an aspect of medical education comparable to 
the inculcation of theoretical knowledge and practical skills. Here we make 
a distinction between attitude and moral attitude. The next part of the paper 
concentrates on the contribution that teaching palliative care can make to 
attitude-education within the medical curriculum. Finally, we will discuss 
two teaching methods that can enhance both palliative care education and 
medical training as a whole. These methods are frequently discussed in the 
literature, but in the Netherlands rarely applied in medical education. 
Box 1
Learning objectives should include the exploration of: 
1. death as a part of life and transcultural issues concerning death; 
2. issues defining the decision for palliative care in a variety of clinical settings and the 
impact of that decision on both the patient’s quality of life and health-care costs;
3. the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual impact of dying on patients and 
their families; 
4. the control of pain and other symptoms; 
5. psychosocial and existential support of patients and their families; 
6. one’s own attitude toward death; 
7. communication skills; 
8. strategies enabling a continuum of care across a variety of in-patient and out-
patient settings, particularly care in the home. 
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Attitude and moral attitude
Two aspects, i.e. theoretical knowledge and practical skills, of the conceptual 
trinity that makes up an adequate education are rather easy to recognise and 
describe, if one takes a closer look at medical education. Theoretical knowl-
edge is acquired as (scientific) information that is presented to students in 
lectures and books. Practical skills are learned in practical courses and during 
hospital rotations. The education of the students’ attitudes is far more diffi-
cult to recognise and describe. The problem is that it is difficult to understand 
what ‘attitude’ means. Attitude is a complex term. In this paper we primarily 
focus on the moral aspects of attitude.
The current psychological concept ‘attitude’ has been defined as: “a 
learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavor-
able manner with respect to a given object” (p.6).13 This is a broad and rather 
abstract definition that does not make clear that in the interaction between 
doctor and patient morality always plays an important role. Reflecting on 
the painting The doctor (Sir Luke Fildes, 1891), Brody argues that “character 
and virtue are as important as knowledge and skills in describing the ideal 
family physician” (p.589).14 The basis of medical practice is more the mainte-
nance of a network of human relationships than the application of scientific 
knowledge.14 A virtuous physician “starts always with his commitment to be 
a certain kind of person, and he approaches clinical quandaries, conflicts of 
values, and his patients’ interest as a good person should” (p.247).15 In terms 
of attitude this means that the attitude of a doctor towards a patient is always 
a moral attitude which reflects the personal motivation and commitment of 
someone to act in the interest of other people. In contrast to the current psy-
chological concept of attitude, moral attitude focuses on the capacity of per-
sons to respond to others in a particular situation in a humane manner, and it 
is this moral attitude which is exemplified by the virtuous physician. 
Moral attitude is not about what people do, but about the way they act. 
Gastmans argues that providing good care requires more than just the compe-
tent exercise of the various necessary cognitive and technical functions and 
skill.16 Providing good care is more than performing expert activity. Good care 
requires an inner engagement of the professionals involved. “Nurses derive 
their specific identity not only from the set of tasks that they perform but 
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also from the way in which they commit themselves to the caring process” 
(p.215).16 Moral attitude is thus closely connected with the kind of person 
someone is. By taking a closer look at the goals of medicine we will further 
illustrate what we mean by moral attitude.
The goals of medicine concern improving health, curing illness, and if 
this is not possible, caring for patients and helping them to live with the resi-
dues of their illness.17 Health care professionals involve themselves in the 
lives of patients by offering them help to attain these ends. “The good of the 
patient provides the architectonic of the relationship” (p.53).17 Beneficence, 
as the guide to medical action, is “grounded in the humanity of the persons 
interacting in the medical relationship” (p.54).17 For health care profession-
als humanity appears in their personal capacity to respond to patients in a 
humane manner. This is what we mean by moral attitude. More than the 
psychological concept of attitude, the term moral attitude refers to the kind 
of person someone is. The moral quality of a person largely determines the 
moral quality of the actions called for in a particular situation with a specific 
patient. This moral view of medical practice is an essential component of any 
discussion of the importance of attitudes in medical education. 
Moral attitude in medical education and palliative care
Medical education cannot simply be understood as the transmission of medi-
cal, biological and epidemiological information and the acquisition of the 
necessary practical skills. Medical education necessarily influences the moral 
identity of the student. Medical training is “a process of moral enculturation” 
(p.861) into the medical community.18 This process of enculturation is usu-
ally not explicitly expressed in the formal curricula of medical schools. It is 
reflected in what is called the ‘hidden curriculum’. During medical education 
students get socialised. They adopt and internalise new values, attitudes and 
rationales about what is important in practicing medicine and how to be a 
good doctor. Medical training makes students reconstruct their former pic-
ture of medicine.19 The reconstruction of the student’s view of the medical 
world is not an explicit objective of the formal curriculum but an implicit 
result of being part of the medical community. Personal experiences, stories 
about patients’ experiences, casuistry, doctors and teachers functioning as 
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role models, and the explicit content of the curriculum all mould the students’ 
way of committing themselves to (future) patients. Medical training gradually 
and covertly cultivates the moral attitude of the doctor in spe. A problematic 
consequence of this more or less unconscious enculturation of medical stu-
dents is the aforementioned imbalance in the trinity of adequate education. 
The emphasis on theoretical knowledge and practical skills distracts attention 
from the physicians’ moral attitude. Several authors have pointed out the cru-
cial role of the professional’s moral attitude in palliative care.
Randall and Downie for instance, state that palliative caregivers need 
to be morally developed persons.20 Much of the success of a doctor, nurse or 
other health care worker depends on their relationship with each patient. The 
nature of that relationship depends, in part, on the patient’s perceptions of the 
helper. That is why it is important that the judgements made by health care 
professionals are not just the product of a technical, scientific mind, but also 
of a humane and compassionate spirit. The success of a caregiver in palliative 
care depends on his or her perceptiveness about the patient, and reciprocally, 
the perceptions of the patient are determined by the apparent commitment of 
the caregiver.  
In a similar vein, Bradshaw mentions the dangers of developments such 
as the rationalisation of care for terminally ill patients in the United Kingdom, 
and its reduction to a bureaucratic routine.21 She asks whether medical sci-
ence should be the only basis for terminal care. Medicine is an effective tool to 
control symptoms and pain, but it is not the only weapon in the arsenal of pal-
liative care. Medical science has always been and will continue to be a vital 
component of palliative care, but it is now becoming an increasingly dominant 
component. Bradshaw wonders whether the original ethic of humane care for 
the dying can have a place in preventing the reduction of palliative care to a 
purely medical treatment. Although she realises that acquiring the necessary 
knowledge and skill is important, “the quintessential heart of palliative care 
is the kind of compassionate people involved in it” (p.418).21  
Our thesis, that explicit education in palliative care offers medical schools 
a clear and  interesting way of directing attention to the physician’s moral at-
titude, is also supported by medical educators. Barnard et al point out the im-
portance of the preclinical years of medical education in preparing students to 
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provide optimal care for patients near the end-of-life, as well as for patients 
in general: “The foundations for excellence in end-of-life care that are laid in 
the preclinical years, are also the foundations for excellence in general medi-
cal practice” (p.500).22 “A curriculum that optimally prepares students to give 
excellent care near the end of life will best prepare them to become excellent 
physicians in all aspects of medical care” (p.503).22 Obviously, palliative care ed-
ucation fits very well with the aims and agenda of general medical education. 
Also, from the perspective of the widely accepted WHO-definition (see 
box 2), it seems reasonable to conclude that adequate performance in pallia-
tive care practice requires engaged caregivers who are capable of acting in a 
personal and attentive way.23 
Box 2 - WHO definition
Palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their 
families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the 
prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable 
assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and 
spiritual. Palliative care:
-  provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; 
-  affirms life and regards death as a normal process; 
-  neither hastens nor postpones death; 
-  integrates the psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; 
-  offers a support system to help patients live as actively as possible until death; 
-  offers a support system to help the family cope during the patient’s illness and in 
their own bereavement. 
-  uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their families, includ-
ing bereavement counselling, if indicated; 
-  will enhance quality of life, and may also positively influence the course of illness; 
-  is applicable early in the course of illness, in conjunction with other therapies 
that are intended to prolong life, such as chemotherapy or radiation therapy, and 
includes those investigations needed to better understand and manage distress-
ing clinical complications.
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In our view, it is imperative to integrate palliative care into the medical cur-
riculum. This is dictated by the fact that every caregiver must be able to pro-
vide palliative care. The inclusion of palliative care in medical training will 
also contribute to the education of the moral attitude of physicians. In the 
next section we will focus on two ways of including palliative care education 
in the medical curriculum.
Two means of educating moral attitude 
Several experiences with student participation in a hospice during medical 
training show that students consider experiencing palliative care practice a 
welcome and very valuable contribution to their education.24,25 These empiri-
cal studies support a recent plea to integrate clinical experiences in palliative 
care into the core curricula of medical schools.26 Moreover, according to Block 
and Billings, gaining some experience in care for the dying can “help young 
physicians learn to tolerate a degree of intimacy and personal engagement 
that other aspects of medical training may subvert or undermine” (p.765).26 
Consequently, both professionals and patients throughout the health care sys-
tem can benefit from the integration of experience in palliative care into the 
medical training program.  However, prudence is called for. Working in pal-
liative care can be stressful, and the students have to be well-supervised and 
given adequate emotional support if this integration is to be successful.
Another method that can contribute to moral attitude in caring is the 
use of the humanities in medical school. Health care practitioners are daily 
confronted with the complex interplay of the generality of the disease and the 
unique, individual and emotional response to it. Narrative art forms like nov-
els and films can help them understand that interplay in three separate, but 
inter-linked, ways.27 Literary examples give insight into common patterns of 
response. Narratives can provide insight into individual differences and may 
help to produce a feeling for ambiguity. Reading literature also can enrich the 
language and thus the thought processes of health care practitioners. 
Beyond these three more or less cognitive and affective characteristics, 
novels (or narratives in general) also serve as moral guides for living a good 
life.28 Experiences with humanities-courses in medical education support 
these suggestions.29-32 While Hampshire30 recommends the study of medicine 
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in literature as an option for those who are interested, Finlay31 and Downie32 
suggest an integration of the humanities into the medical curriculum. On the 
basis of anecdotes from final-year students’ tutors, Finlay has noticed the 
emergence of a different type of graduate in Wales.31 The tutors remarked on 
the students’ “ability to show compassion and to communicate effectively, 
their understanding of the gravity of medical decisions and their insight into 
human suffering” (p.165).31 Others have successfully used a humanities course 
to explore the impact of cancer on the lives of patients, families and profes-
sionals.33 By offering the student the chance to stand back and reflect about 
their professional task, the humanities module allowed the student “to access 
the wealth of human experience that is embodied in the arts” and informed 
and directed them “in their search for the wisdom and the humanity to fulfil 
their role as clinicians” (p.53).33 On the basis of these educational experiences 
it seems reasonable to conclude that using narratives to dramatise the expe-
riences of the chronically ill or dying patients, the loss of a beloved family 
member or friend, or the inevitability of aging or death, will not only lead to 
the provision of better palliative care, but will also result in a generally more 
humane medical practice. 
Concluding remarks
A medical student’s journey through medical school may be compared with 
Dante’s medieval journey through the Inferno.34 This analogy does not mean 
that medical education is a hell, but rather that attending medical school con-
tains the same tasks which Dante had to accomplish during his trip, as de-
scribed in the Divine comedy. Dante’s first task involves learning God’s laws. 
This task is accomplished through studying case histories of sin and occasional 
lectures from his companion Virgil on their way down through Purgatory. The 
second task involves the emotional reactions of Dante to the sufferings and 
mutilations that human souls undergo in hell. He has to learn to deal with the 
misery he meets on his way down. These two tasks are identical to the double 
task that confronts medical students: “they must learn about disease and how 
to treat it, but they must also retain the capacity to feel, deeply, the suffering 
they encounter without being overwhelmed or incapacitated by it” (p.204).34 
‘Learning about disease and how to treat it’, refers to knowledge and skills, 
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and ‘the capacity to feel without being overwhelmed’, refers to the moral at-
titude of the student as it is put forward in this article. As we have indicated, 
the latter seldom forms an explicit part of contemporary medical education, 
but is embedded in a ‘hidden curriculum’ that socialises the students during 
their progression through medical school. 
Education in palliative care can transform the ‘hidden curriculum’ into a 
more governed and explicit enculturation of future physicians into the medi-
cal community. In particular, experience in palliative care for every student, 
and exposure to the appropriate narratives during medical training offer seri-
ous prospects for developing a profound education for a humane, rather than 
merely technical, palliative care. Ultimately, this will improve health care as 
a whole. Unfortunately, there is little empirical understanding of the relation-
ship between the education of palliative caregivers, the practice of palliative 
care and the personal qualities or moral attitudes that are needed in the care 
for the dying. This relationship should therefore be a topic for future empiri-
cal and philosophical research in palliative care.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and conclusion

Discussion and conclusion
In several places in this thesis, it has been mentioned that the professionals 
who were being interviewed for the study indicated that their activities as 
palliative care professionals formed part of their self-image. For example, in 
chapter 3 the consultant interviewed remarked that palliative care gave her 
the opportunity to actualise herself. A psychologist in chapter 6 claimed that 
working in palliative care “brings out the best in me” and that “it addresses 
my own essence”. Chapter 5 argues that the performance of nurses will be 
better if the moral goals of palliative care coincide with their personal view 
of the good life. One of the nurses interviewed – one of the contributors to the 
story of the exemplary nurse Susan –  explained that her interest in the end of 
life is “tied up with who I am”. These remarks fit the assumption that becom-
ing a member of the nursing profession is more than acquiring the necessary 
credentials or necessary skills, “it is rather a feeling of fulfillment at a deeply 
personal level” (p.96).1 It is assumed that becoming a nurse means develop-
ing a self-identity as a nurse: “It’s just who I am”.1 That the performance of 
palliative care professionals is closely interwoven with the people that they 
are, is something that goes – from the perspective of the present thesis – to 
the heart of the moral attitude of these professionals and is the central issue 
of this concluding chapter.
The first objective of this thesis was to explore and analyse normative 
views about the moral attitude of professional caregivers in palliative care. 
Opinions from palliative care professionals are combined with several ethi-
cal points of view in the chapters 2-5. From the perspective of virtue ethics 
(chapter 2), theories on well-being (chapter 3), and the hermeneutical ethics 
of P. Ricoeur (chapter 4) the current study attempts to provide insight into 
the moral attitude of professional palliative caregivers. On the basis of the 
notions of self-esteem, of personal identity, and of professional identity the 
discussion has been extended to the interface of ethics and social psychology 
(chapter 5). Together, these chapters draw a picture of what motivates and 
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commits health care professionals to get involved in palliative care and to act 
in the interest of seriously ill patients who suffer from a life-threatening ill-
ness. These chapters also discuss – from a moral perspective – what it takes to 
be good at providing such care. 
The chapters 6 and 7 deal with a second objective: to explore how the 
moral attitude of care professionals can be stimulated, preserved and main-
tained. The sixth chapter focuses on the preservation and maintenance of the 
moral attitude of professionals who already work in palliative care practice. 
The seventh chapter focuses on ways the moral attitude of medical students 
can be stimulated during medical training.
The bulk of this concluding chapter is devoted to a résumé of three crucial 
moral notions that run as a common thread through the preceding chapters: 
phronesis, the caring conversation, and the covenantal relationship with pa-
tients. To better understand how these three notions are interrelated, an ethi-
cal view on professionalism in health care – emphasising the interrelationship 
between the professional and the personal – is introduced in the next section. 
The three notions are then discussed separately. Next, some comments are 
made on Randall and Downie’s view on ‘whole person care’ that was intro-
duced in the first chapter of the thesis as a point of departure from which to 
explore the moral attitude of palliative caregivers. The chapter concludes with 
an argument for reflective practice and some suggestions for future research 
on moral attitude and professional development in palliative care.
An ethical view on professionalism
What inspires people to devote their professional life to the care of others? 
This question has not been well covered in recent debates on what may be 
expected from health care professionals. According to the theologian Annelies 
van Heijst the dominant view on professionalism in health care concentrates 
too much on achieving a specific level of knowledge and skills.2 A focus on 
professionalism as a practice where certain ‘objective’ standards of excellence 
are collectively endorsed leaves less room for the ‘inter-subjective’ aspect of 
professionalism, which emerges in the practice of care itself. Professional care 
centres on skillfulness and on ethically relevant inter-human contact between 
colleagues, caregivers, and care receivers. The latter, ‘inter-subjective’ aspect 
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deserves more attention than it now gets in recently published discussions 
about health care professionalism. Van Heijst argues that the ultimate aim of 
caring is not ‘to cure’ or ‘to improve’ but ‘to support other persons in their 
misery and need’, in a way that contributes to the good life for all. From this 
perspective, professional (humanising) care is built on two pillars: 1) having 
compassion for another person’s suffering and consequently drawing the con-
clusion that one should take the initiative to act in the interests of that person, 
and 2) the interest, enjoyment, and amazement one can experience with other 
human beings (p.391).2
Caring as an expression of values
Caring is not morally neutral. Van Heijst understands caring as an unmedi-
ated act that takes place directly between two persons. A caring act evokes 
a response which can be considered a new act. This implies that the results 
of caring are always uncertain and cannot be fully determined by a protocol. 
Providing physical care inevitably involves an inter-subjective relationship 
in which caregiver and care receiver act as persons. Caring is, in short, an 
act where the caregiver is tuned in to another human being who needs help 
or support (p.122).2 Van Heijst claims that caring should express two values: 
humaneness and the bond between human beings. Superficially, a caring re-
lationship is asymmetric and based on an urgent need which evokes a caring 
response of another person. But – at a deeper level – Van Heijst argues that 
there is a need that is present in both caregiver and care receiver; both are in 
need of each other to lead a real human existence. On the one hand, the caring 
relationship is asymmetric because of the difference between caregiver and 
care receiver. On the other hand, the caring relationship is reciprocal because 
it is an inter-subjective relationship in which both participants are human 
beings who need each other to confirm their mutual humanity. This tension 
(asymmetry vs. equivalence) is central in Van Heijst’s ethical view on profes-
sionalism and is also put forward in the three central notions of this thesis. 
Palliative caring
Because there is no chance of cure in palliative care, Van Heijst suggests that 
attempting ‘to support patients in their misery and need’ is central to pallia-
WHO CARES?
138
tive care practice (p.83, p.161).2 Professional palliative care does not aim to 
fight against suffering at the expense of the quality of life of seriously ill pa-
tients, nor does it glorify suffering as a kind of purification. Both on an insti-
tutional and a personal level, palliative care attempts to express the value of 
seriously ill, dying persons and their bonds with other people. As can be read 
from the WHO-definition (see chapter 1), palliative care considers dying as a 
normal process and as a part of life, and focuses on supporting patients and 
their families in a broad sense. Thus, suffering is not banned, but integrated 
in what humanly may be expected of a good life. Van Heijst’s suggestion about 
palliative care accords with the observations made in the chapters 1 and 2 
concerning the specific ethical culture of a ‘palliative approach’. Furthermore, 
the three moral notions that are the common thread in the present study fit 
into the ethical picture of professionalism Van Heijst proposes. 
In the first place, an important characteristic of the act of caring is its 
uncertainty. Time and again professionals have to deliberate about their in-
teraction with patients. Furthermore, in Van Heijst’s view caregivers – like 
care receivers – are considered as valuable and vulnerable. Since care should 
not be self-sacrificial, it is important to look for an endurable balance while 
practicing care. Both deliberation and seeking a balance require the virtue of 
phronesis. In the second place, caring is an inter-subjective activity involv-
ing a human relationship. Its aim is not so much to control or neutralise dif-
ferences between persons and to restore autonomy, but to respect uniqueness 
and to make space for the suffering other. The caring conversation attempts 
to create such space. In the third place, the process of care can involve a 
reciprocity in which participants acknowledge each other’s humanity. Huma-
nising care can be fulfilling for both care receiver and caregiver. Van Heijst 
argues that professionals who take the responsibility to care for others in an 
asymmetrical situation may be convinced that they are relating to their pa-
tients as fellow human beings. The present thesis acknowledges her argument 
and draws attention to the notion of covenant. 
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Phronesis
The place of phronesis in virtue ethics
Aristotle considered phronesis – or practical wisdom – as relevant to the good 
life as a whole.3-5 In chapter 2 phronesis is described as a quality that enables 
a person to deliberate about what is good or bad for a human being in a par-
ticular situation and as a consequence enables the deliberator to act appropri-
ately. It is emphasised that this is a habitual disposition, which implies that 
appropriate action is not the mere consequence of a feeling or a rational choice 
but rather of a developed and durable capacity to make a balanced judgement 
which takes account of all the aspects that may influence the process of ac-
tion. A palliative care professional who has practical wisdom knows about the 
goal of palliative care and the means that are necessary to attain that goal. In 
chapter 6 it is pointed out that phronesis functions as a link between various 
other virtues that are relevant in a situation and that it enables a person to 
know when and how these virtues are to be exhibited. 
Usually, two groups of virtues are distinguished: intellectual virtues and 
virtues of character.6-8 According to Musschenga, character virtues are action 
oriented and can be further distinguished in first order and second order vir-
tues of character.8 First order character virtues are dispositions which are 
required of a competent practitioner of a particular social role. A palliative 
care professional may be expected to provide professionally competent pal-
liative care. However, as was argued in chapter 2, just putting the various 
dimensions of professional competence into practice is not sufficient. The way 
care is provided plays a crucial role. This involves second order character 
virtues that refer to the manner in which a practitioner provides care and to 
the quality and the power of his motivation.8 Every character virtue assumes 
the virtue of practical wisdom.7 Practical wisdom is considered as the order-
ing virtue that discerns how the virtues can be used to best effect.9 A virtue 
is a habitual disposition to choose a middle course between two extremes of 
behaviour (e.g., dedication is the desire to choose the right middle course be-
tween being over-involved and being excessively objective). Practical wisdom 
plays a central role in the practical reasoning that is required to determine 
that virtuous middle course and it is thus crucial to what is determined to be 
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excellent in a specific situation. It belongs to the group of intellectual virtues 
that involves knowledge oriented virtues aimed at the perfection of reason. 
Self-awareness, responsibility, and practice
This study looks at three related aspects of a palliative care professional’s 
practical wisdom: 1) self-awareness, 2) responsibility, and 3) professional 
practice and the practice of life. First, self-awareness – “understanding what 
your own true thoughts, feelings, and abilities are”10 – emphasises the rela-
tionship of professionals with themselves. Self-awareness is an essential as-
pect of knowing when and how to use the virtues in practice (see also chapter 
6). Since palliative caregivers’ readiness to act is a compassionate response of 
the caregiver to the needs of the patient, the professional-patient relationship 
is asymmetric. This inequality is the inevitable starting-point of the caring 
relationship; the patient is dependent on the competence of the caregiver. 
But giving care is a reciprocal action11, to be carried out by practitioners of 
trustworthy character.12 As Van Heijst emphasises, at a deeper level caregiver 
and care receiver are equivalent, and the care provided confirms their mutual 
humanity. The crucial role of this mutuality in the caring relationship in pal-
liative care was put forward in the chapters 4 and 5. Wise palliative care pro-
fessionals have the experience that lets them choose the right action in par-
ticular situations while simultaneously understanding that it is their personal 
effort and commitment that determines the quality of the care provided. 
Second, in chapter 2 it is argued that phronesis is related to responsibili-
ty. This aspect emphasises the relationship of professionals with needy others. 
A caregiver’s intention to care for a palliative care patient implies a responsi-
bility to provide professionally competent palliative care. Competence is more 
than meeting the responsibility to provide the sort of care that is presupposed 
in the ‘standards of excellence’ of palliative care practice. Rather – as is made 
clear in chapter 4 – the responsibility for providing good care is part of an 
ethical relationship between caregiver and patient. The caregiver’s willing-
ness to do good is initiated by perceiving the suffering of seriously ill or dying 
patients, which subsequently evokes a caring response. As can be read from 
Susan’s story (chapter 4), the urge to care is accompanied by a predisposition 
to find human beings fascinating and an inclination to enjoy deeper human 
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contact. Van Heijst considers these two aspects as the pillars on which profes-
sional, humane care is built.
Third, practical wisdom is inseparably interwoven with professional 
practice and the practice of life. This emphasises a professional’s relation to 
the wider world. In chapter 6 it is emphasised that virtue in living and car-
ing is developed in practice, which implies that practical wisdom in caring is 
closely interwoven with the kind of person a palliative care professional is. 
The personal involvement implicit in caring practice means that the people 
involved share in each other’s lives. Van Heijst argues that the practice of 
care rests on an availability to strangers, an openness to their needs, a caring 
and competent response, and the proximity of the professional to those who 
suffer (p.314).2 Illustrative in this respect is Susan’s switch from oncology to 
hospice care which literally brought her closer to the patients she preferred 
to care for. 
Detachment
An issue that is not emphasised in this thesis but which is nevertheless a 
necessary aspect of the balanced professional judgement is ‘detachment’. A 
moral attitude that is over-involved or too self-sacrificial can be harmful to 
patients and can lead to burn-out in professionals. A crucial aspect of profes-
sionalism is knowing when to take a step back. Granting that some detach-
ment is necessary, too much professional detachment also has its dangers.13 
Detachment from patients can have a desensitising effect. A professional may 
become unresponsive or even oblivious to a patient’s problems and can pos-
sibly become alienated from the role itself. Moreover, detachment may dam-
age a professional’s capacity for moral judgement leading to an incapacity to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate role-based actions. Excessive 
detachment may, in other words, deteriorate the practical wisdom that is nec-
essary to bring good care into practice. How can detachment have a place in 
the moral attitude of professional palliative caregivers?
Oakley and Cocking argue that an appropriate level of detachment from 
patients can be reconciled with the “psychic harmony” that is achieved by 
the integration of personal and professional life.13 Sometimes a professional’s 
role implies a requirement to depart from the attitude towards others that 
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“would be a morally appropriate attitude to take to those people” (p.141).13 
Detachment from a morally appropriate attitude can be justified and need 
not be morally defective, if 1) a professional role can be shown to serve the 
goals of that profession; 2) psychological detachment in carrying out that role 
helps a professional meet its requirements and so uphold those goals; and 3) 
these goals, all things considered, serve morally worthwhile ends (p.145).13 
For palliative care this implies that detachment from patients can be justi-
fied if such withdrawal serves the key human goods which form the proper 
goals of the profession. E.g., departing from the morally appropriate attitude 
of close involvement with hospice patients, may give that patient the oppor-
tunity to concentrate on strengthening his relationships with others and to 
deal with ‘unfinished business’ (see chapter 3). This may serve the goals of 
palliative care (i.e., “improve the quality of life of patients and families facing 
life-threatening illness” according to the WHO) better than a deep personal 
relationship with a care professional. 
It may be inappropriate to always strive for deep emotional and personal 
attachments as a means to integrate personal and professional life. Profes-
sional detachment from patients can be reconciled with such integration: by 
regulating their level of detachment from patients against their commitment 
to the goals of palliative care, professionals can retain their capacity to em-
pathise with a patient and remain sensitive to the consequences of their be-
haviour (p.150).13 As Van Heijst underlines, both caregiver and care receiver 
are valuable and vulnerable. Since care should not be self-sacrificial, it is im-
portant to look for a sustainable balance between the need for care and the 
ability to provide it, which brings us back to the importance of self-awareness 
as an aspect of practical wisdom. 
Caring conversation
A caring conversation is an indispensable part of the care for palliative pa-
tients. Hospice nurse Susan, who was at the centre of the chapters 4 and 5, 
indicated that what gave her energy when she worked as oncology nurse were 
the conversations with patients and their families. In fact, this observation 
was one of the reasons she decided to make the move to a hospice. 
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Caring conversation and care ethics
The starting point of the ethics of care is the question what people need to 
experience their world as worth living in.14,15 A central assumption is the in-
terdependence of human beings; people need others to give meaning to their 
existence. From this perspective, care giving is 1) an activity which is rooted 
in concrete practice, and 2) a process to maintain, continue and repair the 
world so that people can live their lives as well as possible. As mentioned 
in chapter 2, attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness 
are identified as crucial moral elements of care. Caring is a process of paying 
attention to what other people need, taking the responsibility to fulfill that 
need, and having the actual competence to provide the care that is needed. 
The element of responsiveness incorporates the care receiver’s opinion about 
the care provided. This becomes tricky when the patient is not responsive to 
the care received. What if patients do not co-operate and are indifferent to a 
caregiver’s skills and concern? 
The caring conversation – as a mode of connecting to a patient and as 
a way of exploring a patient’s suffering – is assumed to be a central issue in 
the caring process (see chapter 4).16-18 It is argued that the characterisation 
of invitation and gift best reflects such a relationship. If a suffering patient 
does not invite caregivers to explore that suffering and rejects approaches 
made by caregivers, it is important that such patient should not be aban-
doned. Caring is intended to respect the value of the individual and aims to 
make room for their suffering. Abandoning an uncooperative patient would 
undo these intentions in advance and would provide the very opposite of good 
care. Distancing oneself from uncooperative patients would be disastrous for 
the caring conversation that is necessary to keep the process of care going, 
even though ‘real’ talk is not possible and communication is limited to being 
present and communicating availability. If the horizon of care is ‘to support 
other persons in their misery and need’, as Van Heijst argues, it is essential to 
preserve some minimal caring relationship. Being present and available, and 
showing an openness to the patient in question seems to be a crucial aspect of 
the caregiver’s moral attitude when the caring process becomes difficult. 
Ideally, both caregivers and care receivers are involved in the caring 
process and their relationship can be described as a partnership based on 
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mutual participation (see also chapters 1 and 4). In chapter 3 this mutual 
participation is extensively explored as an aspect of well-being. According 
to the palliative professionals who were interviewed, well-being is – in the 
first place – a judgement by patients about their current situation. Neverthe-
less, our empirical analysis identified five issues the respondents generally 
concentrated on when they explained their attempts to contribute to patient 
well-being: the emphasis on life, a patient’s preferences, the person of the 
patient, completing life, and dying well. Through conversation, professionals 
attempt to explore these aspects of well-being while taking into account both 
the individual patient’s situation and their personality. From this perspective, 
the moral attitude from which these professionals provide care is an attitude 
that is aimed at contributing in a positive and supporting way to a patient’s 
experience of their world as being one worth living in. In palliative care, the 
care also has to be directed at cultivating the acceptance of death as a part of 
life. The data that is presented on ‘completing life’ and ‘dying well’ suggest 
that issues like dealing with unfinished business, reviewing life, strengthen-
ing family ties, or knowing that physical pain and symptoms can be managed 
well, can all contribute to a situation in which patients may accept their situ-
ation as one in which death is inevitable. 
Emotions and care
Often, emotions play a significant part in the relationship between profes-
sional and patient in palliative care and the caring conversation that is a part 
of this relationship. As noticed in chapter 6, the emotional intensity of pallia-
tive care seems to stimulate a professional’s motivation and commitment to 
provide such care. Gastmans warns against an emotivist conception of care in 
which the commitment to act in the interest of others is momentary and the 
continuity of a caregiver’s involvement is unstable. Care should be motivated 
by the material and existential condition in which the patient finds himself, 
not by the fact that a carer is attracted to certain personal features of the pa-
tient.19,20 However, building and sustaining relationships with patients suffer-
ing from progressive and far advanced disease is hard emotional work. Such 
‘emotional labour’ is considered to be a key factor in the provision of care.21 
Emotional labour involves the regulation and management of feeling and is 
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originally defined as ‘the induction or suppression of feeling in order to sus-
tain the outward appearance that produces the proper state of mind in others 
– that of being cared for in a safe and a convivial place’.22,23 
In care, emotional labour largely consists of day-to-day responses to 
common situations. It is demanding and skilled work that is about action and 
reaction, doing and being. The professional is expected to respond to a patient 
in a way which is personal to both of them.21 Van Heijst points out that reci-
procity in the caring relationship emerges both from the professional’s knowl-
edge that it is good for others to receive care and from a certain personal gen-
erosity. Maintaining a bond with patients involves spending time with them 
and requires personal attention which means that carers must give something 
of themselves.22,23 Studies that framed ‘niceness’ and ‘empathy’ as forms of 
emotional labour show how palliative caregivers and patients collaboratively 
form reciprocal relationships in daily practice while doing emotion work.24-26 
Because care ethics considers caring to be a task in which the carer maintains, 
continues and repairs the world so that people cared for can live their lives 
as well as possible, emotional labour can be considered indispensable to bring 
about that process. The moral attitude of palliative care professionals is thus 
also a motivation and a commitment to act in the interest of others in a way 
which includes the emotional work of personal involvement. 
Covenant
In the introduction of this thesis, it was argued that the professional-patient 
relationship in palliative care is required to meet two moral conditions: the 
commitment of the caregiver to the total good of the patient and the patient’s 
trust in that commitment. In the conclusion of chapter 2 it is claimed that 
providing care is at its centre a moral enterprise grounded in a covenant of 
trust that obliges care professionals to use their competence in a patient’s best 
interest. Chapter 3 further examines this covenant and shows the importance 
of a covenantal approach to palliative care when aiming to support a patient’s 
well-being. 
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Menace to the covenant
In chapter 3 the covenant between patient and professional is described as a 
durable bond based on trust. It is contrasted with a contract which is tempo-
rary and founded on distrust. Several authors point out that the covenant of 
trust is in danger of becoming lost.27,28 It is argued that considering patients as 
clients, adopting a business-like approach to health care, and expanding nurs-
ing into a more technologically oriented and separate profession, damage the 
primary responsibility of health care professionals: “to achieve the well-being 
of those who are vulnerable” (p.479).28 Providing health care is a special kind 
of human activity, requiring specific virtues (i.e., humility, honesty, integrity, 
compassion, dedication, self-discipline), and aimed at serving “the good of 
those persons who seek our help and trust us to provide it” (p.1553).27 Inter-
estingly, in both articles cited above the obligations that belong to the cov-
enant are emphasised, regardless of any reciprocity. Providing care or prac-
ticing medicine would be a self-denying and self-sacrificial service in which 
the person of the caregiver is entirely effaced. The current study casts doubt 
on the assumed self-denying character of the covenant between patient and 
practitioner.
A reciprocal element in the covenant of trust
The bond between human beings that is conceived as a covenant, can be un-
derstood in at least two senses that complement each other. The first sense is 
the bond between human beings who recognise each other as valid interlocu-
tors who are embarking on the same dialogue. In the second sense human be-
ings recognise each other as “someone who to a certain extent belongs to me 
and to whom I belong” (p.115).29 If the bond in the second sense is not recog-
nised, a serious dialogue and serious interest in other human beings can be 
difficult. It is the discovery of this tie between human beings which generates 
an obligation towards others. But this tie is also a bond of mutual attachment 
that comprehends a reciprocal recognition between human beings. Van Heijst 
argues that despite its asymmetric starting-point, care giving may develop 
into a reciprocal process in which participants mutually confirm their whole-
ness and worth as a human being (p.210).2  The discussion of self-esteem in 
the chapters 4 and 5 acknowledges this mutuality and defines this reciprocal 
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element in the bond between caregiver and care receiver in social-psychologi-
cal terms.
Giving care is motivated by the material and existential condition of an-
other person. As mentioned above, this condition of suffering evokes a com-
mitment to care from ‘the one suffering with’ (com passio). The centrality of 
another person’s well-being in this process requires that the one providing 
care esteems the person cared for as a fellow human being. The ricoeurian re-
formulation of Kant’s golden rule, however, reads: ‘in order to hold others in 
esteem, I must hold myself in esteem’ (chapter 4). The examination of self-es-
teem in hospice nurses in chapter 5 brought forward two aspects concerning 
self-esteem and acting in the interest of others. First, self-esteem arises when 
professionals use their abilities to provide benefits that they consider impor-
tant in life. If the values of palliative care practice coincide with the values 
that are important in a professional’s personal life, this will not only lead to a 
personal engagement to care, but will also acknowledge the life values of that 
professional and consequently increase their self-esteem. Second, self-esteem 
arises when professionals find that the effort they make to put the covenant 
of trust in practice is appreciated by others. If professionals find that they are 
accepted as partners in relationships with patients, families and colleagues, 
this leads to the experience of making a difference – as a caregiver, but also as 
a human being – which can positively affect their self-esteem. 
Although the moral attitude of palliative care professionals is ideally 
rooted in a covenant of trust in which the well-being of the patient is primary, 
it does not mean that a professional’s own well-being is ignored. The opportu-
nity to care for others on the basis of a mutual bond of trust can improve the 
self-esteem of the caregiver and create a reciprocal element in the obligation 
to provide competent care in another’s interest. As Byock claims (chapter 3): 
“In acting covenantally, I make decisions affecting the well-being of another, 
conscious that their well-being affects my own”.30 The motivation and com-
mitment to act in the interest of others expresses a caregiver’s esteem for oth-
ers, but accepting the obligation to meet a patient’s needs may also help the 
caregiver’s esteem for themselves.
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Whole person care revisited
In the introduction of this thesis, Randall and Downie’s framework of whole 
person care was used as a first orientation of the moral attitude of palliative 
caregivers.31 A key aspect of their framework is the distinction between the 
intrinsic aim and extrinsic aim of palliative care. Randall and Downie claim 
that the promotion of a patient’s emotional, social and spiritual well-being is 
extrinsic to palliative care’s intrinsic aim of bringing about the medical good. 
Two arguments support this distinction. First, the patient’s primary problems 
are of a medical nature. Second, it is wrong to think that there is a skilled pro-
fessional approach to the broad range of human problems (emotional, social, 
spiritual) that may constitute the background of these medical problems. Deal-
ing with those broader problems requires practical wisdom which is moulded 
by (life) experiences, while medical problems can be dealt with by means of 
knowledge-based skills that can be instilled by taking courses. Since intrinsic 
means “relating to the essential qualities or features of something or someone”10 
and extrinsic means “coming from outside a particular person or thing”10, Ran-
dall and Downie’s point of view seems to qualify a professional’s attempts to 
deal with emotional, social and spiritual problems of palliative care patients 
as a side issue. However, they also argue that palliative care requires personal 
involvement of the caregiver and that “the commitment to act for the patient’s 
total good must be part of what it means to be a carer” (p.39).31
This contrast raises the question of whether such personal involvement 
and commitment on the basis of experiential knowledge and insight into hu-
man characters really must be considered an extrinsic aim of palliative care. 
Furthermore, Randall and Downie seem to qualify their distinction by inter-
preting it from two points of view (pp.20-21).31 On the one hand, they argue 
that the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic aim of palliative care 
should be firm to prevent palliative care falling short of expectation. All health 
care practitioners can be trained to aim at the medical good, while their deal-
ings with psychological, social and spiritual distress will largely depend on 
the experience and personality of the caregiver. This makes the intrinsic aim a 
reasonable target for all health care practitioners. On the other hand, Randall 
and Downie admit that practical wisdom can be considered the “controlling 
element in care” (p.20).31 To whatever extent professional expertise develops, 
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every case is a particular case and practical wisdom always plays an impor-
tant part in a caregiver’s judgements about what to do. The technical skills 
cannot be exercised without a balanced judgement based on practical wisdom. 
Moreover practical wisdom is crucial when it comes to the manner in which 
care is given. “Humane treatment flows from the carer with practical wisdom” 
(p.21).31 Here, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic is blurred. 
The current study supports the latter interpretation in not drawing a 
sharp line between the intrinsic and extrinsic aim of palliative care. Whether 
it concerns health care practitioners in general or specialised palliative care-
givers, good palliative care requires the personal involvement of the practi-
tioner because the relationship between caregiver and care receiver is crucial. 
This study does agree with Randall and Downie’s view on whole person care 
on one important issue: the responsibility of palliative carers with regard to 
the psychological, social and spiritual well-being of the patient is closely con-
nected to their partnership with that patient. The moral imperative of respect 
for a patient’s personal values and goals limits the scope of professional ac-
tivity. This respect is integral to whole person care and acts as a safeguard 
against setting unrealistic goals. Whole person care can only succeed in part-
nership with the patient, but – as Van Heijst argues – a patient with an unco-
operative attitude must not be rejected. 
Randall and Downie claim that acting from a willingness to assist pa-
tients to overcome psychological, social and spiritual barriers to their well-
being is not really a part of a professional role. In overcoming these barriers, 
caregivers rather act as a ‘caring companion’ or as a ‘fellow member of com-
munity’ (p.24).31 From this perspective, the personal involvement of palliative 
care practitioners would be largely disconnected from their professional task 
of bringing about the medical good. From the point of view of the studies that 
were conducted in this thesis, such a disconnection seems problematic. 
This thesis shows how providing palliative care as a professionally 
skilled caregiver inevitably implies providing care in which professionals feel 
personally committed to needy others and in which physical aspects of care 
are closely related to attention to well-being on a psychosocial and spiritual 
level. In chapter 2 this is put forward in the ‘habits of mind’ that are the 
moral basis of professional competence. Chapter 3 advances the importance 
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in palliative care practice of a particular set of values that are considered 
important in every life. It also emphasises the role that a covenant of trust 
– conceived as a mutual bond between human beings – plays when providing 
palliative care. The chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate what providing palliative 
care can mean – by affecting self-esteem – for the professional as a person. 
The chapters 6 and 7 consider providing palliative care as a potential route 
to personal and professional growth. In short, these findings endorse the fol-
lowing words: “Palliative care is whole person care not only in the sense that 
the whole person of the patient is the object of attention. Palliative care also 
demands that the whole person of the caregiver be involved. Palliative care is, 
par excellence, care that is given through the medium of the human relation-
ship” (p.464).32
Reflective practice
Throughout this thesis it is argued that the relationship between patient and 
professional can be considered the cornerstone of palliative care practice. 
Finding a balance between involvement in patients’ lives and (occasional) de-
tachment from their suffering requires self-knowledge, reflection and self-
examination33 or, in other words, awareness of personal resources and limi-
tations.34 Mindful of the importance of that balance, a recent report of the 
European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) – which is discussed in chap-
ter 6 – stresses the need for reflective practice in palliative nursing. Reflective 
practice involves thoughtfully considering one’s own experiences in apply-
ing one’s professional knowledge and skills to practice while being coached 
by other professionals in the discipline.35 The current thesis supports a plea 
for reflective practice, not only for palliative nursing, but for palliative care 
as a whole. Guided reflection offers opportunity to discuss both ‘objective’ 
(knowledge and skills) and ‘inter-subjective’ (providing care within an ethical 
relationship) aspects of professional care. On the basis of this thesis it can be 
argued that such reflection is a prerequisite for watching over and preserving 
a professional’s motivation and commitment to act in the interest of others.  
Experiences in practice trigger two kinds of reflection, that can both be 
retrieved in chapter 6. First, reflection in action can be described as “the abil-
ity to learn and develop continually by creatively applying current and past 
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experiences and reasoning to unfamiliar events while they are occurring” 
(p.214).36 It is advanced in chapter 6, for example, in the quotation of the cer-
tified nursing assistant who – after having worked in palliative practice for a 
while – adjusted her belief that a patient should be washed every day. Second, 
reflection on action is “a process of thinking back on what happened in a 
past situation, what may have contributed to the unexpected event, whether 
the actions taken were appropriate, and how this situation may affect future 
practice” (p.214).36 A striking case in this point was the remark of the head/
nurse in chapter 6 who emphasised the importance of mutuality within the 
caring team and the regular sharing of each others’ experiences. Through the 
process of reflecting ‘in practice’ and ‘on practice’, practitioners continually 
reshape their approaches and develop the way they practice their profession.36 
Since a professional’s moral attitude is closely intertwined with that practice, 
the process of reflection with which a professional scrutinises experiences in 
practice also provides the opportunity to scrutinise their moral attitude. In 
chapter 6 it is argued that portfolio learning may be an effective educational 
tool to structurally integrate such a process of reflection in practice. 
Whereas chapter 6 focuses on the further development and preservation 
of the moral attitude of professionals who work in palliative care, chapter 7 
suggests that palliative care itself can function as a source of reflection on 
moral attitude. Education is considered a key to ‘good work’.37 The chapter 
suggests that reflection on experiences in palliative practice should be a part 
of the formal education of medical students. It is argued that such experiences 
support a more explicit enculturation into the medical realm and in that way 
contribute to a less implicit formation of medical students’ moral attitude, 
and their way of committing themselves to patients. Several authors argue 
that experiencing intimate and caring situations, e.g. in first clinical encoun-
ters, lead to a process of personal reflection and moral reasoning that serious-
ly affected students’ moral awareness.38,39 Other studies support this point of 
view and demonstrate the benefits of a course that brings future doctors into 
contact with palliative care practice.40-43 For example, one course immerses 
students as participant observers in a palliative care setting to counteract the 
influence of the informal and hidden curricula upon medical education.42 Ob-
servation of others is supposed to lead to a critical evaluation of the students’ 
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own practices. This acquaintance with palliative care and the consequent dis-
cussions and reflection not only demonstrated the fact that each person brings 
his or her own perspective to the clinical encounter, it also clarified the part 
human qualities play in medicine. Furthermore, in chapter 7 it is argued that 
gaining experience in palliative care may be supplemented by reflection on 
narratives that describe serious illness, death or grief. This focus on palliative 
care experiences and narratives will help medical students to recognise the 
human dimensions that form the moral starting point of health care and will 
thus offer them an opportunity to refine their moral attitude – their motiva-
tion and commitment to act in the interest of others. 
Future research into ‘Who cares?’ 
The central message of this study is that moral development as a professional 
inevitably goes hand in hand with moral development as a person. The pro-
fessional practice and the personal life of palliative caregivers seem to be 
so closely related that it is difficult to separate palliative care’s aim to bring 
about the medical good from professionals’ commitment to both their own 
well-being and the patient’s total good. In palliative care practice, the ques-
tion ‘What care should be provided?’ is inseparably related to the question 
‘Who cares?’. On the basis of the present study, at least three issues concern-
ing the development and maintenance of the moral attitude of health care 
professionals deserve attention in future research.
First, from a virtue ethical perspective, future research should take the 
opportunity to seriously examine the position of role models in the develop-
ment of professionals. In short, a role model is a person with whom we can 
identify, who has qualities we would like to have, and who is in a position 
we would like to reach.44 But role models are not unproblematic; they are 
serendipitous (it is not fixed what a good role model is) and can be silent (the 
learning is assumed, not explicit).44,45 It can be argued that reflection can play 
an important part in coping with these barriers.46 Reflection on actual role 
models can contribute to a more explicit enculturation into health care and 
can thus counteract the undesirable effects of the hidden curriculum. Explicit 
reflection on role model behaviour however, has rarely been studied in health 
care practice, even less in palliative care practice. 
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Second, an underemphasised aspect of the ethics of care deserves a more 
fundamental study: self-care. This issue strongly relates to the development 
and preservation of the moral attitude of professionals. What kind of care is 
competent ‘care for caregivers’? At first sight, this issue seems to be linked to 
the reflective practice that was brought up in chapter 6. Research is needed 
to better understand the self-care of professionals and its relationship with 
reflection. All the more because this thesis demonstrates that the well-being 
of the care receiver and the well-being of the caregiver are both involved in 
providing care.
Third, from a hermeneutical point of view it seems worthwhile to study 
the relationship between moral attitude and moral competence. It is argued 
that someone’s identity, or having an integrated personality, means changing 
in the right way; one has to continue to interpret one’s actions in one’s biogra-
phy in an understandable and defensible way, which requires a specific moral 
competence.8,47 This process of reinterpreting one’s actions in one’s biography 
shows similarities to the argument made in chapter 6 concerning moral at-
titude and reflective practice in palliative care, in which the central question 
was ‘What kind of palliative caregiver should I be?’. Furthermore, changing in 
the right way, and developing and maintaining oneself as a person and a pro-
fessional seems to be closely connected to care ethics’ aim of recovering and 
maintaining a world worth living in. Future (empirical-) ethical research will 
have to provide further insight into how moral attitude, moral competence 
and care ethics are connected to each other. The present thesis demonstrates 
that palliative care and the caregivers that put it into daily practice, are a 
particularly fertile field for such research on the interface of ethics, empirics, 
and health care. 
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Summary
The central concern of this thesis is the moral attitude of professionals who 
work in palliative care. This attitude is described in general terms as ‘the 
motivation and commitment to act in the interest of others’. The subsequent 
chapters 2-5 attempt to draw a picture of what kind of professionals provide 
palliative care on a daily basis. What motivates them? What does it take to 
be good at such care? How should they engage in their relationships with 
patients? These questions are part of the first objective of the present study: 
to explore and analyse normative views with regard to the moral attitude of 
professionals caregivers in palliative care. The second objective of the study 
is to explore how the moral attitude of (palliative) care professionals can be 
stimulated, preserved and maintained. How can professional palliative carers 
persevere in their motivation and commitment to help patients who suffer 
from a life-threatening illness (chapter 6)? How can the development of medi-
cal students’ moral attitude be stimulated (chapter 7)?
The introductory chapter provides the background against which the 
above mentioned objectives emerge. It briefly sketches what can be under-
stood as palliative care and what characterises patients who receive such 
care. It also offers a first orientation on the moral attitude of palliative carers 
on the basis of a framework of ‘whole person care’ which is taken from Ran-
dall and Downie’s standard work on palliative care ethics.
Chapter 2 revolves around professional competence. The aim of the chap-
ter is to explore an ethical view of professional competence by examining the 
professional competence of physicians in the context of palliative care. Point of 
departure is the definition of professional competence as ‘the habitual and ju-
dicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning, 
emotions, values, and reflection in daily practice for the benefit of the individ-
ual and the community being served’. Four dimensions of this definition – the 
cognitive, technical, relational and affective/moral dimension – are examined 
more closely on the basis of clinical vignettes derived from interviews with 
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palliative care professionals. It is concluded that another dimension – ‘habits 
of mind’ – plays a crucial role in every aspect of professional competence. This 
observation is discussed from the perspective of virtue ethics and care ethics. 
Our conclusion points up the importance of education in ethics in the develop-
ment of professional competence, and argues that because palliative care in-
volves intense human interactions, integrating palliative care into the medical 
curriculum may improve the ethical culture of health care as a whole.
In chapter 3 quality of life is considered as well-being. The aim is to 
compare insights about well-being from contemporary philosophy with the 
practice-related opinions on well-being of palliative care professionals. In the 
first part of the chapter it is outlined how the nature of well-being is inter-
preted in contemporary philosophy. It focuses on two recent views: ‘pruden-
tial perfectionism’ and ‘authentic happiness’. The first theory acknowledges 
the independent existence of prudential values and argues that there are some 
things that are valuable in every life, the latter denies the independent exist-
ence of prudential values and argues that they are valued only in terms of the 
subject’s attitude towards the world. In the second part opinions on well-be-
ing are presented that are derived from interviews with nineteen professional 
palliative caregivers. Both their views on the well-being of patients and the 
well-being of the carers themselves are considered. Seven elements are dis-
cussed: 1) the nature of well-being, 2) emphasing life, 3) trying to meet the 
patient’s preferences, 4) treating the patient as a person, 5) completing life, 6) 
dying well, 7) the professionals’ satisfaction and enrichment. The third part 
of the chapter further discusses these elements and focuses on the question 
how well-being ought to be promoted. A threefold conclusion is presented. 
First, the analysis underscores the subject-relativity of well-being that is cen-
tral in ‘authentic happiness’. Second, it seems that values that are considered 
relevant in every life as presented in the theory of ‘prudential perfectionism’ 
are relevant in palliative care practice. Third, the analysis points out the im-
portance of a covenantal approach to care when aiming to enhance the well-
being of patients in palliative care.
Chapter 4 concentrates on two questions: 1) What kind of person should 
the hospice nurse be?, and 2) How should (s)he engage in caring conversa-
tions? Central in the analysis to answer these questions is the story of Su-
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san, a hospice nurse. This story is composed of examplary statements made 
by five hospice nurse who were interviewed for this study. The normative 
framework that is used as a tool to analyse these statements is the ‘ethics of 
the caring conversation’ which incorporates the ethics of Paul Ricoeur. It is 
explored how the professional role a hospice nurse is expected to play is inter-
woven with the person (s)he is. The ethical notions of self-esteem, autonomy, 
and caritas and the corresponding norms of self-respect, responsibility, and 
reciprocity play a key role in answering the two questions that were the start-
ing point of the chapter.
Chapter 5 elaborates on the analysis that was made in the preceding 
chapter. It offers a more detailed examination of self-esteem in relation to the 
notions of personal identity (person) and professional identity (role). Again, 
the story of hospice nurse Susan serves as the background for the discussion. 
The focus is on examining two questions: 1) What is self-esteem, and how is it 
related to personal identity and its moral dimension?, and 2) How do self-es-
teem and personal identity relate to the professional identity of the nurse? It 
is argued that if the nurse’s personal view of the good life is compatible with 
their experiences and feelings as professionals, this improves their perform-
ance as nurses. Furthermore, it is discussed how good nursing depends on the 
responses that the nurse gets from others (patients, colleagues, family); they 
make the nurse feel valued as a person and enables them to see the value of 
the work they do.  
The next two chapters serve the second objective of the present thesis. 
In chapter 6 a recent report of the European Association for Palliative Care 
is discussed. The report recommends the promotion of reflective practice in 
palliative care. The moral attitude that professionals bring to such reflective 
practice is examined in terms of four crucial aspects of virtue ethics: practice, 
motivation, emotion, and practical wisdom. The examination is tailored to pal-
liative care with quotations from interviews with several professionals. It is 
argued that the reflective practice should be persistently focused on the ques-
tion: What kind of palliative caregiver should I be? While this question plays 
an important, but often implicit, role in staff support activities, it is argued 
that as an educational tool portfolio learning offers opportunities to improve 
the integration of reflection into the structure of palliative care practice.
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Chapter 7 focuses on the development of the moral attitude of medical 
students. It is frequently observed that the current emphasis on theoretical 
knowledge and practical skills in medical education distracts attention from 
the moral attitude of future doctors. It is argued that including palliative care 
into medical training not only improves the quality of palliative care in gen-
eral, but also stimulates the development of the moral attitude of the doctors 
being trained. Clinical experience in palliative care, supplemented by reflec-
tion on narratives about chronically ill or dying patients, and mourning or 
aging processes, offer prospects for such development. In conclusion, it is sug-
gested that inclusion of palliative care can contribute to the transformation of 
the present ‘hidden curriculum’ of contemporary medical education – which 
implicitly shapes the student’s moral attitude – into a more explicit encul-
turation into the medical realm.
Chapter 8 is largely devoted to a résumé of three crucial moral notions 
that run like a common thread through the preceding chapters. First, the vir-
tue ethical notion of phronesis – or practical wisdom – is discussed. After situ-
ating phronesis within the whole of virtue ethics, three aspects that relate it 
to the moral attitude of palliative carers are discussed: 1) self-awareness, 2) 
responsibility, 3) professional practice and the practice of life. The issue of 
professional detachment from patients is discussed here as well. Second, the 
notion of the caring conversation is further discussed. It is considered from 
the perspective of the ethics of care. Subsequently, the role emotional labour 
plays in the relationship between professional and patient are discussed. The 
caring conversation does not follow a predetermined formula; personal in-
volvement of the professional through emotion work seems inevitable. Third, 
the moral notion of the covenant of care is further examined. It is argued 
that the covenantal approach to caregiving is a crucial element of the moral 
attitude of palliative caregivers. However, the often assumed absence of reci-
procity this approach would imply is questioned. The opportunity to care for 
others from a mutual bond of trust may lead to self-esteem on behalf of the 
carer and thus shows that a reciprocal element can well be a part of the obli-
gation to provide competent care in another’s interest. Chapter 8 is completed 
with a comment on the framework of ‘whole person care’ that served as the 
starting point for the current explorations. It is argued that from the perspec-
 Summary
161
tive of the present study palliative care involves both the whole person of 
the patient and the whole person of the caregiver. It is difficult to separate a 
palliative care professional’s task to skillfully deal with a patient’s physical 
good from the humane interventions that aim at a patient’s psychological, 
social, and spiritual good. This is underlined by both the importance of get-
ting to know the patient as a person and the consequences the commitment 
to act in the patient’s interest can have for the professional as a person, as is 
repeatedly advanced in this study. The explorations in this thesis support a 
plea for reflective practice in palliative care. Guided reflection seems to be a 
prerequisite for watching over and preserving a professional’s motivation and 
commitment to act in the interest of others. Finally, role models, self-care, and 
moral competence are regarded as issues concerning the development and 
maintenance of the moral attitude of health care professionals that deserve 
attention in future research.
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Samenvatting
Wat beweegt mensen om hun werkzame leven te wijden aan de zorg voor pa-
tiënten die lijden aan een levensbedreigende ziekte en die soms zelfs de dood 
al in de ogen zien? Wat motiveert hen een professional in de palliatieve zorg 
te zijn? Hoe zouden palliatieve zorgverleners moeten staan in de relatie met 
de patiënten waarvoor ze zorgen? Hoe kunnen zorgverleners hun engagement 
met betrekking tot dit soort intensieve zorg volhouden? In dit proefschrift 
wordt zichtbaar gemaakt dat de zorgverleners die palliatieve zorg dagelijks in 
de praktijk brengen, dit werk doen vanuit een bepaalde morele houding. Deze 
houding wordt in algemene termen omschreven als ‘de motivatie en betrok-
kenheid om in het belang van anderen te handelen’ en wordt in de voorliggen-
de studie vanuit diverse ethische invalshoeken verkend. Hierbij passeren de 
deugdethiek, de hermeneutische ethiek van Paul Ricoeur en welzijnstheorieën 
uit de hedendaagse filosofie de revue. Tegelijkertijd wordt de morele houding 
van palliatieve zorgverleners ook vanuit een empirische invalshoek verkend. 
Een dertigtal interviews met diverse palliatieve zorgverleners die werkzaam 
zijn in verschillende settings speelt een belangrijke rol in de analyses. De doel-
stelling van dit proefschrift is tweeledig. Allereerst beoogt deze studie norma-
tieve zienswijzen van zorgverleners ten aanzien van een morele houding in de 
praktijk van de palliatieve zorg te verkennen en te analyseren. Dit doel staat 
centraal in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5. Op de tweede plaats wil de studie 
ook verkennen hoe de morele houding van palliatieve zorgverleners gehand-
haafd en gestimuleerd kan worden. Dit gebeurt in de hoofdstukken 6 en 7. 
In het inleidende hoofdstuk 1 wordt beknopt geschetst wat verstaan 
wordt onder palliatieve zorg en wat patiënten karakteriseert die dergelijke 
zorg ontvangen. Zo verschijnt de achtergrond waartegen de hierboven ge-
noemde vragen en doelen zich aandienen. Bovendien biedt dit hoofdstuk een 
eerste oriëntatie op de morele houding van palliatieve zorgverleners op basis 
van een kader van whole person care (‘zorg voor de hele mens’) dat is ontleend 
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aan Randall en Downie’s standaardwerk op het gebied van de ethiek van de 
palliatieve zorg.
De achtergrond voor hoofdstuk 2 wordt gevormd door recente discus-
sies over medisch professionalisme. Een breder, ethisch perspectief ontbreekt 
daarin veelal. In dit hoofdstuk wordt het begrip professionele competentie 
nader onderzocht in de context van de palliatieve zorg met als doel nader in te 
gaan op de morele basis van professioneel competente zorg. Het vertrekpunt 
is een definitie van professionele competentie als ‘het vanzelfsprekend en oor-
deelkundig gebruik van communicatie, kennis, technische vaardigheden, kli-
nisch redeneren, emoties, waarden en reflectie in de dagelijkse praktijk van 
de zorg ten bate van het individu en de gemeenschap’ (Epstein et al, 2002). 
Vier dimensies van deze definitie – de cognitieve, technische, relationele en 
affectief-morele – worden bediscussieerd aan de hand van een aantal inter-
viewfragmenten, afkomstig uit interviews met palliatieve zorgprofessionals. 
Er wordt geconcludeerd dat een vijfde dimensie – habits of mind (‘tweede 
natuur’) – een cruciale rol speelt in elke dimensie van professionele compe-
tentie. Competent handelen hangt, met andere woorden, nauw samen met een 
vanzelfsprekende, morele houding die een zorgverlener in staat stelt zich aan-
dachtig, nieuwsgierig en zelfbewust op te stellen jegens patiënten. Dat geldt 
voor zowel de technische en cognitieve aspecten, als de morele, emotionele en 
relationele aspecten van het handelen. Deze constatering wordt vervolgens 
besproken vanuit het perspectief van de deugdethiek – die zich richt op mo-
rele kwaliteiten en houdingen – en de zorgethiek – waarin de nadruk ligt op 
de wijze waarop die kwaliteiten vorm krijgen in zorgrelaties. In de conclusie 
wordt gewezen op het belang van ethiekonderwijs als het gaat om het ontwik-
kelen van professionele competentie. Ook wordt beargumenteerd dat, omdat 
intense menselijke interacties er zo centraal in staan, de palliatieve zorg goe-
de aanknopingspunten biedt om over de morele basis van geneeskunde na te 
denken; het vertrouwen dat patiënten stellen in de competentie van dokters 
en de plicht van de dokter die kundigheid in te zetten in het belang van de 
patiënt. Daarom zou het integreren van palliatieve zorg in het geneeskunde 
curriculum de ethische cultuur van de gezondheidszorg als geheel mogelijk 
kunnen verbeteren. 
Palliatieve zorg, en daarmee ook het handelen van palliatieve zorgver-
leners, richt zich op het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van leven van patiënten 
met een levensbedreigende ziekte en hun familie. Een belangrijke maat voor 
kwaliteit van leven is welzijn. Het doel van hoofdstuk 3 is om inzichten over 
het begrip welzijn uit de hedendaagse filosofie te vergelijken met de prak-
tijkgerelateerde opvattingen over welzijn van palliatieve zorgprofessionals. 
In het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk wordt geschetst hoe in de filosofie de 
essentie van welzijn wordt geïnterpreteerd. Twee gezichtspunten staan cen-
traal: ‘authentic happiness’ en ‘prudential perfectionism’. Beide visies ver-
trekken vanuit de vraag: Wat maakt het leven goed voor degene wiens leven 
het is? Een heikel punt is vervolgens de kwestie of er waardevolle zaken zijn 
aan te duiden, los van individuele wensen en verlangens, die richtinggevend 
zijn voor het welzijn van iemand. De eerste theorie ontkent dit en stelt dat 
zaken met betrekking tot welzijn alleen gewaardeerd kunnen worden in ter-
men van iemands (subjectieve) houding jegens de wereld. De tweede theo-
rie daarentegen, erkent het bestaan van waarden die van belang zijn voor 
elk leven, onafhankelijk van het individuele perspectief. In het tweede deel 
van het hoofdstuk worden de opvattingen over welzijn gepresenteerd zoals 
die naar voren komen uit interviews met negentien palliatieve zorgverleners. 
Zowel hun visie op het welzijn van de patiënt als die op het welzijn van de 
zorgverlener komen aan bod. Zeven punten worden besproken: 1) de essentie 
van welzijn, 2) de nadruk op het leven, 3) proberen tegemoet te komen aan de 
voorkeuren van de patiënt, 4) omgaan met de patiënt als persoon, 5) afronden 
van het leven, 6) goed sterven, 7) voldoening en verrijking van de professional 
als persoon. Het derde deel van het hoofdstuk gaat dieper in op deze zeven 
punten en concentreert zich op de vraag hoe welzijn dan verbeterd kan wor-
den. De conclusie is drievoudig. Allereerst onderstreept de analyse de subject-
gerelateerdheid van welzijn die centraal staat in de theorie van ‘authentic 
happiness’. De geïnterviewde zorgverleners maken duidelijk dat het welzijn 
van de patiënt een oordeel is van die patiënt over zijn of haar eigen situatie. 
Op de tweede plaats maakt de analyse duidelijk dat, hoewel zij het welzijn van 
de patiënt als een individueel oordeel opvatten, palliatieve zorgverleners zich 
in de praktijk in belangrijke mate laten leiden door de waarden die de theorie 
van ‘prudential perfectionism’ als relevant beschouwt in elk leven. Een derde 
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punt wijst vervolgens op het belang van een benadering van zorg vanuit de 
‘menselijke verbondenheid’ (covenant). Zoals een geïnterviewde verpleegkun-
dige benadrukte: ‘Wat je geeft, staat in geen verhouding tot wat je ontvangt.’ 
Vanuit een dergelijke verbondenheid wordt gehandeld met de bedoeling het 
welzijn van de ander te beïnvloeden, wetend dat het welzijn van de ander een 
rol speelt bij dat van zichzelf.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt één specifieke palliatieve zorgprofessional onder de 
loep genomen: de hospice verpleegkundige. De ‘ethiek van het zorggesprek’, 
gebaseerd op de hermeneutische ethiek van Paul Ricoeur, wordt in dit hoofd-
stuk ingezet om het op basis van interviews samengestelde verhaal van hos-
pice verpleegkundige Susan nader te duiden. Centraal in deze analyse staat de 
wijze waarop persoon, professionele rol en zorgrelatie met elkaar verweven 
zijn in de hospice zorg. In het hoofdstuk wordt geprobeerd antwoord te geven 
op twee vragen: 1) Wat voor persoon moet de hospice verpleegkundige zijn? 
en 2) Hoe moet hij/zij participeren in gesprekken waarin de betekenis van 
het lijden voor de patiënt verkend wordt? Met betrekking tot de eerste vraag 
komt het belang naar voren van de wijze waarop de verpleegkundige zichzelf 
acht (self-esteem) en de achting die hij of zij heeft voor anderen. In meer nor-
matieve termen wordt dan gesproken van zelfrespect en respect. Daarnaast 
speelt de notie van autonomie een rol. Het evalueren van het eigen handelen 
(wat kan leiden tot zelfachting) veronderstelt de mogelijkheid tot handelen te 
hebben (autonomie). In normatieve zin brengt deze mogelijkheid een verant-
woordelijkheid met zich mee. In het geval van een hospice verpleegkundige 
is dat de verantwoordelijkheid te handelen in het belang van doodzieke pa-
tiënten die niet de mogelijkheid hebben zelf te handelen. Het antwoord op de 
tweede vraag benadrukt het belang de lijdende patiënt als persoon, vanuit een 
houding van wederkerigheid, te benaderen. Hiermee wordt allereerst het ge-
vaar van een puur asymmetrische relatie bezworen; de relatie tussen hospice 
verpleegkundige en patiënt is idealiter ook een relatie van medemenselijk-
heid. Bovendien, en hierop aansluitend, maakt het ethische perspectief van 
Ricoeur duidelijk dat het persoonlijke en interpersoonlijke nauw verbonden 
zijn. Of zoals Ricoeurs herformulering van Kants gulden regel luidt: ‘teneinde 
anderen te kunnen achten, moet ik mezelf achten’. 
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In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de analyse van het vierde hoofdstuk verder uitge-
werkt en wordt de notie van zelfachting (self-esteem) in relatie tot persoon-
lijke en professionele identiteit bestudeerd. Ook hier dient het verhaal van 
hospice verpleegkundige Susan als achtergrond voor de discussie. Twee vra-
gen staan centraal: 1) Wat is self-esteem, en hoe is het gerelateerd aan de 
morele dimensie van persoonlijke identiteit?, en 2) Hoe zijn self-esteem en 
persoonlijke identiteit gerelateerd aan de professionele identiteit van de ver-
pleegkundige? Er wordt betoogd dat de begrippen zelfachting, persoonlijke 
identiteit en professionele identiteit zich verenigen in wat wordt genoemd 
‘moreel actorschap’. Het beeld dat verpleegkundigen van zichzelf als persoon 
hebben en het beeld dat ze hebben van zichzelf als professional is intrinsiek 
verbonden met hun vermogen het goede te zien in het werk dat ze doen. Zo-
wel de waarde van het verpleegkundige werk op zich, als de waarde die het 
heeft voor de verpleegkundige zelf – dat deze doet wat hij of zij vindt dat een 
professionele verpleegkundige zou moeten doen – spelen hierbij een rol. Met 
andere woorden, goede verpleegkundige zorg vereist idealiter dat de ervarin-
gen en gevoelens die een professional in de praktijk van de zorg heeft, aanslui-
ten bij het beeld van het goede leven dat deze professional als persoon voor 
ogen staat. Tot slot wordt besproken hoe ‘goed verplegen’ samenhangt met de 
respons die verpleegkundigen krijgen van anderen (patiënten, collega’s, fami-
lie); deze respons zorgt er voor dat zij zich gewaardeerd voelen als persoon en 
laat hen de waarde van het verpleegkundige werk zien. Het draagt, kortom, 
bij aan hun zelfachting.
De volgende twee hoofdstukken staan in het teken van het tweede doel 
van het proefschrift: het verkennen van de wijze waarop de morele houding 
van palliatieve zorgverleners gehandhaafd en gestimuleerd kan worden. In 
hoofdstuk 6 vormt een recent rapport van de European Association of Pal-
liative Care (EAPC) de aanleiding voor de discussie. Het rapport beveelt de 
bevordering van ‘reflective practice’ in de palliatieve zorg aan, waarmee de 
noodzaak van zelfbewustzijn en het vermogen van het maken van ethische 
afwegingen wordt bedoeld. De morele houding van waaruit professionals 
deelnemen aan een dergelijke reflexieve praktijk wordt in dit hoofdstuk be-
sproken aan de hand van vier cruciale aspecten van de deugdethiek: praktijk, 
motivatie, emotie en praktische wijsheid. Deze bespreking wordt op de maat 
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van de palliatieve zorg gesneden aan de hand van citaten uit interviews met 
verscheidene professionals. Er wordt betoogd dat een reflexieve praktijk zich 
voortdurend zou moeten richten op de vraag Wat voor palliatieve zorgverlener 
zou ik willen zijn? Deze vraag speelt een belangrijke, maar vaak impliciete, rol 
in activiteiten die professionals ondersteunen in hun werk (zoals bijvoorbeeld 
intervisie). Er wordt beargumenteerd dat ‘portfolio leren’ kansen biedt de in-
tegratie van reflectie in de praktijk van de palliatieve zorg te verbeteren. 
In hoofdstuk 7 staat de ontwikkeling van de morele houding van medisch 
studenten centraal. Er wordt vaak beweerd dat de nadruk op theoretische 
kennis en praktische vaardigheden in het medisch onderwijs de aandacht af-
leidt van de morele houding van toekomstige dokters. In dit hoofdstuk wordt 
betoogd dat het opnemen van palliatieve zorg in de medische training niet 
alleen de kwaliteit van de palliatieve zorg in het algemeen verbetert, maar 
ook de ontwikkeling van de morele houding van de dokters in spe zal verbe-
teren. Het opdoen van enige klinische ervaring in de palliatieve zorg, aange-
vuld met reflectie op verhalen over chronisch zieke of stervende patiënten, en 
over rouw of veroudering, biedt kansen om de ontwikkeling van een morele 
houding te stimuleren. In de conclusie wordt opgemerkt dat het structureel 
opnemen van palliatieve zorg in de geneeskunde opleiding kan bijdragen aan 
het omvormen van het hidden curriculum in het hedendaagse medisch on-
derwijs – dat de morele houding van studenten impliciet vormt – tot een meer 
expliciete inwijding in de medische gemeenschap. Het reflecteren op ervarin-
gen in en verhalen over zorg rond het levenseinde kan studenten in een vroeg 
stadium gevoelig maken voor de morele onderneming die de praktijk van de 
geneeskunde in feite is. 
Hoofdstuk 8 is grotendeels gewijd aan het samen nemen en verder door-
denken van drie cruciale morele noties die als een rode draad door het proef-
schrift lopen. Allereerst wordt de deugdethische notie phronesis, of praktische 
wijsheid, besproken. Na phronesis gesitueerd te hebben in het geheel van de 
deugdethiek, worden drie aspecten die gerelateerd zijn aan de morele houding 
van palliatieve zorgverleners nader bediscussieerd: 1) zelfbewustzijn, 2) ver-
antwoordelijkheid en 3) praktijk. Het spanningsveld tussen nabijheid en af-
stand houden van de patiënt wordt hier ook besproken. Ten tweede wordt de 
notie van de caring conversation uitgewerkt. Dit begrip wordt bediscussieerd 
vanuit het perspectief van de zorgethiek, waarin de nadruk ligt op de vraag 
wat mensen van anderen nodig hebben om hun leefwereld als waardevol te 
ervaren. Bovendien wordt de rol die ‘emotionele arbeid’ speelt in de relatie 
tussen professional en patiënt besproken. Een gesprek dat de betekenis van 
het lijden voor de patiënt verkent, volgt geen van tevoren vastgestelde for-
mule; persoonlijke betrokkenheid van de professional en omgaan met emoties 
lijken onvermijdelijk. Ten derde wordt het begrip covenant (‘verbondenheid’) 
verder onderzocht. Er wordt betoogd dat dit een cruciaal element is in de 
morele houding van palliatieve zorgverleners. De door sommigen veronder-
stelde afwezigheid van wederkerigheid in dit verband wordt echter in twijfel 
getrokken. De kans om voor anderen te zorgen vanuit een onderlinge band 
van vertrouwen kan leiden tot zelfachting aan de kant van de zorgverlener. 
Dit laat zien dat een wederkerig element goed een onderdeel kan vormen van 
de morele verplichting competente zorg te verlenen in het belang van de an-
der. Hoofdstuk 8 wordt afgesloten met een beknopt commentaar op Randall 
en Downie’s visie op whole person care die diende als uitgangspunt van het 
onderzoek in dit proefschrift. Er wordt betoogd dat vanuit het perspectief van 
dit onderzoek het verlenen van palliatieve zorg zowel ‘de hele persoon van de 
patiënt’ als ‘de hele persoon van de zorgverlener’ aangaat. De professionele 
taak om vaardig om te gaan met de fysieke aspecten van de zorg, kan moeilijk 
los worden gezien van het handelen van professionals op het vlak van de psy-
chosociale en spirituele zorg. Deze bewering en de observatie dat de relatie 
tussen de professional en de patiënt de hoeksteen vormt van de palliatieve 
zorgpraktijk, ondersteunen een pleidooi voor een meer reflexieve praktijk in 
de palliatieve zorg. Het onder begeleiding reflecteren op praktijkervaringen 
lijkt een noodzakelijke voorwaarde te zijn om de morele houding van zorgpro-
fessionals te bewaken en te handhaven. 
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Curriculum vitae
Hoewel in dit proefschrift een groep zorgverleners van voornamelijk vrouwen 
centraal staat (zoals verbeeld op het omslag), ben ik een man. Ik ben in 1971 
in een ziekenhuis in Almelo geboren. Twee jaar daarvoor, in 1969, publiceerde 
J.H. van den Berg Medische macht en medische ethiek. Dit boekje wordt over 
het algemeen aangemerkt als het begin van de ‘nieuwe’ medische ethiek in 
Nederland. De paternalistische medische macht brokkelde sindsdien af en de 
openheid jegens patiënten nam toe. De stem van de patiënt won aan belang 
bij het nemen van beslissingen. Deze verschuiving had zich nog niet helemaal 
voltrokken in het ziekenhuis waar ik ter wereld kwam. Mijn vader was bijna 
de kans ontnomen om de geboorte van zijn eerste kind bij te wonen. Ik lag 
namelijk in stuit en de hoofdzuster achtte het verstandiger dat hij in de wacht-
kamer bleef. Hij weigerde. De zuster hield voet bij stuk, maar de dienstdoende 
gynaecoloog schoot te hulp: “Deze man is zo rustig, laat hem er toch bij.” En 
zo geschiedde. Na dit, naar huidige medisch-ethische maatstaven gemeten, 
tumultueuze begin van mijn leven, groeide ik in alle rust op in Hellendoorn. 
Vervolgens verhuisde ik, na het behalen van het VWO-examen (College Noet-
sele, Nijverdal) in 1989, naar Nijmegen voor de studie Bestuurs- en beleidswe-
tenschappen. Deze studie beviel maar matig. In de loop van het studiejaar be-
sloot ik te stoppen en het jaar daarop psychologie te gaan studeren. In januari 
1996 studeerde ik af in de richting Cultuur- en godsdienstpsychologie (thans 
Cultuur- en persoonlijkheidspsychologie). Er volgde een periode van vrijwil-
ligerswerk bij de Wetenschapswinkel (inmiddels opgeheven) van de Radboud 
Universiteit en enkele korte aanstellingen bij Cultuur- en godsdienstpsycholo-
gie. In 1998 verwierf ik een beurs van de Radboudstichting Wetenschappelijk 
Onderwijsfonds waarmee ik in de gelegenheid werd gesteld om een aanvul-
lend jaar Ethiek te gaan studeren aan de universiteiten van Tilburg en Nij-
megen. Aan het einde van dat studiejaar, in het voorjaar van 1999, kwam ik 
een vacature tegen voor een onderzoeker bij de afdeling Ethiek, Filosofie en 
Geschiedenis van de Geneeskunde (EFG) van het UMC St Radboud. Het project 
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was getiteld ‘Gezondheidszorg in een multiculturele samenleving’ en werd ge-
financierd door de Wetenschapswinkel. Ik solliciteerde, werd aangenomen en 
zette mijn eerste schreden in de medische ethiek. Eind 2000 werd het project 
afgerond met de publicatie van het rapport Colourful care. In het daarop vol-
gende jaar kreeg ik de gelegenheid uitvoerend onderzoeker te worden van het 
onderzoeksproject ‘Morele attitudevorming in de palliatieve zorgverlening’, 
dat volop in de race was voor een subsidie van NWO. Het project zou eveneens 
uitgevoerd worden bij de afdeling EFG. De subsidie werd toegekend en het 
onderzoek ging in de zomer van 2001 van start. Inmiddels is ook dat project 
afgerond. Het resultaat heeft u nu in handen. 
Gert Olthuis
Nijmegen, maart 2007
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- advertentie-
Vindt u dit proefschrift mooi vormgegeven?
Voor de inhoud bent u natuurlijk zelf verantwoordelijk …
… maar voor een goede vormgeving en drukwerkbegeleiding kunt u terecht bij
Bart Roelofs van Bartswerk Grafisch Ontwerp.
De vormgeving van een proefschrift is aan allerlei regels gebonden. Ik kan u helpen om 
tot een mooi en goed resultaat te komen door:
- een ontwerp te maken dat er aantrekkelijk uit ziet en aan de regels voldoet;
- de lay-out tot in de puntjes consequent uit te voeren;
- als contactpersoon met drukkerijen op te treden.
Vraag vrijblijvend informatie of een offerte aan:
Bartswerk Grafisch Ontwerp
Dommer van Poldersveldtweg 138
6523 DD Nijmegen
024-3602633
info@bartswerk.nl
www.bartswerk.nl
